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Abstract Hugo James Dobson 
JAPAN AND UNITED NATIONS PEACEKEEPING: 
FOREIGN POLICY FORMULATION IN THE POST-COLD WAR WORLD 
This thesis investigates Japan's contribution to United Nations (UN)-sponsored peacekeeping 
operations (UNPKO) by locating sources of activism and passivism in Japan's foreign 
policymaking process. In particular, it examines the influence of factors, such as Japan's 
traditional post-W.W.II commitment to pacifism, its relationships with the US and its East Asian 
neighbours, and the role of the UN. 
The introduction provides a broad overview of the remit of the thesis as well as clarifying 
its ontological commitments and justifying the topics offocus, Japan and the UN. 
Chapter One constructs a detailed theoretical approach to this topic by rejecting traditional 
realist, liberal, and Marxist interpretations of international politics and, instead, highlighting the 
study of norms in international society. 
Chapter Two centres on the topic of UN peacekeeping operations and explains how this 
practice has become a norm of international society. 
Chapter Three introduces the topic of Japan's foreign policy by examining traditional 
approaches and interpretations. It also utilises the approach outlined in Chapter One and 
examines Japan's contribution to PKO from the time of admission to the UN in 1956 through to 
the eve of the outbreak of the Second Gulf War. 
Chapter Four looks at Japan's response to the Second Gulf War from the financial 
contribution through to the legislation adopted to facilitate the despatch of the Self-Defence 
Forces (SDF). It demonstrates the initial power of traditional norms in shaping policy and how this 
changed with the rise of the influence of the UN. 
Chapter Five takes the first despatch of the SDF to Cambodia as its case study and 
reveals how the traditional norms of domestic-rooted pacifism and the opposition of East Asian 
nations to Japanese re-militarisation continued to be eroded. . .. '. 
Chapter Six looks at the most recent of the SDF's despatches to Mozambiqu~, Rwanda 
and the Golan Heights and demonstrates the continued influence of the US as well as the 
consolidated power of the UN, in contrast to the declining influence of pacifism and Japan's East 
Asian neighbours. 
Takin'g this empirical investigation into account, the conclusion reappraises the importance 
of norms in Japan's foreign policymaking process, and highlights the influence of the UN. 
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PREFACE 
I want to thank a multitude of people for their assistance in what has been a sometimes 
frustrating, but ultimately rewarding, experience. My supervisor in Sheffield, Professor Glenn 
Hook, deser'\fes the greatest credit for providing the inspiration, constructive criticism and 
deadlines that are so necessary to any postgraduate undertaking. Gratitude is also extended to 
everybody else at Sheffield, particularly Professor Ian Gow. In Japan, the late Professor Kamo 
Takehiko and Professor Takahashi Susumu of the University of Tokyo were kind enough to act 
as my sponsors and supervisors during the two years I have spent in Japan. In addition, I would 
like to thank Professor Kashiwagi Noboru, Wada Keiko and the Hise Garusu of the International 
Center for Comparative Law and Politics at the University of Tokyo for giving me the opportunity 
to come to Japan in the first place and then keeping me here. Finally, thanks to my 
contemporaries from Sheffield-Julie Gilson, Christopher Hughes, Ise Naoko and James 
Malcolm-for advice, encouragement and alcohol. If this dissertation proves to be of Jnterest or 
use to the reader, the credit belongs to them; if there are any errors in fact or interpretation, the 
fault is mine. 
Throughout this dissertation, Japanese names are given in their proper order, i.e. the 
surname first and the given name second. Long vowels are expressed in the form of a macron 
except in the case of 'Tokyo'. North American spelling, e.g. organization, minimize, etc., is 
maintained in citations from North American publications; otherwise, British spelling, e.g. 
organisation, minimise, etc., is observed. 
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AHG 
ARF 
ASDF 
ASEAN 
CIS 
CSBM 
CSCE 
DSp· 
DMZ 
EC 
ECOMOG 
ECOWAS 
EU 
JASDF 
JCP 
JOA 
JMSOF 
JSDF 
JSP 
LOP 
MFO 
MICIVH 
MINURSO 
MITI 
MNF 
MOFA 
MOF 
MOHA 
MOJ 
NACC' 
OAS 
OAU 
ONUC 
ONUCA 
ONUMOZ 
OUNSAl 
ONUVEH 
ONUVEN 
GLOSSARY 
Ad hoc Group on Co-operation in Peacekeeping (NACC) 
ASEAN Regional Forum 
Air Self-Defence Force 
Association of Southeast Asian Nations 
Commonwealth of Independent States 
Confidence and Security Building Measure 
Conference on Security and Co-operation in Europe 
Democratic Socialist Party 
Demilitarised Zone 
European Community 
ECOWAS Monitoring Group (in Liberia) 
Economic Organisation of West African States 
European Union 
Japan Air Self-Defence Forces 
Japan Communist Party (KyOsantO) 
Japan Defence Agency 
Japan Marine Self-Defence Forces 
Japan Self-Defence Forces 
Japan Socialist Party (ShakaitO) 
Liberal-Democratic Party (JiyOminshutO) 
Multinational Force and Observers (in Sinai) 
Mission Civile Intemationale en Haiti (International Civilian Mission to Haiti) 
UN Mission for the Referendum in Western Sahara 
Ministry of International Trade and Industry (Japan) 
Multinational Force in Haiti . 
Ministry of Foreign Affairs (Japan) 
Ministry of Finance (Japan) 
Ministry of Home Affairs (Japan) 
Ministry of Justice (Japan) . 
North Atlantic Co-operation Council 
Organisation of American States 
Organisation of African States 
Organisation des Nations Unies au Congo (UN Organisation in the Congo) 
Observadores de las Naciones Unidas en Centro-america (UN Observer 
Mission in Central America) 
UN Operation in Mozambique 
Mision de las Nacionas Unidas en EI Salvador (UN Observer Mission in 
EI Salvador) 
UN Mission to Verify the Election in Haiti 
Observadores de las Naciones Unidas para la Verificacion de las 
Elecciones en Nicaragua (UN Verification Mission for the Nicaraguan 
Elections in Europe) 
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OSCE 
PKO 
SDPJ 
UN 
UNAMIC 
UNAMIR 
UNAVEM 
UNCRO 
UNDOF 
UNEF 
UNFICYP 
UNGOMAP 
UNHCR 
UNIFIL 
UNIKOM 
UNPKO 
UNIPOM 
UNITAF 
UNMIH 
UNMOGIP 
UNOMIG 
UNOMIL 
UNOMSA 
UNOMUR 
UNOSOM 
UNPF 
UNPREDEP 
UNPROFOR 
UNSF 
UNTSO 
UNTAC 
UNTAG 
UNTEA 
UNTSO 
UNYOM 
WEU 
Organisation for Security and Co-operation in Europe 
Peacekeeping Operations 
Social Democratic Party of Japan (Nihon Shakaiminshut6) 
UN 
UN Advance Mission in Cambodia 
UN Assistance Mission for Rwanda 
UN Angola Verification Mission 
UN Confidence Restoration Operation in Croatia 
UN Disengagement Observer Force (in Syria) 
UN Emergency Force (in Israel and Egypt) 
UN Peacekeeping Force in Cyprus 
UN Good Office Mission in Afghanistan and Pakistan 
UN High Commissioner for Refugees 
UN Interim Force in Lebanon 
UN Iraq-Kuwait Observation Mission 
UN Peacekeeping Operations 
UN India-Pakistan Observation Mission 
Unified Task Force (in Somalia) 
UN Mission in Haiti . 
UN Military Observer Group in Lebanon 
UN Observer Mission in Georgia 
UN Observer Mission in Liberia 
UN Observer Mission in South Africa 
UN Observer Mission Uganda-Rwanda 
UN Operation in Somalia 
UN Peace Forces (incorporates after March 1995 UNPROFOR, UNCRO 
. and UNPREDEP) 
UN Preventive Deployment Force {in Macedonia} 
UN Protection Force (in the former Yugoslavia 1992-March 1995; from March 
1995 in Bosnia and Herzegovina) 
UN Security Force (in Irian Jaya) 
UN Truce Supervision Organisation 
UN Transitional Authority in Cambodia 
UN Transition Assistance Group (in Namibia) 
UN Transitional Executive Authority (in Irian Jaya) 
UN Truce Supervision Organisation (in Egyptllsrael/Lebanon/Syria) 
UN Yemen Observation Mission 
West European Union 
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INTRODUCTION 
THE REMIT OF THIS DISSERTATION 
The end of the Cold War has raised questions both within and outside Japan as to the future role 
it will play in international society. In the fields of Japanese foreign, security and defence policies, 
one of the most salient changes is the now legally permissible despatch abroad of the Japanese 
Self-Defence Forces (SDF) in a non-combat role under the aegis of United Nations 
peacekeeping operations (UNPKO). Due to legislation enacted in the wake of the Second Gulf 
War of 1991, Japan was able to contribute personnel for the first time to the United Nations 
Transitionary Authority in Cambodia (UNTAC) mission in September, 1992, and subsequently to 
missions in Mozambique (ONUMOZ), EI Salvador (ONUSAL), Rwanda (UNAMIR), and the Golan 
Heights (UNDOF). After ten years of minimal contributions of civilian personnel to UNPKO and 
nearly half a century of emphasis on purely economic contributions to the maintenance of the 
international system, this change is all the more remarkable. Equally, as seen in Diagram I, the 
attitude of the Japanese public towards SDF despatch has changed dramatically. There is a 
multitude of reasons for this state of affairs, both internal and external, and it is the purpose of 
this dissertation to investigate the various reasons for this change with particular emphasis being 
placed on the role that the UN has played in encouraging, constraining, and justifying Japan's 
watershed decision to expand its participation in UNPKO. The kinds of questions this dissertation 
will address include: what factors have influenced, encouraged and prohibited Japan's sudden 
UNPKO activity? How has Japan regarded the UN system and its PKO functions? What kind of 
role has the UN specifically played in legitimising the despatch of JSDF personnel? What kind of 
role can Japan play within UNPKO? 
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DIAGRAM J: CHANGES IN JAPANESE PUBLIC OPINION REGARDING 
THE DESPATCH OF THE SDF ON UN PEACEKEEPING OPERATIONS 
(Source: Takeishi, C., 'Japanese National Identity in Transition: Who Wants to Send the Military Abroad?', 
International Sociology, Vol. 11, No.2 (1996), p. 245). 
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WHY PEACEKEEPING?1 
, , 
The UN's increase in importance is one phenomenon of the post·Cold War period, especially as 
regards its PKO functions. However, as Charles Kegley has posited, the UN continues to suffer 
from certain weaknesses like the fear that it 'has become a captive of the strongest member at 
the moment, the United States.' In addition, there are criticisms' that a renewed UN will need 
more resources to fulfil increasing PKO commitments.2 Yet, as Anne-Marie Slaughter Burley and 
Carl Kaysen have written, 'over the second half of the 20th century the foundations of the 
existing norm of non-intervention have been shaken.... The proliferation of domestic 
insurgencies, rebellions and full-fledged civil wars has superimposed an image of domestic 
9 
implosion as a major challenge to the stability of the international system.'3 All of the thirty major 
armed conflicts fought in 1995 were intrastate wars.4 Addressing these conflicts and the post-war 
reconstruction of these nations is a major preoccupation of the international community and 
peacekeeping is often touted as the means by which to carry out these tasks. Furthermore, as 
Barry Blechman has observed, 'all people in other countries, and their governments, have not 
only the right, but the obligation, to intervene on behalf of both oppressed peoples and innocent 
bystand~rs.'5 In a world characterised by the extremities of political life with genocide and ethnic 
cleansing in Africa, Asia and Europe, Richard Falk is correct in stressing that the immediate task 
is to find 'the will and means to oppose those forms of extremism.'6 Therein lies the importance of 
peacekeeping specifically, and more broadly, the UN system, in addressing these various 
manifestation of disorder. In the first twenty-five years of its existence, the UN created twelve 
PKO. In contrast, as many have been created since 1989.7 Former UN Secretary-General 
Boutros-GhaJi has recognised the way in which these developments have propagated the 
expansion in the number and duties of PKO: '[tJhe world is being changed by powerful forces that 
no state, or even group of states, has the capacity to manage by itself.'B 
The development and refinement of peacekeeping techniques is one of the many methods 
which can be used to achieve the goal of 'resituating the sovereign state, making governments 
less responsive to the priorities of global market forces, and more receptive to the needs and 
aspirations of the peoples of the world, especially those who are most economically, socially, and 
politically deprived.'9 Michael Mandelbaum has stated that 'the world is ready for government, or 
rather it is ready for more international governance than ever before. But the UN is not a world 
government and it will not be one. The instruments of order are sovereign states.'10 I concur with 
Mandelbaum's assertion that sovereign states still count and world government under the UN is 
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an unlikely normative proposition, but will argue that international organisations can and do play 
a salient role in the promotion of multilateralism and can influence the behaviour of sovereign 
states. In this dissertation, the state under examination is Japan and the international 
organisation is the UN in the specific issue-area of peacekeeping. 
With the expansion of PKO both in number and nature, 'the UN has become the all-
purpose ambulance service for bleeding countries.'11 Yet trying to interpret these developments 
in the framework of international relations' (IR) theory, as Charles Kegley has done, reveals that 
'realism is fundamentally opposed to the idea of international organization."2 Realism (or, in its 
later variant, 'neo-realism'), the chief paradigm of IR, places emphasis on sovereign states as the 
main actors of world politiCS. Its rejection of the concept of global governance plays down or even 
denies any role for an international organisation like the UN and its peacekeeping functions. As a 
result, realism regards states as having to provide for their own security needs. However, as new 
strains of peacekeeping begin to question the once sacrosanct status of the nation-state and 
ignore national boundaries, the use of PKO is on the ascendance and the explanatory power of 
realism is on the wane.13 With the increasing relevance of PKO as a multilateral response to 
security matters, new explanatory models are the sine qua non for good social science. Thus, the 
underpinning threads of realism are slowly being unwoven and PKO is gaining acceptance as a 
valid multilateral method of providing security. The use of force as part of UNPKO comes to 
mind as the only justifiable exercise by states of military power in an interdependent post-Cold 
War world. It could be argued that, to a certain extent, PKO has become the new just war 
outlined centuries ago by St. Augustine and Hugo Grotius. Certainly, it is suited to the recent type 
of ethnic conflicts and unstable political situations that have emerged in the post-Cold War world, 
as well as having a proven record in the more traditional inter-state conflicts. Charles Kegley has 
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captured this spirit in stating that: 
The post-Cold War challenges scholars to resume the search for that hybrid combination of both 
realist and idealist concepts around which a neo-idealist paradigm might be organized, and attempt 
to construct, to borrow a phrase, a 'realism with a human face'. Because a concem for justice 
arguably would serve states' interest, should not this principle serve as a springboard for the 
redirection of theory building in the post-Cold War period?14 
THE RELEVANCE OF JAPAN 
A central question to any study in the field of area studies concerns the relevance of the nation or 
region under examination. In the case of Japan, it is possible to describe the remarkable 
development and economic growth of post-W.W.II Japan. However, this task has been 
undertaken ad nauseum in the literature pertaining to Japan-cutlining Japan's remarkable 
levels of GNP, status as largest creditor nation, etc.-and need not be repeated here. This is 
very much an upshot of the shock the West received with Japan's sudden growth in the 1960s 
and the vast amounts of wealth that accumulated thereafter in Tokyo.15 In other fields, however, 
it is not so widely expounded why Japan matters. After having justified the reasons for 
concentrating on PKO in the post-Cold War period, it is now necessary to shed light on the 
salience of Japan's experience, both generally in the field of security and foreign policy, and 
speCifically in the sub-field of peacekeeping. 
As David Williams has stated, 'in a way true of no Asian nation since the vigorous prime of 
the Ottoman Empire, Japan looms large today in the practical affairs and speculative cares of the 
contemporary Westerner.'16 Despite this attention, the Japanese experience of government, 
security and foreign policy has singularly failed to enter into the West's understanding. 
Japan is one of the only nations to have renounced its right to belligerency and the 
maintenance of an armed force with an explicit statement in its Peace Constitution of 1947.17 
Despite traditionally Western interpretations of pacifism based on Christian ethics, Japan has 
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demonstrated a commitment to pacifism based in society and rooted in the A-bomb attacks on 
Hiroshima and Nagasaki, the firebombing of Tokyo, and the reaction to the colonisation of East 
Asia by the Imperial Army. With a societal, not religious, basis for this noteworthy stance (no 
Western, Christian country, except for Costa Rica, has ever renounced violence as a state policy 
so explicitly), Japan is undeniably worthy of attention. 
There is an obvious gap in the literature addressing and evaluating sufficiently the 
contribution Japan can make to PKO as a war-renouncing nation, in addition to the contribution 
peacekeeping can make in the promotion of Japan's international policy. The Japanese 
experience of security in terms of its Peace Constitution and the respect it accords to both 
society and international organisations, especially the UN, should provide us with new ways in 
which to think about the practice and conceptualisation of peacekeeping, as well as the way we 
think about foreign policymaking and the role of non-traditional actors in this process. Japan can 
shed new light on Western ways of thinking about politics and unearth new centres of power, in 
line with the contention that 'one should study Japan to understand the totality of human 
experience, not because Japan is part of the whole, but because the Japanese example 
illuminates the whole.'18 Thus, recognising the Japanese political experience as something 
different from the Western political experience is crucial in differentiating between the subject and 
the object under observation, and how the two interact each other. As Japan is one of the few 
states in the WOrld, along with Costa Rica, to renounce its right of belligerency in constitutional 
terms, and its right of collective self-defence, as an interpretation of the constitution, the 
Japanese experience of peacekeeping is highly relevant. UNPKO now appears to be the issue 
that is the trigger for a reconsideration of Japan's position in and contribution to the international 
system, rather than the once dominate US-Japanese bilateral relationship. In a similar way to 
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Japan, Finland has suffered from restnctions to its military posture resulting from its action in 
W.W.II. However, it has carved out a role for itself as one of the world's leading peacekeepers.19 
Thus, UNPKO has been used by certain elements in Japanese society as the justifying factor for 
a new military role for Japan. 
In this way, Japan is examined because of its capabilities, rather than because it is there .. 
Thus, this dissertation is classified as falling into the work of what Williams has called the 'miracle 
men' (studying Japan because it is important), rather than the work of the Everest-ites (studying 
Japan because it is there), in an attempt to locate the foundations of Japan's post-Cold War 
foreign policy.20 As a result, the Japan-shaped hole in the discourse of Western IR can be filled in 
and thinking space can be opened up in the mainstream of Western IR theory. 
THE STRUCTURE OF THIS DISSERTATION < • 
Traditionally analyses of Japan's foreign, security and defence policy have been concerned 
chiefly with the bilateral relationship between Japan and the United States (US) and, ergo, an 
imbalance, with too much focus upon inter-state relations, has deve/oped. The relationship 
between the Japanese state and society has been chiefly ignored, and furthermore so has the 
influence of international organisations in framing and guiding Japanese foreign policy.21 These 
links will be the focus of this dissertation with the objective of addreSSing a related gap in the 
literature and enhancing our understanding of both the influence the UN possesses in the post-
Cold War world and the way in which Japanese foreign policy is shaped in this new era. 
The first three chapters of the dissertation will highlight the theoretical debates regarding 
both the role of international organisations in international politics and the foreign policymaking 
process in Japan. Chapter One (Approach) will outline the traditional approaches to Japan's 
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relationship with the UN, its PKO policy and multilateralism before proceeding to describe, 
differentiate, and justify the particular normative approach adopted to the questions raised above. 
Concrete criteria of measuring changes in these internal (pacifism) and external (the US, the UN 
and East Asian nations) norms will be explained. With this approach in mind, Chapter Two 
(UNPKO) will discuss the rise in the profile of the UN with the end of the Cold War, and in 
particular the increase in importance of its peacekeeping functions as a norm of the international 
community. This analysis will refer to the classic debate in the discipline of intemational relations 
between neo-realists and nee-liberals regarding the importance of international organisations, in 
addition to making reference to the Marxist contribution. Suffice it to say at this point that neo-
realists minimise the role of international organisations in favour of the nation-state, whereas 
neo-liberals outline various roles that they can play in influencing state behaviour. Chapter Three 
(Japanese Foreign Policy and UNPKO, 1956 to 1990) will address the factors that influence 
Japan's foreign policy firstly by tracing the traditional interpretations centring on the triumvirate of 
the Liberal Democratic Party (LOP), the bureaucracy, and big business. While not dismissing the 
contribution the traditional interpretation has made to our understanding of Japanese foreign 
policy, this dissertation will seek to supplement this body of knowledge with an analysis of other 
factors, particularly the role of the UN. Traditional interpretations of Japan's partiCipation in the 
UN system have revolved around Japan's relations with the United States and the subordinate 
position Japan has played within this bilateral relationship; as will be seen, foreign pressure or 
gaiatsu is the main theme of this debate. Altematively, many have highlighted the internal 
workings of the Japanese body politic positing the ruling triad model of the LOP, the business 
elite and the bureaucracy mentioned above. Keeping in mind the broader debate between nee-
realists and neo-liberals, I will highlight and evaluate the role and the particular input of the UN as 
15 
the embodiment of an international institution, and UNPKO as a norm of international society into 
an evolving multilateral foreign policymaking process in Japan. This chapter will also provide a 
broad historical overview of the role in PKO played by Japan from admission to the UN in 1956 
through to the Gulf Crisis of 1990, examining the factors that resulted in Japan's minimal and 
predominantly financial contribution. This is not in order to locate a single point of origin for the 
discourse, but rather to understand how the debate has been nurtured, framed and limited for 
those involved with the issue today. Thus, the past and the present can be scrutinised, and 
! ~, 
issues questioned that may have been omitted from the traditional debates, thereby opening up 
thinking space and liberating this dissertation from 'the slavery of habit.'22 In this case we can 
also locate influences for change which existed before the end of the Cold War and, thus, 
Critically examine what kind of intemal and extemal factors have been predominately responsible 
. for the change in Japan's UNPKO policy. 
The remaining three chapters will deal with the empirical evidence and will address the exact 
nature of Japan's participation in UNPKO through a series of case studies. Chapter Four (The 
Second Gulf War) will take the Second Gulf War of 1991 as its theme in an attempt to 
understand which factors were influential in the resulting legislation that heralded the change in 
Japan's PKO policy. Chapter Five (Cambodia) will deal with Japan's first despatch of the SDF to 
Cambodia in 1991 examining the various problems that were encountered and the solutions 
found. The final case study in Chapter Six (Subsequent Missions) will bring the debate up to date 
by looking at the subsequent missions in which Japan has participated including Mozambique, 
Rwanda, EI Salvador and the Golan Heights. The dissertation will conclude by highlighting 
various empirical and theoretical points that have arisen through the case studies as to the 
influence of certain norms and especially the role the UN and its peacekeeping functions have 
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played in framing Japan's UNPKO policy. In short, by examining and measuring the role of norms 
in constraining and also promoting Japan's PKO policy, this dissertation will demonstrate the 
essential importance and utility of norms in analysing Japan's foreign policy formulation, in 
addition to highlighting specifically which norms are on the ascendance and which are in decline 
in terms of influence. A simple table of findings can 'be given at this point and will be referred to 
again in the following chapters and the Conclusion: 
TASlE I: TYPOLOGY OF CHANGING NORMS 
PACifiSM .us UN EAII AlilAN NAIlQtJli 
SE!~IEICITY Medium-Falling High Medium-Rising Medium-Falling 
DUBAllLlIY Medium High High Medium 
CONCORDANCE Medium High High Medium 
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CHAPTER ONE: ApPROACH 
After having introduced the topic under investigation in the previous chapter, let us now tum to 
how I will examine the role of norms in encouraging and constraining Japan's UNPKO policy 
formulation. In this chapter I will outline firstly the traditional approaches to the discipline of 
international relations with two objectives in mind: on the one hand, to comprehend how the 
discourse of international relations has evolved in the late twentieth century and how it has 
attempted to interpret the practice of peacekeeping; and, on the other hand, to provide an 
understanding of the mainstream approaches to the study of IR, which can provide a 
juxtaposition for the different approach I will outline thereafter. After introducing the 'mainstream', 
I will relate these paradigms to Japan's UNPKO policy and demonstrate how, although they may 
provide us with a degree of understanding, they fail to provide us with the necessary new 
perspectives in the light of the end of the Cold War. Then, I will outline my own approach 
discussing the analysis of ideas, norms and language in international relations before continuing 
to relate this approach to the topic of Japan's UNPKO in order to highlight the advantages of the 
approach adopted here. 
TRADITIONAL AppROACHes: Neo-REALISM 
Neo-realism has been criticised as it 'addresses only questions, the answers to which we already 
knew, and its explanatory framework is the night in which all cows are black.'1 However, it would 
be a mistake to underestimate its influence, for, as Berthold Brecht stated, 'realism is an issue 
not only for literature: it is a major political, philosophical and practical issue and must be handled 
and explained as such-as a matter of general human interest.'2 In other words, to ignore the 
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realist paradigm, whether or not one agrees or disagrees with it, is to ignore not only the central 
discourse of world politics, but modem philosophy. 
Political realist thinking can be traced back to the writings of Thucydides on the 
Peloponnesian Wars (c. 400 B.C.). However, realism in modem IR is usually associated with the 
writings of Hans Morgenthau. In response to the attacks of liberals in the 19705, Kenneth Waltz 
attempted to reinvigorate realism by shifting attention to the structure of the international system 
and neo-realism was bam. It is questionable and outside of the remit of this dissertation as to 
how much of an improvement neo-realism was upon traditional realism.3 Thus, for the sake of 
clarity the more recent term neo-realism will be employed in this study. Both variants of realism 
would regard Japan's broader relations with the UN, and more specifICally Japan's PKO policy, in 
the light of three major assumptions: first, that the state is the main actor in world politics; 
second, that the use of force is effective in realising policy goals; and third, that a hierarchy of 
issues exists in world politics with the security field constituting 'high politics' and economic, 
social and ecological issues constituting 'low politics'. Thus, the world of the nee-realist scholar is 
one characterised by the constant threat of violence and, due to this constant threat, political 
integration and co-operation are seen only to exist for as long as it Is deemed to be in a state's 
interest. It is believed that the world has always been like this and will continue to be so; 
ultimately, there is little chance of change and progress within the neo-realist paradigm" History 
Is cyclical and characterised either by conflict and war, or peace through a balancing of nation-
states. States remain. thus, reluctant to enter into a system of dependence upon other states; the 
desire to maintain autonomy is paramount and, as a result, the influence of international 
institutions will be minimal. States are seen as billiard balls, impenetrable and self-governing, 
impervious to external stimuli-state sovereignty is of the utmost importance to the nee-realist. 
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Thus, if one were to adopt a neo-realist approach, Japan's UNPKO policy would be 
relegated to the lower reaches of the hierarchy of issues in the international system. Atthough 
touching upon security issues, realists would not regard UNPKO as providing a justifiable 
alternative to the ability of states to provide for their own security. In the case of a war-
renouncing state like Japan, where its ability to provide for its own security has been 
circumscribed, realists look for an explanation of Japan's recent activism in PKO to the most 
powerful state in the international system, i.e. the US. Thus, Japan's increased contribution is 
regarded as a result of US pressure in the bilateral relationship between these two nation-
states.5 Furthermore, the emphasis is placed on security, power, and nation-states at the 
expense of civil society, the role of international organisations, ideas and norms. Nee-realists 
would regard these latter factors as of minor importance with public opinion mattering little to 
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pOlitiCians, international organisations being merely tools of the most powerful nation-state, and 
ideas and norms being an unambiguous representation of an objective reality. For example, 
Charles Pentland describes a scene where various international organisations represent nothing 
more than a variety of tools which the state inspects and assesses for utility in achieving its 
objectives. The more powerful the state, the more easily it can utilise an international 
organisation for its own ends. Smaller states, which cannot act freely in a unilateral manner, 
need to form coalitions in order to make the most of international organisations. Whatever the 
level of multilateral co-operation, the end goal is to accumulate power.6 The traditional realist 
model of international relations does not place any onus on international organisations as 
important actors in the intemational system. Instead, their actions are seen to be curtailed by the 
pOlicies and actions of states. International organisations 'are simply tools of state policy and one 
more arena in which they can compete for power. Under the realist view of the world, the UN is 
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not considered a form, or an emerging form, of world government with the authority to act as 
such. Rather, the UN is a product of the states that make up the international system and is a 
forum for these states to pursue their own interests. Thus, the UN is constrained by states' 
interests and will invariably fail in its attempts to influence state behaviour. As Samuel Huntington 
has stated, '".every international organization at some point finds itself limited by the very 
principle which gives it being.'T Huntington has little time for the argument that international 
organisations can behave as autonomous entities separate from the controls of the nation-state, 
contending that, as the number of international organisations increases, so will the need for 
these organisations to access the resources of particular nations and, thus, the consent of the 
nation-state to enter its borders will become of ultimate importance. 
In seeking to improve on the realist model, a critique of the realist model must highlight the 
vagueness of the concept of defining power, the over-attention paid to states as the central 
actors of international politics, the lack of attention paid to economics and other 'softer' aspects 
of power such as norms, and the weakness of the idea that states are always in competition with 
each other and will only co-operate in order to maximise their own national interest in the short 
term. Thus, to nee-realist eyes, the Japanese government's recent activism in UNPKO is an 
attempt at self-promotion in the international system, with one eye on a permanent seat in. the 
UN Security Council (UNSC).8 Moreover, with the emphasis placed upon the primacy of state 
sovereignty, UNPKO is seen as a practice at the beck and call of nation-states. If a nation-state 
wishes to secure the withdrawal of an operation it can always refer to its sovereign borders. 
UNPKO is, in this light, a practice both brought to life and curtailed by the nation-state. 
Morgenthau wrote that 'it is the testing of this rational hypotheSis against the actual facts 
and their consequences that gives meaning to the facts of international politics and makes a 
21 
/ 
theory of politics possible'.9 With this in mind it appears that when Morgenthau first advocated 
political realism the theory was sustainable and was highly applicable to the competitive 
interstate system in the immediate post-war era being concomitant with US aims 'of [exorcising] 
isolationism, fiustifying] a permanent and global involvement in world affairs, [and rationalising] 
the accumulation of power'.10 However, in the post-Cold War world it no longer provides a 
useable map, if it ever did, of a world in which the bipolar confrontation of the Cold War has 
ended, ethnic and religious conflicts proliferate, and security threats begin to encompass issues 
such as drugs, AIDS and global warming which have no respect for abstract national boundaries. 
Looking at the post-Cold War world through neo-realist eyes, one would expect the number of 
international organisations to decrease as their functional utility declines with the end of 
superpower conflict. However, it is adaptation which seems to characterise how international 
organisations have fared after the end of the Cold War, with their continued existence and even 
an increase in number. Neo-reaJism appears to have a limited memory and fails to allow for such 
types of change. UNPKO is a practice that has changed drastically over the years, increasing its 
remit and influence. In a world of declining sovereignty, UNPKO, as will be seen in Chapter Two, 
is becoming a norm of international society at the expense of the realist principle of state 
sovereignty. Thus,· the argument put forward that Japan's relations with the UN and its 
peacekeeping policy are merely adjuncts to the US-Japan bilateral relationship is similarly called 
into question. Both generally and specifically, neo-realism provides only a limited view of the 
world; thus, further approaches are necessary to produce a more multi-faceted understanding of 
any issue. 
Neo-realism, as Cox has stated, has failed to allow for change because it deals with a 
frozen world and does not understand the way in which this image came about as it has failed to 
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reflect upon these processes. Interests and identity are exogenously given and never 
investigated. In light of the failure of realism to even adequately explain the collapse of the Soviet 
Union and the global disorder that followed, where the mainstream went wrong needs to be 
located, addressed, and thinking space created. This can be achieved by moving into a post-
positivist field, characterised by the shibboleth: 'reality is never a complete, entirely coherent 
Uthing", accessible to universalized, essentialist or totalized understandings of it.'11 Thus, 
limitations in understanding and bias must be recognised before embarking on a research 
programme. In addition, the traditiona', positivist assertion that all social science research must 
be value-free is questioned. Having recognised that there are doubts about what the world refers 
to, then the non-existence of value judgements must also be questioned. Ideas and research 
must be articulated by language, which is heavily laden with values. Essentially, it is impossible 
to divorce the subject from the object and value judgements are unavoidable; it is a matter of 
recognising bias in the early stages of any research programme.12 With a move away from the 
traditional realist approaches to security we can begin to look upon the UN and its peacekeeping 
functions as a revitalised and important tool in creating security in the post-Cold War. Moreover, 
Japan can be considered for the contribution it can make to international society in tenns 
different to a realist-type billiard ball. 
TRADITIONAL APPROACHES: Nee-LIBERALISM '. 
Neo-liberalism is a critique of the neo-realist view of international relations questioning the neo-
realist explanation of the way in which the international system works. With this in mind, it is 
necessary to highlight the major characteristics of neo-liberalism and demonstrate how it has 
claimed the greater explanatory power and set forth a rnuch more useable map of the world.13 
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Nevertheless, scholars have attacked nee-liberalism for its lack of conceptual clarity and 
weakness in defining its terms.14 Thus, I will explain what J understand by the term neo-liberalism 
and how it has attempted to tackle the shortcomings of neo-realism. 
Neo-liberalism has sought to debunk neo-realism by highlighting the importance of non-
state actors, like international organisations. In addition, it stresses the inability of the state to 
make its own decisions as it is forced to compromise with a series of governmental and non-
governmental, transnational and domestic actors. This has created a system of interdependence 
that, as David Baldwin demonstrated, has a long and rich history helping to underpin its 
conceptual clarity. Baldwin draws upon the work of Machiavelli, Montesquieu and Rousseau to 
illustrate the earliest conceptions of interdependence defined in terms of reliance upon others, 
and, as a result, in terms of the benefits that a state would rather not spurn by reneging upon a 
relationship. In the twentieth century, writers such as Ramsay Muir and Sir Norman Angell 
continued this idea of reliance by painting a world where states would join together to achieve a 
greater good, like peace or economic growth, transcending their own parochial national 
interests. 15 Keohane and ' Nye expanded this predominantly mercantilist definition of 
interdependence and applied it to other areas of international politics, and, importantly, not 
necessarily in the positive sense of mutual benefit; an arms race could be cited as an example of 
a relationship where the risks of breaking the relationship are too costly to take. 16 Thus, it would 
seem that interdependence is a term which is normatively understood as not only encapsulating 
a degree of sensitivity to other actors in the international system, but also in terms of a 
dependence on a certain relationship which, being too damaging to break, tends to persiSt.17 
Being affected by external forces does not adequately describe the commonly held definitions of 
interdependence. The onus needs to be placed on the vulnerability each state suffers from and 
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the inability to face the consequences of severing a certain relationship. This line of argument 
follows the thinking of functional studies of international organisations which presumes that 
international organisations are given life by the interests of states converging over certain 
issues.18 
Keohane and Nye contend that non-state actors have become as much a part of foreign 
relations as they are a part of domestic relations.19 In other words, these new actors have begun 
to blur the link between domestic and foreign policy: their actions make foreign governments 
more sensitive to each other. Government interests have had to become' broader and 
transnational organisations have begun to make decisions that exert a global influence. Domestic 
policy in one state has, thus, begun to exert an effect on the domestic policy of other states. The 
variety of channels of communication and the global nature of communications reinforces this 
characteristic. As a result, the sovereign state, the central tenet of realism, has been slowly 
eroded so that it could be said that 'the actual content of sovereignty, the scope of the authority 
of the states can exercise, has always been contested.'20 Furthermore, theorists of 
interdependence stress that there is no hierarchy among issues, and thus, military and security 
issues are consequently not the dominant issues. The important point to emphasise here is that 
the dichotomy between domestic and foreign policy is obscured.21 This demonstrates how issues 
tend to overlap and cannot be addressed fully without reference to other issues. Thus, 
governance is rendered a much more problematic exercise. Keohane and Nye quote the energy 
crises of the 1970s which were categorised as a foreign policy problem; however, the 
introduction of fuel tax domestically could not have hoped to solve this problem due to the 
opposition of interest groups at home. Thus, in pluralist democracies, a domestic consensus may 
be necessary before foreign policy problems can be addressed. The consequences for theory 
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are that the divide between domestic and foreign policy is bridged. Third, when a situation of 
interdependence exists the importance of military power for the solution of a range of problems 
will diminish; ecological problems, say, would not be solved by military means. In a number of 
areas the use of the military' to find a solution has been precluded and the fear of military attack 
has declined generally. Furthermore, it is reasoned that the processes of agenda-setting will 
become more prominent. In the traditional realist model the agenda was decided by relevance to 
the central issue of security interests, and the· balance of power; non-military issues would only 
be regarded in terms of how far they affected the balance of power. Keohane and Nye claim that 
due to the non-centrality of military issues, the dichotomy between domestic and foreign policies 
will be bridged, and with the growing role of international organisations, the agenda of 
international politiCS will become more varied. Dornestic pressure groups will be able to bring 
internal problems to a global arena. States and other actors will gain access to a variety of 
international organisations in which they can campaign for an issue to be raised. Economic 
issues will no longer occupy the position of low politics they once possessed in relation to the 
high politics of security. Simply put, the once dominant issue of military security, and how states 
deal with it, is no longer an accurate reflection of global concerns. 
With all this mind, it would be fair to say that for a number of reasons neo-liberalism is a 
progression beyond neo-realism in looking at the issue of Japan's PKO policy. Neo-liberalism 
stresses the abandonment of a hierarchy of issues, and thus, peacekeeping can be regarded as 
a relevant issue. Furthermore, with the distance put between neo-Iiberalism and neo-realism on 
the issue of the centrality of the nation-state, and the importance of dependence as opposed to 
self-sufficiency, other influential actors, like civil society and international organisations, can 
begin to be included in an analysis. Thus, an analysis of Japan's PKO policy can move away 
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from a dependence on the bilateral relationship with the US and the dominance of the Japanese 
state. In this way, previously ignored factors, like public opinion, international organisations, etc., 
become worthy of attention. Furthermore, peacekeeping is no longer regarded purely as a 
makeshift security palliative, as realists would stress, but rather as including economic, 
humanitarian, and social aspects which states contribute to, not solely out of a desire to promote 
their own narrow interests, but rather due to an obligation and dependence on others to 
collectively provide security. Ergo, the neo-liberal approach is drawing closer to fleshing out the 
initially narrow picture of the world provided by the neo-realist approach. 
However, the debate between the neo-realist and neo-liberal schools is not a zero-sum 
game; it is not a matter of states losing power so as to be rendered into a condition of obscurity. 
There has been a noticeable synthesis in interpreting international relations resulting in what Ole 
Wmver has termed the 'neo-neo synthesis', where states 'are sharing powers-including 
political, social, and security roles at the core of sovereignty-with businesses, with international 
organizations, and with a multitude of citizen groups.'22 Neo-liberalism does not ~im to be a 
critique of political realism and ' ... replace one oversimplification with another', but rather, ' ... to 
encourage a differentiated approach that distinguishes among dimensions and areas of world 
politics.'23 Thus, neo-liberalism still accepts the nation-state as the primary actor in the anarchy of 
world politics. It may recognise norms of international behaviour, but only regulative norms of 
behaviour and not constitutive ones, a definition that will be discussed later. Thus, it fails to 
explain change. To understand what is occurring in current Japanese security and foreign policy 
it is necessary to pay attention to how new norms are constructed and how Japanese society 
and government respond to them. Moreover, as far as neo-liberalism is concerned, international 
institutions can be useful in faCilitating co-operation between states, but only within the confines 
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of the anarchical state system usually labelled the 'Westphalian System'. Thus, the two 
mainstream approaches of international relations are time-bound to this historical period and, as 
Zacher and Sutton have suggested, 'Westphalian realism' and 'Westphalian liberalism' are more 
suitable terms for these two main discourses of IR theory.24 . 
TRADITIONAL ApPROACHES: MARXISM 
There is no single representative work dealing with the Marxist contribution to IR theory, chiefly 
because the work of Karl Marx never dealt directly with international relations as a discipline. 
Some scholars have even argued that the works of Marx have nothing useful to say about the 
field of international affairs.25 Marx took labour, production and inter-class relationships, not inter-
state relations, as the focus of his work. Thus, its raises the question of what possible use 
Marxist theory could provide in deepening our understanding of international relations. A 
traditional Marxist contribution is limited to the core concept of the production of wealth and profit. 
Because of this, in certain fields, especially those related to security, it is difficult to see the way 
in which Marxist theory can be related to UNPKO and what benefits this would result in. Marxism 
can certainly throw light upon the source of various conflicts being addressed by ~he UN and its 
peacekeeping activities. For example, Marxist theory would point to the global reorganisation of 
production, class struggle and the pOlitical vacuum resulting from the withdrawal of an imperialist 
power as sources of disorder in the Third Wor/d. Equally, the foreign policy of China and the 
once influential superpower, the Soviet Union, can be understood to a degree, in addition to the 
ideological motives of various revolutionary groups in Africa, Asia and latin America which were, 
and are, all informed by Marxist thought. In this light, UNPKO would be regarded as a tool of the 
Western, capitalist states deSigned for the promotion and domination of Western values of 
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democracy and the free market economy throughout the globe. One Japanese scholar, 
Watanabe Osamu, has interpreted Japan's activity in UNPKO (as well as its ODA contributions) 
as a step in the development of Japanese neo-imperialism. Watanabe argues that the strength of 
internal pacifism in Japan against the overseas despatch of the SDF created one of the strongest 
set of 'shackles' (ashikase) against the growth of Japanese neo-imperialism. Moreover, the 
adoption of the PKO Law is regarded as an important first step in the progression of Japanese 
militarisation, the incremental revision of the Peace Constitution and the attainment of a 
permanent seat on the UNSC. Under the name of 'international contribution' the Japanese 
government is seen to be implementing a neo-imperialist policy in line with the bilateral 
relationship with the US.26 
However, many of the fields in which a Marxist contribution can be discerned are time-locked in a 
Cold War scenario. A Marxist approach may be useful for examining the sources of regional 
conflicts; however, the origins and causes of the conflicts to which Japan has despatched its 
SDF peacekeepers are solely on the margins of this study. Moreover, with the collapse of the 
Soviet Union and the rise of a free market economy, the role of these two Marxist-adhering 
superpowers is thrown into question. Watanabe's study attempts to make radical approaches 
more relevant to the post-Cold War wond, yet is IimHed in the range of actors it takes into 
consideration and falls into the neo-realist trap of being overtly state-centred. In understanding 
what factors have affected Japan (or any state) in its decision to expand its UNPKO commitment, 
Marxism sits very much on the periphery, highlighting in the case of Japan only the influence of 
the US and the power triumvirate of the LOP, big business and the bureaucracy as the essential 
policymaking forces. No consideration of international and civil society and their respective norms 
is embraced beyond the concepts of production, profit and class exploitation. 
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However, some analysts have argued that Marxist theory is highly relevant to the study of 
international affairs. By investigating the nature of the state, causes of peace and war, and when 
coupled with Lenin's later and highly Marxist-influenced work on imperialism and other recent 
neo-Marxist work, a case has been made that Marxism can provide us with a degree of 
understanding.27 Three areas of Marxist contribution do exist in dependency/development 
studies, 'world-systems' approaches, and Gramscian interpretations of international pOlitical 
economy and hegemony which pay attention to non-material aspects of power, like ideology, 
which is linked to the study of norms and values.28 Especially the work of Robert Cox in critical 
theory has been influenced by the writings of Marx and Gramsci. By using Gramsci's ideas of the 
hegemony of the bourgeoisie over both government circles and civil society in capitalist systems, 
an analogy can be drawn with the dominance of Westem, capitalist states in international society 
and the use of UNPKO as a tool in propagating this hegemony-in keeping with a traditional 
Marxist interpretation. Yet, the more interesting concept is that due to this hegemony, a definition ' 
of the state which is limited to govemment organs is too limited and needs to include civil society. 
By civil society, Cox's interpretation of Grarnsci is referring to 'all the institutions which helped to 
create in people certain modes of behaviour and expectations consistent with the hegemonic 
social order.'29 Thus, an analysis of Japan's UNPKO policy can begin to move away from the 
state-centred 'neo-neo synthesis' of. 'Westphalian realism' and 'Westphalian liberalism'. 
Moreover, Cox has placed the emphasis on historicism more so than neo-realism or neo-
liberalism and has taken the idea of production and widened its meaning to include 'the 
production of ideas, of intersubjective meanings, of norms, of institutions and social practices ... 
Looking at production is simply a way of thinking about collective life, not a reference to the 
'economic' sectors of human activity.'30 Thus, ideas, not just material resources, are credited with 
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possessing power and international organisations are regarded as assisting 'the process through 
which the institutions of hegemony and its ideology are developed.'31 In this way, a Coxian 
analysis builds upon traditional Marxist theories by including ideas, norms and international 
organisations. 
, 
Only with Cox's Gramscian-influenced work on ontology and intersubjectively understood 
meanings has Marxist international relations theory broken free of the historical structure of the 
Cold War and can an original and specific approach for studying Japan's UNPKO policy be 
constructed. Cox outlined three broad categories of forces: material capabilities (a necessary 
recognition of the role of the neo-realist debate); ideas; and institutions. These latter two will be 
taken up in the following section which outlines my own approach referring to the decline of 
sovereignty, the importance of intemational organisations, and the norms of international society 
and how they are understood. 
BEYOND POSITMSM TO CONSTRUCTMSM 
As has been demonstrated, there are gaps in the neo-realist and neo-liberal approaches that 
render them, in their traditional forms, both essentially rational, positivist approaches. They fail to 
envisage a role for international institutions beyond the facilitation of co-operation within the 
primary national interest of the state. Furthermore, change is ignored within these approaches: 
change both in institutional arrangements, the international system, and the language, values 
and norms which frame the possibility of co-operation in international politics. Under the tenets of 
realism the likelihood of International organisations playing an effective role in the international 
system seems unlikely when the constant struggle for power motivated by self-interest is 
highlighted. In a world characterised by interdependence, the opportunity for international 
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organisations to play an integral role is somewhat improved; as described above, the creation of 
transnational interest groups can also encourage this development. Intemational organisations 
have demonstrated the ability to highlight a problem in a given country, like the 1974 World Food 
Conference did in the United States, or the 1992 Global Summit in Rio de Janiero. Moreover, 
international organisations have brought government representatives together who would not 
normally come into contact with each other, and non-governmental organisations can take the 
opportunity to form transnational understandings. In this way international organisations become 
an arena for fostering cooperation. International organisations can, in fact, affect state strategies 
by serving as templates for policy choices as demonstrated by the nations of Eastern Europe 
altering their economic policies in order to gain admittance to the Organisation for Economic Co-
operation and Development (OECD). As a result of the multiplicity of channels, the traditional 
view that national boundaries will limit the scope of a problem no longer seems to be an accurate 
assessment. On the societal and governmental level, co-operation among certain groups across 
national boundaries can be witnessed as a means to politicise a given problem. With a 
multiplicity of channels and a variety of actors connecting each other, the role of centralised 
government becomes complicated when it attempts to give the impression of a united front 
against a foreign threat. Simply put, the once all-powerful state has been eclipsed from below on 
the societal level, and from above on the transnational level. . 
Connected to this, Robert Cox has argued that with a high quality of leadership, 
international organisations can play an important role by creating their own power base 
independent of nation-states. Cox describes an interdependent world where states join together 
because of higher interests which only co-operation through international organisations can 
promote. Under Article IX of the UN Charter the Secretary-General is given the power to bring 
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matters to the attention of the Security Council. Thus, an administrator with ebullience will 
promote the work of the UN as Oag Hammarskjold did in the field of PKO and Albert Thomas did 
with the International Labour Organisation (ILO). An international organisation led by an 
executive head can raise issues when states are incapable or disinclined to advocate a certain 
line, as was the case with the United Nations Emergency Force (UNEF-I) in the Suez Crisis.32 
Personal initiative can create a new consensus or norm of behaviour, as Hammarskjold did with 
UNPKO by concentrating on that particular issue and leaving other issues to under-secretaries. 
Cox argues that a true sense of independence and an international viewpoint can be fostered 
among the civil service of an international organisation with the promotion of long-term 
employment and the avoidance of short-term secondment. Thus, any loyalties to their nationality 
can be overcome. Moreover, the way in which an executive head organises the b~reaucracy 
around him, the political connections he/she possesses with various member states, (purely 
diplomatic leaders are regarded as inclined to failure), the utilisation not only of governmental 
links, but links with domestic pressure groups, can aI/ influence the executive head's ability to 
succeed. His role as a consensus builder can be a central factor if the confidence of the major 
powers is maintained.33 Thus, in a number of ways institutional arrangements can prevail over 
the neo-realist paradigm of inter-state Co-operation. First, the neo-realist distribution of power is 
ignored and the previously disenfranchised are accredited voting power equal to that of major 
powers. Second, international institutions can link different issues ensuring state participation in 
issues that may not necessarily be of interest.34 Third, international institutions can provide 'road 
maps' as alternative policy directions or in the' absence of policy options all together, thus 
providing international institutions with a utility value.35 
~ The independence of international organisations is not only a recent phenomenon but can 
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be seen in the example of the British India Company that cultivated the whole of the Indian sub-
continent independently of the British government. The important thing about the current state of 
affairs is the scope and number of these actors. More capable institutions are needed by states 
to address issues and in the post-Cold War world they have been created but with uncertainty as 
to where the borderline between state sovereignty and the remit of international organisations is 
drawn. Some have been given the power to ignore state sovereignty, like the International 
Atomic Energy Agency and the Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, Production, 
Stockpiling and Use of Chemical Weapons and their Destruction. The process has been 
described in the following terms: 
. States do co-operate regularly because it is in their own best interest to do so. Co-operation 
pertaining to particular sets of issues in international relations is reinforced by social learning and 
results in specific patterns of behaviour and institutions. International institutions are significant to 
states' actions because they provide for an exchange of information and help define areas of 
common interest; they thus affect the formulation of security concepts and strategies. A growing 
specialization among units resulting from a division of labour leads to increasing participation of 
states in joint decision-making and contributes to a transformation of the atomistic structure of the 
international system.36 
Multilatera/ist approaches are proliferating with the end of the Cold War. Nobody would 
dispute the power and potential of the European Union. Even institutions like NATO, the object of 
much concern, have redefined their role in the post-Cold War world. John Ruggie makes the 
historical analysiS by contending that not since the Congress of Vie~na in 1815 has the_ world 
been so keen to repudiate the system of bilateral alliances and forge ahead with multilateral 
approaches to a variety of issues.37 The Asia-Pacific region, which traditionally had been the 
exception to this rule, has begun to embrace this new multilateralism with a wide proliferation, 
reinvigoration and expansion of organisations. from the Association of Southeast Asian Nations 
(ASEAN) to the ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF) to Asia Pacific Economic Co-operation (APEC). 
Although behind the progress seen in Europe, multilateral approaches have begun to take root in 
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Asia. 
This is because intemational organisations often act as the venue for an increased amount 
of transgovernmental policy co-ordination. Face-to-face communications between similar organs 
of different governments can be promoted within the aegis of an international organisation and, 
as a result, affect the resultant policy. Thus, the seemingly closed walls of a state's decision-
making processes are broken down and external influences are endowed with the power to 
influence policy. This functionalist view of intemational institutions stresses that they are able to 
'reduce the transaction costs of bargaining, provide opportunities for looking at issues, inform 
govemments about their altematives, and mitigate fears of uncoordinated or exploitative 
strategies by stabiliSing expectations about future state behaviour. '38 If allowed to develop over a 
certain time frame this contact can produce a sense of collegiality amongst policymakers, 
SCientists, engineers, etc., of various nations. Keohane and Nye contend that, eventually, these 
groups behave with more deference to their respective group's interests than their respective 
nation's interests. Negotiations between members of the British Commonwealth and relations 
between the US and Canada are put forward as examples of communities that have reached a 
certain level of mutual understanding.39 Within these areas transgovemmental elite networks can 
be seen at work created through friendship, common interests, etc., and to a certain degree 
influencing or easing the bargaining processes between each group. To the die-hard political 
realist, this level of co-operation among transgovemmental elites within the forum of an 
intemational organisation may be regarded as something approaching disloyalty or treason. 
As intemational organisations facilitate the growth of these transgovemmental elite 
networks, the area that these organisations decide to promote decides in which areas this kind of 
transgovemmental activity can proceed. Thus, through agenda setting, intemational 
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organisations can influence how these elites regard certain issues. From this perspective, we 
perhaps need to look at Cox's examination of the role of the executive head of a given 
international organisation in deciding which areas are to be tackled. Yet, Keohane and Nye 
contend that even without the existence of an active executive head, purely by being arenas of 
discussion, international organisations can promote potential transnational coalitions. 
However, this role is primarily passive. Keohane and Nye elaborated subsequently a more 
active role for international organisations based on the assumption that the bureaucracy of an 
international organisation has its own interests and objectives. Moreover, an international 
organisation can play the role of a catalyst in a given issue area, thereby acquiring the qualities 
of an independent actor alongside nation-states (in no way do Keohane and Nye regard the 
relationship between international organisations and the nation-state as a zero-sum game, rather 
they can co..axist quite harmoniously). As opposed to the minimal role of international 
organisations where they foster transgovernmental co-operation, in this' case, a government 
agency can work with an international organisation to achieve certain ends, as the Chilean 
conservatives did with the International Monetary Fund (IMF) to reinforce their domestic position. 
Keohane defined these institutions as 'persistent and connected sets of rules, formal and 
informal, that prescribe behavioural roles, constrain activity, and shape expectations.'40 The 
number of actors within this institution imbues it with the quality of multilateralism-'a belief that 
activities ought to be organised on a universal (or at least many-sided) basis for a relevant group, 
i '1'- i 
, , . 
such as the group of democracies. '41 Multilateralisrn requires states to forego their immediate 
national interest and attempt to co-operate with each other for the realisation of a common good. 
This study will concentrate on the achievement of the public good of peace through the 
peacekeeping functions of the UN. 
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In addition, if the element of time is introduced and repeated interaction is fostered, the 
purely functional approach to international organisations is overcome as states view national 
interest with a more long-term focus. Thus, in this study I seek to adopt an approach that does 
not regard international organisations in such functional terms. Oran Young has noted that co-
operation within institutions leads to 'identifiable social conventions' which can limit or encourage 
state behaviour.42 Donald Puchala and Raymond Hopkins state that co-operation and interaction 
can produce patterns and routines which, as Young concurs, can result in future expectations.43 
Cognitive approaches take this line of argument further and overcome the limits of functionalism. 
In, addition to functional terms, within a cognitive approach the practises of international 
organisations and the intersubjective meanings and norms they produce are emphasised rather 
than the utility value of an international organisation. March and Olsen have suggested that: 
the core notion is that life is organized by sets of shared meanings and practices that come to be 
taken as a given for a long time. Political actors act and organize themselves in accordance with 
rules and practices that are socially constructed, publicly known, anticipated and accepted. Actions 
of individuals and collectivities occur within these shared meanings and practises, which can be 
called institutions and identities."" 
Institutions can learn from their past and adapt through a process of trial and error. In 
order to understand how these inter-subjective meanings are constructed, it is crucial to examine 
the history, language used and the ideas posited in the creation of institutions and norms of 
behaviour. As Keohane has noted, '[i]nstitutions are often discussed without being defined at all, 
or after having been defined only casually.'45 In this neo-institutionalist view. institutions are 
defined in functionalist terms which tends to shed light on international institutions and 
organisations for the benefits they can provide for states. However. while recogniSing that states 
still retain importance as units of analysis· in any paradigm of international relations, I intend to 
move beyond functionalism and suggest that international institutions, especially when 
manifested as international organisations, can behave independently of states and influence 
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state behaviour. Thus, I will regard the relationship between Japan and the UN within a systems 
approach regarding each as a unit, or a collectivity as defined by James Rosenau: 
Collectivities are actors in the sense that they have authority structures and other mechanisms for 
sustaining the coherence and co-ordination of their members and for maintaining the boundary 
distinction between themselves and their environments, which makes it possible for their leaders to 
undertake actions on behalf of their memberships.46 
Thus, I seek below to demonstrate that the UN and Japan can both be regarded as 
Rosenau's collectivities, thus making any analysis of a bilateral relationship between the two as 
unproblematic as the analysis of the relationship between two sovereign states. 
Moving on from having justified the importance of international organisations, it is 
important to outline the related decline of the state as the main actor of world politiCS. In contrast 
to the realist paradigm, the decline· of the sovereign state in being able to provide security is 
evident over recent decades.· According to Falk, 'there are no commanding ideas of a 
progressive or humanist character coming forth in these various forms of deterioratlon.'47 What is 
meant by sovereignty often remains unclear. Bodin has been cited as one of the first thinkers to 
address the idea of sovereignty making a similar distinction to that of later writers in recognising 
an internal and international sovereignty.48 A date for the appearance of state sovereignty, 
commonly referred to as the Westphalian system, is often given in the literature as 1648 with the 
end of the Thirty Years War. Effective control in a geopolitical space by a Single source of 
governance to control law and order and maintain the loyalty of civil society has been the 
traditional interpretation of sovereignty since that time.49 For the purposes of this study the idea 
of sovereignty is regarded as a doctrine that posits that 'within a given territory there should be a 
single identifiable source of political rule, internally supreme, and with no legally sanctioned 
external overlord.'50 Thus, for the purpose of analysis, sovereign states are self-determined with 
no responsibility to an alternative authority either inside or outside the geographical space the 
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state occupies. By assuming the traditionally realist interpretation of sovereignty the extent to 
which it has been eroded will come into relief. 
Tangible characteristics of a sovereign state may exist like territory, peoples, government, 
etc., yet these are variables that may be marginalised and even disappear and reappear, as 
seen in the case of Poland, Scotland or the Baltic States. Thus, sovereignty can be regarded 
legally, and thus far there is little doubt that state sovereignty is intact today de jure. Traditional 
approaches to sovereignty have stressed that 'a sovereign state is able to show actual political 
supremacy in its own territory', as well as 'actual independence from outside authority, not the 
supremacy of one state over others, but the independence of one state from its peers. '51 Thus, in 
addition to legal recognition of sovereignty, a state must be in a position to assert its power 
capabilities and behave with a measure of independence. Hedley Bull described intemal 
supremacy in terms of 'states assert, in relation to territory and population, what may be called 
internal sovereignty, which means supremacy over all other authorities within that region and 
population.'52 Raymond Aron described sovereignty as the 'supreme power of deciding in a case 
of crisis,' thus, stressing the concept of national interest and the govemment's autonomy to 
pursue this interest. 53 " , 
This is, however, an extreme case of independent sovereignty. To be totally free of 
external influence is, in an interdependent world, difficult to achieve. As Inis Claude has noted, 
'for all their vaunted sovereignty and independence, states are rarely lone wolves, intent upon 
going their own way heedless of the actions of other states.'54 Thus, the direction for a synthesis 
of the neo-realistlneo-liberal debate lies in recognising the importance of the state as the main 
actor in international politics, but denying it the full independent political authority that traditional 
realists have accorded it in the face of domestic and external challenges to its power: 
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A helpful way of envisaging sovereignty is as a kind of shell encasing an appropriately qualified state, 
but not of the sort which helps to provide a barrier to penetration. For what sovereignty entails is not a 
physical but a constitutional shell. It expresses the lack of any links that place the state concerned in 
a subordinate constitutional position to another state. 55 • 
Thus, sovereignty is only regarded rigidly as a legal term and sovereign states are what 
are recognised by international law as the main actors. Politically, sovereignty is, however, not 
such a rigid term and can allow for influence from various sources to affect policy outcomes and 
promoting multilateral solutions to transnational problems. 
Not only, according to many, has the territoriality of states come to mean less, the ability of 
politicians and bureaucrats to address the problems of any state have been greatly 
circumscribed by a number of factors ranging from popular disillusionment with government to 
the globalisation of the world economy. As a result, the idea of the sovereign state, the central 
tenet of realism, has been slowly eroded so that it could be said that 'the actual content of 
sovereignty, the scope of the authority states can exercise, has always been contested.'56 In 
contrast to this decline in state authority, there are a number of WOUld-be states attempting to 
realise their potential in statehood. This only contributes to the weakening of the state as can be 
seen in the case of Britain's control over Northern Ireland and Scotland, or Italy's control over 
Lombardy in the North and the Mafia in the South.57 It is evident that 'authority in society .. .is 
legitimately exercised by agents other than states, and has come to be freely acknowledged by 
those who are subject to it,' and 'no one really believes that recognition of their sovereignty is 
.4 
more than a courteous pretence.'58 The duties that the sovereign state had been charged with 
over the centuries, like providing national security, controlling currency eXChange, and 
maintaining law and order are these days tasks assigned to transnational institutions or domestic 
organisations, like the Big Six accountancy firms, telecommunication companies, and the Mafia, 
Chinese triads and other gangster organisations of the world which either ignore or avoid the 
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authority of the traditional, realist..cJefined state. 59 Relating this to Japan's UNPKO contribution, 
this dissertation will examine how the state's ability to take the crucial security decisions of 
participation, scale of contribution, right to withdraw, etc., has been constrained by non-state 
actors on the societal level, and by international institutions on the transnational level. In 
achieving accurate interpretations of international relations, new actors need to be taken into 
account. UNPKO can be seen to be promoting this same process. The principal actors in 
international politics are those that can make and pursue their demands effectively and it has 
traditionally been regarded that sovereign states can do this, 'the state is the principal actor in 
that the nature of the state and the pattern of relations among states are the most important 
determinants of the character of international relations at any given moment.'60 This study seeks 
to question the above assertion and supplement its definition in the face of the erosion of state 
, , "-
sovereignty by adding international organisations, and particularly the UN, to the list of actors 
that can articulate and realise their objectives with efficacy. With the end of the Cold War, 'the UN 
and its proxy armies intervene in Somalia, Iraq, and Rwanda for humanitarian reasons and apply 
sanctions on Haiti on behalf of democracy, all without the consent of local parties.'61 The 
European Union is probably the most evident challenge to the order put in place by the Treaty of 
Westphalia, although the UN's humanitarian and peacekeeping activities are also contributing to 
the weakening of the Westphalian paradigm. By becoming an international norm, UNPKO can 
. ~ , ' , 
contribute to the erosion of the 'closed walls' of a state's decision-making process and external 
, . 
influences can shape resultant policy. 
However, the state system remains intact for the time being. As Falk states, 'this is 
. certainly not the end of history, but it is a weakening, at the very least, of the geographical glue 
that gave modern statecraft its coherence.'62 Thus, there is an urgent need to make th~ state \ 
,~Q 
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more receptive to the transnational concerns and security threats of the post-Cold War world: 
What we are seeing then are the ouUines of a global system that has been in the making since the 
French Revolution; in the process, the principal defining element of it - the autonomous nation-state 
. - is losing its privileged position ... the map is changing, literally and metaphorically. 53 
In the case of Japan we can see a rigid state structure having to address these demands 
for a multilateral slant to its foreign policy in reaction to the UN's call for pro-activism (see 
Appendix" for the way in which Japanese political cartoonists have portrayed this phenomenon). 
. . 
As regards ontological commitments, I recognise the existence of norms in an international 
SOCiety and the Japanese state as a policymaking unit that will be investigated in Chapters Two 
and Three respectively. The definition of norms in international society revolves around the UN 
system and its peacekeeping functions as a standard of behaviour and manifestation of this 
society's will. According to Martin Wight, on the one hand, domestic society is characterised by 
central authority; on the other hand, international society is characterised by the lack of rigid 
governance.64 However, this is made up for by the rules and institutions, like the UN, which 
provide the rules and authority for the conduct of international affairs.65 A hard-nosed neo-realist 
argument would be that international society does not exist. The emphasis on the anarchical 
nature of international politics precludes any existence of the construct of mutual rules and 
institutions. In reply to this thinking tYPified by Hobbes, Grotius stressed an international society 
distinct from domestic society recognising common interests and the need for rules of behaviour. 
States do not 'exist in a political or cultural vacuum, but in continuous political relations with one 
another:S6 As Hedley Bull states: 
A group of states, conscious of certain common interests and common values form a society in the 
sense that they conceive themselves to be bound by a common set of rules in their relations with 
one another, and share in the working of common institutions.S7 
It must remembered that these rules are not the first principles naturally given, but are 
socially constructed by the states whose behaviour they affect. This is the contribution of social 
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constructivism and needs to be kept in mind in tracing the sources of the rules and institutions of 
an international society.68 However, the point which should not be forgotten is that, 'the allegedly 
inescapable consequences of anarchy have been largely overcome by a complex web of 
institutions that govern interstate relations and provide mechanisms for resolving disputes ... a 
community of nations has evolved that is bound together by the realisation that national security 
and economic well-being require close co-operationand co-ordination with other democratic and 
democratising states.'69 Thus, an international society differs from an international system in the 
level of its co-operation and development. An international system may be characterised by 
" 
discord or dominance and an appropriate synonym, as investigated later in this chapter, would 
be a structure, or an environment. Obviously, a system is required before an international society 
can develop and encourage multilateral co-operation. 70 
In line with the introduction to this dissertation, I will undertake an examination of the 'soft' 
.• 
side of Japan's participation in UNPKO by looking at norms, ideas and language in the UNPKO 
debate in Japan in order to trace the external (international society) and internal pressures (civil 
society) on Japan to make some form of contribution.71 David Baldwin has stated, 'the elucidation 
of the language of political science is by no means an idle exercise in semantics, but in many 
instances a most effective way to solve substantive problems of political research.'72 In this 
-. 
dissertation I seek to analyse the way norms, ideas and language play a role within the debate 
on Japan's participation in UNPKO in order to come to a clearer understanding of Japan's 
international relations and commitment to multilateralisrn. 
This can be achieved chiefly by examining the way in which peacekeeping as a practice 
and in definition has changed and how this, as a norm, has affected other norms within Japan as 
to what kind of actions are permiSSible, or not, under the Japanese Constitution. As will be 
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demonstrated in the following chapter, UNPKO is not mentioned in the UN Charter and was very 
much a makeshift attempt to address instability in a col/ective security system crippled by 
bipolarity; thus, what peacekeeping entails has changed over the decades and can be regarded 
as a regime of sorts if we take Stephen Krasner's definition: 
Regimes can be defined as sets of implicit or explicit principles. norms. rules. and decision-making 
procedures around which actors' expectations converge in a given area of intemational relations. 
PrinCiples are beliefs of fact. causation, and rectitude. Norms are standards of behaviour defined in 
terms of rights and obligaflons. Rules are specific prescriptions or prOScriptions for action. Decision-
making procedures are prevailing practices for making and implementing col/ective choice.73 
Under this definition of norms and principles, UNPKO (as well as pacifism, the relationship 
, < , 
with the US and the attitudes of East Asian nations) becomes a sign of commitment to 
international society from a particular state and a belief in collective decisions. Principles are the 
standards of behaviour that can be attributed to a policy decision and will naturally come into 
conflict with each other. Norms are the basic actions expected of actors in a given issue area. 
Norms of behaviour often consist of a trade-off between principles and, although bereft of any 
legal weight, contain a moral weight. As Friedrich Kratochwil and John Ruggie have shown 
'norms need not exist in a formal sense in order to be valid.' as actors can 'exhibit principles and 
shared understanding of desirable and acceptable forms of social behaviour.'74 Peter 
< , 
Katzenstein has suggested that traditional approaches to the study of Japan's security and 
foreign policies, 'as variants of realist political thought, both seek causal primacy in the structure 
of the intemational state system and the putative effects of that structure on rational state actors 
seeking to maximize their relative gains in the intemational system.'75 To overcome these heavily 
positivist approaches, one different area of,scholarship can be ~rawn upon in the form of the role 
of norms and ideas in. foreign policy-the normative context that shapes acceptable and 
appropriate behaviour which is, of course, shaped by historical change. Thus, what is acceptable 
is altered by time, and consequently interests are affected. What kind of contribution states 
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should make to the international community is a norm that has changed over time. For example, 
it is not a rule, or a legal norm, that states have to contribute to UNPKO. However, I will seek to 
demonstrate in Chapter Two that UNPKO has attained recently the status of a political and social 
norm in the international system. In later chapters I will illustrate how Japan has interpreted and 
reacted to this norm and accommodated it with other internal and external norms. 
Culture is a difficult concept to define and, thus, problems exist in utilising the concept as 
an analytical tool. However, these difficulties can be overcome by examining the constituent 
parts of culture, i.e. norms. Norms can be regarded in both a legal, political and social light: 
legally, in the interpretations that have been developed regarding Japan's international 
contribution based on the Constitution. Politically and socially, they can be seen in developments 
which have encouraged or circumscribed the kind of contribution Japan can make. These 
phenomena can be seen in Nakasone's militarisation of the 1980s on the political side, and in the 
changes in public opinion and awareness of the UN, peacekeeping, and an international 
contribution on the societal side. Another important norm may be seen in anti-militarism which 
has become entrenched in Japanese society since the end of W.W.II, firstly under the hegemony 
of the US and then independently, described by some as a process of 'Hollandisation' as they 
became suspicious of military issues and international engagements.76 Rather than looking to the 
international system or the most powerful state within the system, as a nee-realist would, to 
explain Japan's increased UNPKO contribution, a great deal can also be learnt by paying 
attention to these norms of behaviour both within Japan and international society.77 As Peter 
Katzenstein has stated, 'most variants of structural analysis take as a given the normative 
context in which actors define their interests. But structures often embody different norms and 
thus give different cues as to what actors should do. And in times of change when structures 
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crumble, these norms acquire particular importance in informing actors about the interests they 
hold. '78 Especially when the Cold War structure of bipolarity has collapsed it is necessary to look 
to new areas for original viewpoints, one of which is the study of norms and ideas, regarding 
them not as given, but as affected by historical change and informing the decisions of politicians . 
and bureaucrats. 
What is meant by the word 'norm'? Keohane and Goldstein have conceptualised 'ideas' 
(which, for the purposes of this study, approximate to norms) into three categories-world views, 
principled beliefs, and causal beliefs. World views are regarded as having the widest impact on 
human thought and action. Examples of world views are religions, capitalism or communism, and 
state sovereignty. Principled beliefs are defined as normative ideas that are worthy of realisation. 
Examples of which include, human rights, abolition of slavery, and environmentalism. In these 
cases moral authority is important and can be regarded in the same way as military and 
economic capabilities as a power source.79 ft is argued that decolonisation was a prinCipled idea 
that had an enormous impact on foreign policies of both the states fighting for and resisting 
dec%nisation. The final category, causal beliefs, is defined as a consensus amongst policy 
elites to address a specific problem, like pollution or financial regulation. The necessity to 
address a particular problem ensures that decision-making elites will congregate, discuss. and 
introduce policies to alleviate ~ese problems. Of course, these three categories can overlap as 
is the case with UNPKO. As will be demonstrated, peacekeeping is both a prinCipled idea in that 
it was created in the post-W.W.II world in the spirit of the UN Charter to eradicate war and 
poverty. and also a causal belief in so far as it was an attempt, in the face of the East-West stand 
off, to navigate the UN through the inertia that resulted from unprincipled use of the veto in the 
Security Council.so In the next chapter, I seek to identify the development of the idea of 
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peacekeeping as both a principled and a causal belief, and in later chapters, examine the 
causality of the idea of peacekeeping in the foreign policymaking process in Japan, keeping in 
mind Keohane and Goldstein's assertions that 'ideas serve as road maps', 'ideas contribute to 
outcomes in the absence of a unique equilibrium', and 'ideas embedded in institutions specify 
policy in the absence of innovation'.B1 
Language, equally, can contribute to the legitimatisation of the existence and meaning of 
an intemational organisation. Language can subconsciously determine the choices and actions 
of actors: 'not only do intersubjective meanings supply the context that renders practices and 
actions intelligible, they are also enmeshed inseparably with these practices and actions. 
, 
Fundamentally, intersubjective meanings are constitutive of social practices.'B2 Intemational 
organisations can become dominated by a certain use of language and since 'once particular 
arguments and phraseology have been deployed, a rhetoricsl momentum is generated which 
operates independently to affect policieS.'83 As Victor Hugo declared, 'there is nothing more 
powerful than an idea whose time has come.'84 I seek to examine the power of the idea of the 
UN, and PKO in particular, in influencing Japanese foreign policy. 
Peter Katzenstein has defined norms as: 
social facts whose effects are potentially as Important in shaping poHtics as raw power or rational 
calculation. Norms typically inform how political actors define what they want to accomplish. Norms 
help ccrordlnate political conflicts (regulative norms). and they shape political conflicts over identity 
(constitutive norms). To disregard norms and take the interests of actors as given Is thus to short-
circuit an important aspect of the politics and policy of national security.as 
, 
The way in which these regulative (constraining) and constitutive (encouraging) norms not 
only affect the decisions of actors, but also how they are created and prevail over competing 
norms is one area of investigation of this study in understanding how the changes in Japan's 
contribution to UNPKO were realised. After all, norms are not static or permanent. The Japanese 
government and society went through a soul-searching process in the 19405 and 1950s which 
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contributed to defining the norms that would influence its behaviour with militarism and 
imperialism losing and pacifism and economism winning. They can, however, be accorded some 
degree of permanence through institutionalisation in law, through historical practise or be 
manifested in the form of organisations. Axelrod regards norms as standards of behaviour which, 
if not lived up to, can result in some kind of punishment.86 However, this is a purely restrictive 
definition of norms. As Friedrich Kratochwil has stated: 
We understand the international arena largely negatively, i.e., in terms of the "lack" of binding legal 
norms, of central institutions, of a sovereign will, etc .... the conceptual links between order, law, and 
special institutions remain largely unexamined even for domestic affairs.87 
Kratochwil's work, however, is chiefly concerned with contract making in a legal context 
and the norms that involve the language of promising. However, theoretical commitments in this 
discipline can hold for foreign and security policies: 
Norms are therefore not only "guidance devices', but also the means which allow people to pursue 
goals, share meanings, communicate with each other, criticize assertions, and justify actions.88 
Fiorini makes the insightful comparison with genetiC science. Norms and genes are 
instructional units which influence the behaviour of the host organisms.89 Norms can be of an 
either domestic or international nature, but both influence the construction of interests and 
identities. The emphasiS is upon how actors ought to behave in reference to a legitimate not 
enforced ideal. Constitutive and regulatory norms have been mentioned as types of norms, but a 
sense of shame or 'ought-to-ness' should be added to these two variants which can encourage 
and constrain behaviour. As Finnemore has stated, norms are 'a set of intersubjective 
understandings readily apparent to actors that make behavioural claims on those actors. '90 
Norms can be assessed for their robustness based on the principles cited in Table I, gauged in 
, 
the Conclusion and outlined by Jeffrey Legro: specificity, how well defined and understood a 
norm is; durability, how long a norm has been recognised; and concordance, how wi?ely 
48 
recognised a norm is. In this way we can comprehend how norms have changed, which are 
rising and which, internal or external, are in decline in the case of Japan's reaction to UNPKO.91 
This approach can overcome the traditional preoccupation with the material power of 
nation-states, by centring upon how norms influence the discourse. A fine example of this failure 
of the realist paradigm and the importance of ideas and norms has been posited by Keohane: 
As Stalin once famously quipped about the pope: "How many divisions does he have?" Not only did 
an unarmed Pope John Paul II prevail in the contest for the allegiance of the Polish people, but after 
the fai/ed 1991 coup against Gorbachev, the Soviet Union broke into its constituent parts on the basis 
of the norm of ·self-determination " rather than along lines of military power or economic resources. 92 
This approach a/so improves on neo-liberal approaches by examining the identity of actors 
which is ignored within both the traditional'neo-neo' approaches. Political actors are a great deal 
more than unitary actors engaged in making decisions, political institutions can create, confirm, 
and modify interpretations of reality, 'through politics, individuals develop their identities.' Thus, 
by examining norms and identities, the weaknesses of a positivist approach can be overcome. 
The emphasis is placed upon improving our analytical tools. Traditional interpretations are not to 
be rejected out of hand as redundant in the act of throwing the neo:.realist and neo-liberalist 
babies out with the Cold War theoretical bathwater. The way to improve our understanding of 
. . 
Japan and world politics is to supplement the understanding the traditional approaches have 
provided with the cOncepts of different fields, like culture, history and norms, while still leaving 
room for structural and situational determinants of state behaviour. In this way the following 
problem can be addressed: .. 
The end of the Cold War has reminded us onCe more how naked the emperor of International 
relations theory is. It will take more than a couple of tailors to provide the necessary clothes.93 
As well as placing the emphasis upon ideas into my analYSiS, I also seek to add the 
elements of time and the evolution of ideas in order to explain how norms can change over time. 
Using Fiorini's genetic analogy, the ideas of inheritance and competition are important. Like 
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genes, norms can pass on information and identities previously constructed to the current actor 
in question. From parent to child the information that decides how an actor will generally behave 
is transmitted. Equally, as genes often become warped, die and are replaced, so norms are in 
competition with each other and differing norms can rise and fall over time. This study will 
investigate how domestic norms like pacifism have come into competition with international 
norms of behaviour like UNPKO. Norms, like mutant genes, find processes by which they can 
gain permanency and survive. Incorrect information can enter the mainstream and become 
institutionalised driving out the original correct information. A good analogy is the tendency 
people have to misquote: For example, the quotation 'old wine in new bottles' is current but 
incorrect; the original quotation from the Bible is 'new skins', not bottles, obvious for anybody 
aware of their bible but regularly misquoted to the extent that the original citation has almost 
been 10st.94 Once manifested as policy over time, norms (like genes or misquotations) become 
institutionalised and written into laws and continue to exert influence on policy, even if the fashion 
of a particular idea has passed. Without an understanding of how a norm, like partiCipation in 
UNPKO, became institutionalised, a researcher may, in behaviouralist terms, identify purely the 
distribution of power and come to under-developed or even incorrect conclusions about a policy 
decision. In order to understand how norms became dominant, it is necessary to respect the 
process of evolution and be a good historian. This is why I seek to include in Chapter Four an 
outline of Japan's participation in UN peacekeeping operations from the date of Japan's 
admission to the UN and include an analysis of the Second Gulf War. Although not officially a UN 
peacekeeping operation, any understanding of subsequent contribution to UNPKO cannot be 
understood without a knowledge of the policymaking process at this time· and the 
institutionalisation of PKO contribution in Japanese law. This approach is highly compatible with 
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liberal institutionalist thinking which stresses the creation of international norms through the 
interaction of belief systems and the exchange of ideas, rather than the material capabilities of 
states which can also be mediated by belief systems and perceptions. 
SUMMARY . 
Using an approach centring on the examination of norms of behaviour and the role of 
international organisations as described above, I seek in the following chapters to trace the 
processes leading to Japan's participation in UNPKO with particular attention on the internal and 
external pressures upon the Japanese government. Furthermore, the clash of norms will be 
examined as the new norm of peacekeeping finds accommodation with the traditional norms in 
Japan of pacifism and non-involvement in overseas military operations. 
This study also attempts to understand change in policymaking by incorporating other 
aspects of critical theory in addition to ideas and norms. Critical theory contends that 'all social 
reality is subject to historical change, that a normative discourse of understandings and values 
entails corresponding practices, and that social theory must include interpretation and dialectical 
critique.'95 In essence, this means rejecting the ahistoric, overly scientific methods of traditional 
realist international relations theorists in favour of concentrating on changes in practices, ideas 
and discourses over time. This stands in direct contrast to nee-realism, which as demonstrated in 
this chapter, ignores the possibility of social change: the 'texture of international politics remains 
highly consistent, patterns recur, events repeat themselves endlessly,'96 Neo-realists explain this 
lack of change due to the structure of anarchy using rational, naturalist scientific methods to 
discover the 'objective' laws of international politics; these 'objective' laws being that the state is 
the main unit of analysis and that it behaves in a self-interested manner tending to balance 
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against other states. Critical theorists, however, reject these positivist laws and stress change: 
'the term human nature ... does not refer to an original or an eternal or a uniform essence ... new 
individual and social qualities arise in the historical process.'97 
Thus, 'social events have to be understood by a critical analysis which interprets the 
discourse of norms and understandings that motivate people to act, which explains the material 
relations of production, and which undertakes a dialectical study of social contradictions in order 
to emancipate people for a life of freedom and reason.'98 In this way, rather than through a neo-
realist structure, critical theorists see the world as a community organised by shared, inter-
subjective norms, values and understandings which shape human action. For example, state 
sovereignty is a social discourse dating back to around the time of the Treaty of Westphalia, 
which has been restated time and time again to make the principle of the nation-state 
inviolable.99 Implied in this is that people possess the ability to change the world for the better by 
promoting the discussion of new norms like peace, co-operation and exchange as opposed to 
the realist paradigm of war, the balance of power and survival. Furthermore, any research design 
must include an explanation of how these norms come about, through what kind of discursive 
practices, and in this way neo-realists are culpable for simply taking the sovereign state as a 
given without tracing the discourse that led to its acceptance and institutionalisation. 
Relating this to the Japanese state, it has been stated that, in economic terms, the Japanese 
government lacks a strong commitment to international norms, with no sense of 'internationalism 
in the sense of identification with the international community, with human kind as a whole, that 
is, rather than in the senSe of good neighbour punctiliousness about international obligations-
which the Japanese have in good measure.'100 This dissertation looks at the international (the 
UN and its peacekeeping functions) and domestic norms (pacifism/anti-militarism) which have 
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shaped the debate on Japan's contribution to UNPKO in the post-Cold War world in order to 
overcome this disparity in the over-attention paid to the sovereign state. 
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CHAPTER Two: UNPKO 
Having outlined in the previous chapter my approach to the topic of Japan's participation in 
UNPKO, I will in this chapter now address the growing importance of both the UN and its 
peacekeeping functions in the wake of the Cold War's end and the extent to which UNPKO has 
become a behavioural norm in international society. In order to achieve this, I will outline firstly 
the growth in the remit and importance of UN duties that has occurred in recent years. Next, I will 
demonstrate the way in which the practice and meaning of peacekeeping has changed in its 
development in becoming a norm since its inception and through the changes in the international 
system during the 19805 and 19905, gaining in specificity, durability and concordance. Having 
highlighted what role the UN and its peacekeeping functions can play in the international system, 
the following chapters will illustrate how the conceptualisations of the UN . and UNPKO in this 
chapter, Originating both inside and outside of Japan, have affected the debate regarding 
Japan's partiCipation in the Second Gulf War, Cambodia and subsequent missions-the case 
studies later in this dissertation. Simply put, this chapter will illustrate how since 1945 the concept 
and practice of peacekeeping has become a standard of behaviour in international society by 
means of a necessary historical review. '.' 
THE IMPORTANCE OF THE UN 
Before establishing the importance of the norm of peacekeeping, it is necessary to establish the 
relevance of the sponsor of so many of these operations, the UN. The post-W.W.II expansion of 
global ,mechanisms of governance is remarkable. Especially Non-Governmental Organisations 
(NGOs) have expanded in number as people seek to construct institutions to govern rules in their 
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daily lives. The UN is one of the more salient examples of this as seen in the rise in the number 
of UN members from 51 in 1945 to 184 fifty years later-demonstrating the extent of its 
acceptance/concordance in international politics. As James Rosenau has stated, 'the world is 
undergoing a remarkable expansion of collective power.'1 Certainly this growth has been uneven; 
however, 'global governance in the twenty-first century may not take the form of a single world 
order, but it will not be lacking in activities designed to bring a measure of coherence to the 
multitude of jurisdictions that is proliferating on the world stage.'2 The reasons behind this are 
manifold and extend from the collapse of the East-West confrontation, to the globalisation of the 
world economy, to the rise of transnational problems like AIDS, drugs, and pollution. Situations 
where the conditions described above are realised include those where certain services, the 
creation of accepted norms, rule observance, and the settlement of disputes are· required.3 
Furthermore as the number of actors (usually nation-states) increases, as happened with the 
processes of decolonisation and with the end of the Cold War, the need for communication 
increases. Thus, the steady rise in importance of international organisations as arenas for states 
to come together is a result. Moreover, with the desire of these newly created states to develop 
economically and politically, the need for a system-wide actor with the resources and know-how 
to devise, implement, and realise programmes of development. settlement of disputes etc., will 
increase. Four revolutions in thinking which have influenced the scope of the UN's work have 
been discerned: first, the move from laissez-faire thinking to a welfare state-based philosophy; 
second, the discrediting of imperialism and colonialism and the shift to decolonisation; third, the 
rise in concem for environmental issues; and fourth, the promotion of gender issues.4 
Pentland also argues that intemational organisations can modify state behaviour by 
altering the complexion of the international system and also as fully qualified independent actors. 
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In a similar vein to Keohane and Nye's argument, Pentland suggests that international 
organisations acting as fora for debate and channels for communication can modify state 
behaviour. The international system needs to be multipolar, in order to provide states with the 
freedom to manoeuvre, as tight bipolarity ensures that states are tied to one of the two 
superpowers. Power needs to be distributed evenly amongst states so as not to produce one 
. . 
superpower that can dominate the international organisation. As a result, transgovernmental 
interaction should be high and will facilitate the growth in the role of the' international 
organisation. Pentland further argues that international organisations can possess the ability to 
restrain states and in this regard function as independent actors alongside the nation-state. 
However, their numbers are few. Autonomy, in this sense, is a result of a 'process whereby an 
initially dependent system, created by a set of actors representing different and relatively 
independent nation-states, acquires the capabilities of a self-maintaining and self-steering 
system, one whose course cannot be predicted solely from knowledge of its environment.'s The 
. . 
ability of international organisations to do this is dependent upon the resources available-cash, 
, 
expertise, arms, bureaucrats, etc. The most obvious proof of the UN's firm identity and specificity 
. , 
as an actor and a norm is in the existence of its budgets, its own flag, buildings, legislature, civil 
" . 
service, etc. Recently, with the appointment of Kofi Annan as UN Secretary-General, a concerted 
~ \ . . " 
effort can be discerned to sharpen the axe of the UN in preparation for the 21st century. The 
revamping of the organisation seeks to combine departments and cut 1,000 jobs in an attempt to 
ensure efficiency, save money, and curry favour with the US in order to cajole it into fulfilling its 
payment duties.6 
The UN's new-found relevance can be seen in one typical newspaper report stating that: 
In a resolution approved 10 to 3, the Council dismissed Iraq's objection that Its handling of the 
Kurdish and Shiite Muslim Arab insurgencies was an internal affair, saying the wave of refugees 
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flowing toward neighbouring Turkey and Iran threatens "international peace and security." Never 
before has the UN Security Council held that governments threaten International security if their 
actions force thousands of their citizens to flee to other lands.7 . 
The further decline of Iraqi sovereignty as a barrier to the work of the UN was apparent 
during the Iraqi crisis of February, 1998. These events demonstrate not only the expansion in the 
UN's role but also the watershed that these new undertakings signify. The UN has become not 
merely a product of change but an agent of change in international politics. As demonstrated in 
the last chapter, it would be wrong to regard the Westphalian state system as a given, and as 
James Rosenau has stated, 'states are not eternal verities; they are as susceptible to variability 
as any other social system, and this includes the possibility of a decline in the sovereignty 
principle from which they derive their legitimacy as well as an erosion of their ability to address 
problems, much less to come up with satisfactory solutions to them.'8 Thus, with civil society 
looking elsewhere for its security, the UN has been empowered with a greater role to influence 
outcomes. looking at the UN in this way allows us to escape from the theoretical dead-end of 
neo-realism that looks upon the UN only in relation to the states system and the principle of 
sovereignty. Thus, the UN can be regarded as responding to change and is beginning to expand 
the remit of its work beyond its Charter, so much so that it has become a challenge in itself to 
delineate where the UN's duties end. 
The turbulence in world politics that has been evident since the collapse of bipolarity has 
called into question the existence of the sovereign state. It is now challenged from below and 
above by differing levels of governance, calling into question its ability to implement policy and 
confront crises. One of the major results of this turbulence, as well as the increased importance 
of factors, such as civil society and multilateralism in their decisional power, has been the equally 
important relevance of the UN. The UN has, in equal measure, benefited from this trend as seen 
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above in the increase of its peacekeeping duties. The UN has shown itself to be adaptable to 
international politics as seen in the expansion of the duties of the Secretary-General, the 
expansion of its administration, and, as demonstrated below, in the development of its 
peacekeeping abilities. 
THE DEVELOPMENT OF PEACEKEEPING AS A NORM 
In this section I seek to demonstrate that peacekeeping has progressed to constitute a norm of 
international behaviour since operations first began. Especially as the UN itself has gained in 
relevance, as shown above, with the end of the Cold War, so has its peacekeeping functions. It 
will be shown in later chapters that this has had a bearing upon the debate about Japan's 
participation in UNPKO. As stated in the previous chapter, norms exist in international society 
and can attain a level of institutionalisation and legitimisation: 'states operate in an international 
environment awash with organizational and professional networks that both reflect and alter that 
environment.'9 This section seeks to outline the historical process by which, despite not being 
referred to in the UN Charter and lacking a degree of specificity, peacekeeping has become a 
recognised behavioural norm of the international system, especially in the post-Cold War world. 
Building on this background, later chapters will examine the evolution of state preferences in 
regard to peacekeeping, rather than presuming them to be given. 
'Peacekeeping is an uncertain, unpredictable, and unregulated international operation.'10 
By tracing the origins of UNPKO from their inception through to the kind of operations undertaken 
in the post-Cold War world, a period in which a considerable number of peacekeeping operations 
were sanctioned by the Security Council, the wide range of peacekeeping operations can be 
demonstrated.11 Obviously each peacekeeping operation. like the conflict it is meant to address, 
58 
has its own characteristics, objectives, and degree of success. However, certain continuities, 
styles and hybrids can be seen and it is by concentrating on this inventory of UNPKO that I wilt 
outline various definitions of UNPKO undertaken during the Cold War period-a period which is 
quantitatively and qualitatively different with the kind of operations undertaken in the post-Cold 
War world and have yet become a standard of international behaviour. 
'Peacekeeping is a technique which has been developed, mainly by the UN, to help 
control and resolve armed conflicts.'12 The concept and practice of UN peacekeeping came 
about on an ad hoc basis as the UN adapted to the unforeseen circumstances of the Cold War. 
Under the catholic term of peacekeeping, a variety of functions existed including monitoring 
cease-fire arrangements, supervising the disengagement of forces from a conflict area and 
establishing a buffer zone, fact-finding and providing humanitarian assistance. Placing 
peacekeeping in historical context, the practice was a response to the paralYSis the UN security 
provisions suffered with the onset of US-Soviet animosity. Peacekeeping was seen as an 
effective method of containing regional conflict and preventing it from escalating into a direct 
East-West confrontation.13 It must be noted that the UN does not possess a monopoly in 
peacekeeping, but is one of the main instigators of peacekeeping operations building a whole 
bureaucracy and military staff to deal with the undertaking. However, nowhere in the UN Charter 
or in the writings of those who set up the UN system in 1945 does the term 'peacekeeping' 
appear. Thus, although initially lacking in a degree of institutionalisation, in the Cold War period 
and especially after the end of the Cold War, peacekeeping came to acquire the recognition and 
inter-subjective understanding a norm requires. Moreover, the practice of peacekeeping can 
claim a heritage of sorts. 
Peacekeeping has been called 'a modern application of an ancient arrangement-that of 
59 
the use of impartial and non-threatening go-betweens'.14 The concept of peacekeeping can claim 
a long history and high level of durability going back to before the creation of modem 
international organisations.15 A case can be made that peacekeeping as a concept can be dated 
back to the Crusades, or the Napoleonic Wars. Although punitive, the collective security action in 
Shanghai at the tum of the century against the Boxer Rebellion involved 20,000 US, British, 
French, Russian, German, Japanese, Italian, and Austrian troops. Thereafter, the Saar plebiscite 
of the 19305 saw international troops being used to prevent rioting and maintain public order. 
Other examples can be cited in Crete in the last century, the Aaland Islands and the Greco-
Bulgarian Crisis. But whatever the period, peacekeeping has always been placed within the 
context of international politics as the collective decision of a number of states to come to a 
troubled state's aid. Although all these operations were ad hoc in the same way much UN 
peacekeeping would prove to be, they did not display any co-ordination in military planning and 
did not have the sanction of an international body to legitimise their actions. This was first seen 
with peacekeeping undertaken by the League of Nations. 
The League did undertake a number of what can be termed 'first' and 'second' generation 
peacekeeping operations. 16 After W.W.I, a desire to bring an end to the scourge of war led to the 
creation of the League of Nations and the drafting of Article X and Article XVI of the League's 
Covenant to sanction collective security actions.17 Two well-known examples of the League's 
operations involved the administration of the Saar between 1922 and 1935 and the organisation 
of a plebiscite to determine possession between France and Germany, mentioned above. A 
similar operation was thereafter undertaken with the city of Danzig coming under the protection 
of the League. Minor peacekeeping operations took place with the League attempting to broker 
deals over the possession of the city of Vilnius between Poland and Russia and the region of 
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Mosul between Britain and Turkey. A peacekeeping force of sorts was even despatched in 
1933-consisting of 75 men-which sought to arbitrate the possession of the province of Leticia 
between Peru and Colombia. 
However, when the covenant was tested by the Japanese invasion of Manchuria in 1931, 
it was found lacking. Articles X and XVI sanctioning collective security actions were never 
enacted as Japan possessed veto power over any decisions. In the case of the Italian invasion of 
Abyssinia in 1935, severer measures were enacted by the League in the form of sanctions; 
however, with Britain, France and the United States ignoring these sanctions and the idea of an 
international community for their own national interest and the recognition of Italian domination in 
North Africa, the League's attempts at collective security once again came to nought. To 
summarise, the failure of peacekeeping under the aegis of the League was due to a number of 
reasons: first, the great powers were unwilling to sacrifice their interests for the interests of the 
international community; second, the necessary unanimous voting structure in the League led to 
passivity; and third, there were no League troops to undertake peacekeeping operations in the 
unlikely event that a resolution was agreed upon. 
The term 'peacekeeping' was first used in the late 1950s. The UN's earliest attempts at 
peacekeeping took the form of observer missions. UNTSO was the first UN operation that 
resembled modem peacekeeping as conceptualised below in the UNEF·I mission. Despatched in 
1948, UNTSO aimed to supervise a truce in the Palestine. A similar operation, UNMOGIP, was 
created in 1949 and despatched to the India-Pakistan border. Although not referred to at the time 
as such, these operations displayed some of the characteristics that define the modem practice 
of peacekeeping. For instance, they were unarmed in adherence with the principle of the non-use 
of force (the UN Mediator for Palestine, Ralph J. Bunche, reasoned that an armed force would 
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probably invite aggression}.18 The UN peacekeeping force UNEF-I first despatched in 1956 can 
be regarded as a watershed. The objective of UNEF-I was to contain the Suez Crisis precipitated 
by military action taken by Israel, France and Britain against Egypt. This new strategy of 
'peacekeeping' was to improve the functional role of an observer mission and avoid the hostility 
of great powers caused by proposing an enforcement action. The mandate for this mission, 
although sanctioned by the General Assembly under the Uniting for Peace Resolution 
{demonstrating further how peacekeeping was an attempt to circumnavigate the East-West 
confrontation}, was gfven life and specificity by the Secretary-General Dag Hammarskjold, when 
he outlined the principles which were to shape the development of peacekeeping operations until 
the late 19808: the involved parties' consent to the operation, the non-use of force except in self-
defence, acceptance of troop contributions from small and middle powers, impartiality, and day-
to-day control of the operation by the Secretary-General. This mandate has been described as 'a 
conceptual masterpiece in a completely new field, the blueprint for a non-violent, intemational 
military operation.'19 In fulfilling its mandate the UNEF-I force was successful In accommodating 
the withdrawal of Britain and France in 1956, and eventually Israel in 1957. 
The success of UNEF-/ can be seen in the phase of activism In the field of peacekeeping 
that followed. Observer missions continued with UN Observation Group in Lebanon (UNOGIL) in 
1958, UN Yemen Observation Mission (UNYOM) in 1963, Representative of the Secretary-
General in the Dominican Republic (DOMREP) in 1965 and UN India-Pakistan Observer Mission 
(UNIPOM) in 1965. Peacekeeping operations on the scale of UNEF-I were undertaken with 
ONUC in the Congo (mentioned below), UN Temporary Executive Authority and UN Security 
Force in West New Guinea (UNTEAlUNSF) in 1962 and UN Force in Cyprus (UNFICYP) in 1964. 
This period saw the UN at its most active in the field of peacekeeping until the collapse of the 
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Cold War. 
The crisis in the Congo between 1960 and 1964 demonstrated the limits of peacekeeping 
operations, came closer to defining what was and was not involved ideally in the act of 
peacekeeping, and added to its specificity as a norm of intemational society. The operation 
resulted in the UN using force to restore order, prevent the secession of Katanga and aid the 
central government in governing the country. The ONUC operation presents an exception to the 
peacekeeping rule: an ambiguous mandate; no cease-fire and, thus, no peace to keep; an 
internal conflict with undisciplined elements in the Congo like the Congolese National Army; and 
an eventual revision of the mandate leading to the abandonment of the principles of the non-use 
of force and impartiality. Hammarskjold did not intend to create this path-breaking peace 
enforcement mission, and the initial mandate could be categorised as a 'classic' first-generation 
peacekeeping operation. Initially, the concept of the non-use of force was strictly adhered to and 
Bunche's opinion took priority that, 'the UN Force is in the Congo as a friend and partner, not as 
an army of occupation .... Obviously, if the force began to use its arms to wound and kill 
Congolese, its doom would be quickly sea/ed, for It cannot long survive amidst a hostile public.'20 
However, after some time in the field ONUC found itself dragged into an ethnic, civilian conflict 
that could not be addressed without compromising the operation's neutrality. ONUC was unable 
to interpose itself between two opposing sides and was forced to take sides in the conflict to 
prevent the disintegration of the Congo with the secession of Katanga. The other new direction in 
the development of peacekeeping was the nation-building aspects of the mission. ONUC was 
responsible not only for the training and installation of a new civilian personnel in the Congo (with 
426 new Congolese administrators in place by the end of 1961 and 1,149 by the end of 1962). 
but also 'provided bone and sinew to the administration in its different branches, denuded as it 
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was of technical and administrative personnel.'21 In practise, this meant creating financial 
institutions, education systems, and drafting a constitution. However, the divisions centring 
around ONUC within the Security Council, nearly 200 peacekeeping fatalities, and the 
unfortunate death of Hammarskjold cast a shadow over the positive and innovative 
administrative elements of the operation. The Congo provided the disillusionment after the 
enthusiasm that had greeted the UNEF·I operation. 
With the failure of ONUC and the withdrawal of UNEF-I in 1967 at Egyptian insistence, UN 
peacekeeping retired into the shadows with no operations undertaken until 1973 that saw a 
revival of peacekeeping operations centred around the Middle East. The UN Emergency Force-II 
(UNEF·II) was created in 1973 and despatched to Sinai. Soon after the UN Disengagement 
Observer Force (UNDOF) in 1974 and the UN Interim Force in Lebanon (UNIFIL) in 1978 were 
sanctioned. 
The UNEF-II operation ;s important in that it saw the definition and specificity of the 
concept of the non-use of force widened: 'self-defence should include resistance to attempts by 
forceful means to prevent [UNEF·/I] from discharging its duties under the Security Council's 
mandate.'22 In the field UN forces managed to contain certain explosive situations without 
resorting to the use of force.23 However, in the case of UNIFIL the multinational UN force, faced 
with a multitude of actors in the conflict, demonstrated little solidarity in undertaking the mission 
and little uniformity in the use of force. This mission also showed, in the same way as ONUC, 
that consent is a central element in defining a peacekeeping operation from a peace enforcement 
mission. A successful peacekeeping operation is one where belligerents have decided to settle 
their dispute by peaceful means and are willing to allow the UN to monitor a cease-fire while the 
peace-brokering process takes place. Liu is correct when he classifies UNPKO during the Cold 
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War as 'essentially palliative measures that could be taken to contain regional conflicts in a few 
cases when it was in the interest of the superpowers to do SO.'24 After this spurt of activity the UN 
peacekeeping initiatives again took a back seat due to the resurgence of the Cold War with the 
Reagan administration. Despite the activity in the Middle East described above, there were no 
peacekeeping operations undertaken between 1965 and 1988. Only with the willingness of the 
US and the USSR to co-operate were demands for UNPKO heard once again and the process of 
acceptance in international society given another boost. 
The end of the Cold War saw peacekeeping operations continue, to an extent, in the same 
vein with observer missions monitoring cease-fires-what has been termed 'traditional', or 'first-
generation' peacekeeping. However, peace-building and peacemaking elements also came to 
the fore, two terms that have caused a great deal of trouble as regards their definition. Soutros 
Ghali described peacemaking as 'action to bring hostile parties to an agreement', and 
peacebuilding as 'efforts to identify and support structures which will tend to consolidate peace 
and advance a sense of confidence and well-being among people.'25 These definitions appear to 
be similar to traditional peacekeeping, but in practice can be seen in the operations undertaken 
in Cambodia, characterised by nation-building exercises such as election-monitoring and human 
rights regulation, and In Somalia and Yugoslavia, characterised by humanitarian efforts such as 
aSSisting refugees. These more recent missions, although often including elements of traditional 
peacekeeping operations, have also demonstrated . a willingness to use force and thereby 
compromise impartiality. One of the more remarkable aspects of the 'new' peacekeeping is the 
increase in the number of states willing to participate not only In UNPKO, but generally 
peacekeeping, despite the perceived failures of recent years. Appendix I illustrates the important 
newcomers to this practice and the extent of peacekeeping's acceptance/concordance in 
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international society as a behavioural norm. 
DEFINING PEACEKEEPING 
As is evident from this overview of the growth of the UN and its peacekeeping duties, due to the 
failure of the concept of collective security because of superpower rivalry, peacekeeping evolved 
as a stopgap measure, but eventually became an established practice of international society. 
However, peacekeeping exists in a grey area of the UN Charter between peaceful sett/ement of 
disputes (Chapter VI) and military enforcement (Chapter VII). For this reason, peacekeeping has 
been defined functionally necessitating the previous historical review before a definition of this 
norm, recognised by international society, could be posited. During the Cold War period attempts 
were made to enact peacekeeping operations with clarity to distinguish them from military 
enforcement and the peaceful settlement of disputes. Thus, generally, UNPKO can be divided 
into two categories: unarmed military observer missions and armed peacekeeping missions; 
however, each peacekeeping operation has its own particular criteria. Generally speaking, 
peacekeeping was an attempt to end hostilities through· non-coercive methods; peace 
enforcement used military muscle to achieve the same ends. Of course the attainment of peace 
is referred to frequently within the Charter.26 The International Peace Academy has defined the 
term as 'the prevention, containment, moderation and termination of hostilities between or within 
states, through the medium of a peaceful third-party intervention organised and directed 
internationally, using multinational forces of soldiers, police and civilians to restore and maintain 
peace.'27 This definition is worthy of attention because it de-emphasises the action of 
enforcement and places the emphasis upon mediation and negotiation. The theoretical 
underpinning appears to be that violence and conflict can be controlled and limited through non-
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violent means and through the process of negotiation. Peacekeeping does not solve an issue at 
the heart of a conflict; it brings an end to the conflict so that a solution to the issue may be found. 
Peacekeeping's aim is not to provide solutions to global problems, but to furnish those involved 
in a conflict with the conditions to resolve the issues. Peacekeeping is equated with diplomacy, 
whereas peace enforcement is placed on the same side of the ledger as war. Combining the two 
can be dangerous as it may transform 'a peacekeeping operation into a fighting force [which} 
erodes international consensus on their functions, encourages withdrawals by contributing 
contingents, converts it into a factional participant in the internal power struggle, and turns it into 
a target of attack by rival internal factions.'28 
looking at the actions undertaken by the various UN operations, a certain number of 
common factors can be identified which are encompassed by the term peacekeeping. First, the 
consent and co-operation of the parties to the conflict. Peacekeeping operations require the 
permission of a particular state to enter the sovereign territory to be patroHed. In contrast, 
enforcement actions do not. PKO has respected the concept of state sovereignty as lack of 
consent would jeopardise the neutrality of an operation and fail to limit hostilities. Consent can be 
seen as an important factor when Nasser withdrew it in 1967 forcing the withdrawal of UNEF-I, 
supporting David Wain house's contention that 'where co-operation of the parties is not sustained 
and whole-hearted, a positive result will be diffICult to obtain.'29 
Second, international backing, especially in the Security Council, is necessary. This Is 
another prerequisite to maintaining an impartial role and a non-threatening character. Operations 
originate within the UN and not with a particular nation and subsequent command is retained 
within the UN (thus, under this definition the police action in Korea (1950·1953) is not 
categorised as peacekeeping). International backing accentuates a peacekeeping force's 
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attractiveness and facilitates acceptance by member states that may think twice about allowing 
foreign troops onto their soil. 
Third, UN command and control is a prerequisite. Under the UN Charter, it is the Security 
Council (Chapters VI and VII) and the Secretary-General using his 'good offices' (Article IX) 
which possess the power to instigate a peacekeeping operation; the General Assembly is only 
imbued with the power of discussing and making recommendations to the Security Council 
(Article XI) .. 
Fourth, the non-use of force has been generally recognised as a characteristic of UNPKO. 
It has been said that when the first peacekeeping troops were despatched to the Palestine in 
1948 they carried revolvers, but no ammunition. Provisions for the non-use of force (except for 
self-defence) are usually contained within the Rules of Engagement drafted for each operation. 
Traditionally, only light weapons have been carried because peacekeepers are only sanctioned 
to use force in self-defence. This goes hand in hand with peacekeeping being regarded as a 
confidence-building measure and taking a non-threatening stance. Peacekeeping troops are not 
meant to restore order or stop the fighting. They follow a peace agreement so that the order 
should already be in place with the first full-blown peacekeeping operation, UNEF-I, being a 
classic example of this. William Durch describes the use of force in peacekeeping in the following 
terms, 'what constitutes appropriate se/f-defence will vary by mission, but because they are 
almost by definition outgunned by the disputants they are sent out to monitor, any recourse to 
force must be calibrated to localise and defuse, rather than escalate, violence.'30 
The definition of self-defence and the minimum amount of force acceptable have changed 
over time with a shift from the earlier and more rigid interpretation to a broader definition during 
Kurt Waldheim's time as Secretary-General. In 1973 the definition was widened to include 
68 
scenarios where UN peacekeepers were obstructed from carrying out their duties. However, in 
the field, UN commanders often avoided implementing this definition for fear of alienating their 
impartial position.31 Other aspects of UN peacekeeping are contingent upon the concept of non-
use of force. Neutrality of UN forces between belligerents can be jeopardised by the rash use of 
force. Furthermore,·· consent to allow the despatch of UN troops by the belligerents can be 
facilitated by the non-use of force. Based on the study of four decades of UN peacekeeping, 
Ramesh Thakur states that '[Peacekeepers} should not...have the obligation, the soldiers, or the 
equipment to engage violators in hostilities. International peacekeeping forces express and 
facilitate the erstwhile belligerents' will to live in peace; they cannot supervise peace in conditions 
of war. Turning them into a flQhting force erodes international consensus on their function, 
encourages withdrawals by contributing contingents, converts them into a factional partiCipant in 
the internal power struggle, and turns them into targets of attack from rival internal faction8.'32 
Parties to a conflict are more likely to allow a non-offensive, mediatory force into the conflict as 
'[p]eacekeeping and the use of force (other than in self-defence) should be seen as altemative 
techniques and not as adjacent points on a continuum, permitting easy transition from one to the 
other.'33 Moreover, greater contribution by UN members is likely to be achieved if the operation is 
characterised by pacifism, rather than aggression. 
Fifth, the military and political neutrality of the UN between belligerents is a necessary 
condition. UNPKO do not target an enemy which may be the case in a collective security action. 
Ideally, there are no judgements made by PKO troops as to who is guilty or not and 
independence between the policies of each belligerent must be retained.34 It has been said that 
UN forces have 'no enemies ... just a series of difficult and sometimes homicidal clients. '35 The 
accepted procedure has been that the troops of states involved in a conflict are not utilised, and 
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generally the same goes for the troops of major powers. For these reasons, the conflicting 
parties are more likely to accept UN intervention. In order to encourage this, non-aligned 
countries have traditionally contributed most troops to PKO-Fiji, Canada, Sweden, to name but 
a few. Using superpower troops or troops from nations that have a vested interest in a given 
conflict would run counter to the idea of impartiality and neutrality. Peacekeeping operations 
should not promote the interests of one particular nation or group of nations. Thus, once again 
the police action taken in Korean cannot be classified as PKO as it promoted the interests of 
South Korea against North Korea. We can conceptualise peacekeeping further by making a 
distinction between passive and active operations. Passive operations have been elaborated in 
the following terms: 'The theoretical concept of international peacekeeping is that the control of 
violence in interstate and intrastate conflict is possible without resort to the use of force or 
enforcement measures.'36 Furthermore, '[y}ou do not need so thoroughly trained troops in 
peacekeeping activities as is needed in war'.37 The key is mediation through non-military means. 
UNPKO are reactive to a conflict and do not usually playa preventative role. An active approach 
would involve the use of troops to settle a conflict or prevent it in order to allow negotiations to 
proceed. 
. With all this in mind, Goulding tentatively defines UN peacekeeping as: 
Field operations established by the UN, with the consent of the parties concerned, to help control 
and resolve conflicts between them, under UN command and control, at the expense collectively of 
the member states, and with military and other personnel and equipment provided voluntarily by 
them, acting impartially between the parties and using force to the minimum extent necessary.38 
Furthermore, co:.operation from all parties involved is required. Ultimately, this is what 
distinguishes peacekeeping from enforcem~nt. Peacekeeping involves creating a 'thin blue line' 
.-
separating parties in conflict and creating the atmosphere for negotiation. UNPKO have been 
likened to a n~rse attending a patient constantly providing care but not playing the'role of a 
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surgeon and providing a cure.39 Peacekeeping in the Cold War period had a number of functions 
including defusing a conflict, or crisis that may develop into a conflict, stabilising a situation which 
will aI/ow for the peaceful conduct of negotiations, and facilitating a solution which can include 
demilitarising an area, international jurisdiction of an area. With the end of the Cold War, the 
characteristics that have begun to be compromised include the consent of parties involved, the 
impartiality of UN forces, and the use of force. However, these conditions have been ignored in 
previous missions and the new-ness of this peacekeeping is not necessarily the most salient 
factor. Operations are case-specific and as former UN Secretary-General Boutros Ghali noted. 
'peacekeeping has to be reinvented every day.'4o • 
As can be seen in Appendix I, the level of global concordance with peacekeeping has 
increased rapidly with the end of the Cold War. There is evidently some motive or sense of 
responsibility for states both old and new, large and small, powerful and weak to make some 
contribution to PKO. Seemingly, UNPKO has become a norm in international SOCiety to which 
states feel a compulsion to respond. In 1988 the UN's peacekeepers were awarded the Nobel 
Peace Prize for their traditional peacekeeping operations adding to its acceptance and 
recognition in international SOCiety. The end of the Cold War has seen the traditional reliance 
upon a handful of states (Norway, Finland, Sweden, Canada, India, etc.) been abandoned and 
the number of states participating has risen from 26 in 1988. to 76 in 1994. One major reason for 
this Increase is that the end of bipolarity allowed both the chance of settlement of certain conflicts 
but also ignited new conflicts. The response has been an expansion in the number, quality and 
remit of PKO undertaken by both the UN and a steadily increasing number of international 
organisations. Examining the motives for this increased participation in peacekeeping, altruism 
can be pointed to in two ways. First, the humanitarian desire exists, as it always has done, to 
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assist a fellow member of the international system, demonstrated in the operations in Somalia. 
Second, participation in peacekeeping has been traditionally regarded by states, like Canada and 
Finland, as a norm for members of an international society. With the increased promotion of 
peacekeeping it now possesses a degree of prestige and participation can enhance a state's 
reputation. Peacekeeping contribution can also be inspired by a desire to enhance security. As a 
means for achieving security in Asia, the ASEAN states championed the UNT AC operation in 
Cambodia. The issue of security can also be seen in the contributions of smaller states hoping to 
enhance their reputation in case they need to receive peacekeeping assistance in the future. For 
instance, the contribution of the Baltic states can be regarded in this way. This is what Trevor 
Findlay has called 'a down payment on future assistance.'41 States like South Korea, Israel, and 
Greece, have tended to regard contributions to peacekeeping as the repayment of a debt to the 
international community. 
Neo-realist explanations also exist. Contributions can also enhance a state's prestige in 
furthering its own objectives, particularly in acquiring a coveted permanent seat on the Security 
Council; a/l the states currently vying for seats are now contributing to UNPKO-Japan, Brazil, 
Germany, Nigeria, etc. However, there are other illuminating ways to regard motivations in 
UNPKO contributions. The state in question may not always be a unified actor with the Foreign 
Ministry often promoting participation more actively than other state organs. Equally, public 
opinion is a factor especially in the more humanitarian operations. There is certainly a neo-realist 
side to the motivations for contributing to UNPKO. Some states may be attempting to profit by 
UN reimbursements, to acquire more advanced equipment, and to receive free training for their 
troops. However, no single motive can explain a state's decision to partiCipate in UNPKO. There 
will always be a melange of reasons. The important point is that the end of the Cold War has 
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complicated the family tree of peacekeeping operations with new duties extending the remit and 
specificity of peacekeeping. Moreover, a sense of 'ought' exists regarding participation in UNPKO 
so that 'the days of turning up equipped with only good intentions, blue berets, and a cut lunch 
are over' and states have begun to consider their participation in UNPKO more eamestly.42 
SUMMARY 
To summarise this far, in the previous chapter I outlined an approach to the study of Japan's 
UNPKO contribution centring upon the examination of domestic and international norms. In this 
chapter I continued the emphaSis on norms by Singling out the practice of peacekeeping and the 
role of the UN in the post-Cold War world as an international norm. By means of a historical 
investigation I demon~trated how th~ two have come to provide current standards of behaviour in 
international society. Based on these foundations, I posited a clarification and definition of 
UNPKO. The following chapter will examine specifically the case of foreign policymaking in 
Japan and how an analysis of Japan's security, foreign, and defence policies needs to take 
. -
norms into account within its ontological commitments, not only such as UNPKO, the topic of this 
chapter, but also traditional domestic and international norms peculiar to Japan, which will be 
examined in the next chapter. 
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CHAPTER THREE: .. 
JAPANESE FOREIGN POLICY AND UNPKO, 1956 TO 1990 
In the previous chapter I built upon the normative theoretical approach detailed in Chapter One 
and demonstrated the way in which specifically the UN and its peacekeeping operations have 
over the years become a norm of international society by increasing in specificity, durability and 
concordance. This was achieved by means of a historical review, centring chiefly upon the post-
W.W.II period, and resulted in a proposed definition of the practice of peacekeeping. In this 
chapter I will touch upon the traditional interpretations of Japan's foreign policy which have 
placed emphasis upon the influence of, among others, the US, the LOP, the bureaucracy, and the 
business community within Japan. I will then proceed to illustrate how these interpretations are 
lacking in explanatory power in the case of UNPKO and, thereafter, explain why, connecting this 
chapter to the previous two chapters, they need to take into account both domestic and 
international norms: the UN (particularly its peacekeeping functions), civil society, the US, and 
Japan's neighbouring nations in Asia. Firstly, however, I will explore in general terms what is 
regarded as constituting the remit of foreign policy in order to understand which factors have 
been understood in the literature to influence the decision-making process. I will then move on to 
outline the most common interpretations of the Japanese state in its foreign policymaking as 
either reactive, or pro-active. 
In addition, little attention has been focused in the extant literature upon Japan's 
contribution to UNPKO during the Cold War period. Interest only developed during the Second 
Gulf War and the consequent passing of the UN Peace Co-operation Law In June 1992. 
However, it would be an oversimplification to characterise the passing of this law as nothing more 
than an automatic reaction to the demands of Japan's Gulf War allies; emphasis needs to be 
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placed on the processes that began some time previously and had shaped the environment in 
which Japan's reaction to the Second Gulf War took place. As Karl Marx wrote, 'men make their 
own history, but not just as they please. They do not choose the circumstances for themselves, 
but have to work upon circumstances as they find them, have to fashion the material handed 
down by the past.'1 Thus, this chapter also seeks to outline the material handed down by the past 
as the current political-military culture of Japan is still shaped by the events of the post-W.W.II 
period. Of course, at any time there are a number of actors attempting to establish their agendas 
and ideology as a norm for the rest of society; thus, this study will delineate between competing 
norms, concurring with Thomas Berger that, 'as a result of their historical experiences and the 
way in which. those experiences were interpreted by domestic political actors, [Japan and 
Germany] have developed beliefs and values that make them peculiarly reluctant to resort to the 
use of military force. '2 
FOREIGN POLICY 
- ._, 
Foreign policy has. been defined in many ways: 
Foreign policy consists of decisions and actions which involve to some appreciable extent relations 
between one state and others.3 
The grand designs of a de Gaul/e, and the day-to-day reactions of diverse policy-makers to foreign 
events in the light of their habits of response.4 . 
It [foreign policy] is never free from muddle, from mistaken information, from the clash of personalities, 
from human infirmity in all its social guises.5 
Thus, foreign policy can include both the attainment of objectives as part of a grand design 
and the everyday reaction to or shaping of external events. Foreign policy must take into account 
the domestic environment in which a state makes decisions: foreign policy is, in essence, a 
series of decisions made by a group of people who can be called decision-makers. Foreign policy 
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decisions do not simply emerge in response to external stimuli, rather, they are processed 
through an identifiable machinery within the state.6 However, it must also be recognised that 
these decisions are formulated with the foreign/external environment in mind. William Wallace 
described foreign policy as 'the all-important boundary between the nation-state and its 
international environment.'7 With the expansion' of interdependence between states, the 
distinction between domestic and foreign has become blurred and foreign policy as an activity 
cannot proceed without taking into account a variety of both intemal and external pressures. The 
kind of questions James Rosenau believed needed to be asked about foreign policy analysis 
included: 
Under what conditions does the influence of individual leaders on foreign policy outweigh that of 
complex societal processes? Why are domestic factors more of a hindrance in the construction and 
maintenance of foreign aid programs than in the formation and conduct of military alliances.8 
In other words, why are certain factors, whether they are externally or intemally based, 
more influential in a particular foreign policymaking area? It has been argued that an approach of 
this sort can imbue an analysis of foreign policy with a rigorous scientific underpinning, which has 
been lacking in many studies overly concemed with a particular event, or period. Foreign policy 
decisions are made based upon particular biases and knowledge; thus, it is necessary to reject 
the positivist role of third party observer and attempt to empathise with the decision-maker, the 
environment in which decisions are made, and the norms which constitute the environment. As 
Rosenau has stated: 
Decision-making sustains bureaucracies, dominates legislatures, preoccupies chief executives, and 
characterizes judicial bodies. Decisions lead to policy, produce conflict, and foster co-operation. They 
differentiate political parties and underlie foreign policies, activate local govemments, and maintain 
. federal authorities, guide armies, and stir international organizations. To explain any sequence of 
political actions, therefore, the analyst must ascertain who made the key decisions that gave rise to the 
action and then assess the intellectual and interactive processes whereby the deciSion-makers reached 
their conclusions.9 
. This kind of approach can help us to avoid an approach based on 'a world composed of 
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abstract states ... with a mythical quest for single-cause explanations of objective reality' and 
brings us to the question of the actors and the intellectual and interactive processes we identify 
as playing an important role in the formulation of foreign policy.10 In other words, what are the 
inputs in any foreign policy systems approach? Traditional approaches have limited the actors 
involved to the governmental actors. However, as Roger Hi/sman observed, 'many more people 
are involved in the process of government than merely those who hold the duly constituted 
official positions.'11 Moreover, within the government itself there are a number of actors with their 
own separate agendas vying to affect the foreign policymaking process. In addition to this, 
external actors, including other states, international organisations,· treaties, etc., must not be 
forgotten as resultant policy (output) can feed back into the system and affect future policy 
decisions by creating a precedence, norm, or the background which frames policy decisions. 
Thus, there are a number of actors challenging the monolithic state structure and if the state 
structure is no longer regarded as unified then the rational-actor approach must be questioned. 
The traditional approaches to foreign policy have been greatly influenced by the realist 
school of international relations. The inputs or influences into foreign policy are regarded by Hans 
Morgenthau as being elements of national power, population, resources, the political system, but 
these factors were regarded as of limited influence and lay on the periphery of influence. At the 
core lies military power and national interest. Furthermore, there is little interest in how these 
factors interacted with each other or how resulting policy could feedback into the system and 
become, in tum, a norm in its own right, and thus, a foreign policy input. The state is the primary 
unit of decision-making and the state comprises the official decision-makers, the politicians and 
the bureaucrats. Thus, no attention is extended towards extemal international organisations or 
internal civil society. Improving on this model, Almond was one of the first theorists to posit an 
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input-output system of foreign policy by highlighting the historical background, the policy process 
and the substance of policy.12 However, again there was no investigation as to how the inputs 
interact, or how a hierarchy of inputs develops, or foreign policy outputs influence the system 
through the creation of norms. 
Attention needs to be paid to the operational environment, i.e. the time and space in which 
decisions are made.13 The overall structure of the international system can influence greatly the 
decisions a state makes. For example, a bipolar system encourages states to side with one of 
the two poles; altematively, a multipolar system allows greater manoeuvre in a state's foreign 
policy choices. The distribution of power within the international system can also be a factor. 
Superpowers are likely to press their foreign policy concerns, whereas micro-states are less likely 
to aggressively pursue policy directions and may have to combine their efforts to do so. The 
environment could also be shaped by the level of technology in the world, the level of exchange 
between nations, the levels of interdependence, the existence of less well-developed states, and 
the gap between the developed states. These and other factors create the decision-making 
process, the atmosphere in which decisions are made. This can also Involve factors like the way 
in which a policy-maker views a situation or their perception of reality, often based upon 
experience. His or her prejudices, social status, values, and beliefs can regulate what a decision-
maker decides to ignore or emphasise. Information and reality can be distorted through this filter 
of the decision-makers' belief system. 
In the case of Japan, it can be alleged that the international environment has always 
exerted an influence upon Japanese political decisions since Japan was first exposed to the 
West with the Meiji restoration. It was an intemational system of Westem Imperialism against 
which Japan was reacting in its attempts to enrich the nation. After defeat in W.W.II, the 
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environment within which Japan was able to promote its neo-mercantilist growth was highly 
influential in the decisions that were made to maximise Japan's interests. The dominance of the 
US after W.W.II enabled Japan to develop economically and reduce its security spending by 
positioning itself under the wing of the US. The policy direction commonly known as the Yoshida 
Doctrine could not have been contemplated under any other International environment.
'
" US 
hegemony helped to promote the ruling triad within Japan's domestic system, demonstrating the 
strong influence the environment of the time and the possible shape of future environments can 
have upon the domestic framework of decision-making and the resultant policy. Donald Hellman 
pointed to three major developments in the international political environment which greatly 
influences the decisions the Japanese government makes: first, the strong position Japan 
occupies in the international economy at a time when the future development of the world 
economy is unclear; second, the precarious state of US hegemony which has provided so well 
for Japan for so long, both in the economic and security fields; and third, the growing influence of 
Asia as an economic entity and the role Japan will play vis-a-vis the economically strong nations 
it once occupied militarily.'S This is the international environment which provides some of the 
norms that Japan must take into account when making its decisions with one eye on the present, 
and the other on current and future developments. Policy makers will tend to make a decision 
with consideration for already existing norms as well as the longue dume of possible future 
norms, like the decline in US hegemony, the development of regionalism, and the growing 
importance of civil society. 
JAPANESE FOREIGN POLICY 
There are a number of internal and external norms at play in the formulation of Japan's foreign 
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policy, and if one surveys the literature on Japan's foreign policy, each interpretation, either 
knowingly or unknowingly, accredits a different norm with having influence upon policy 
formulation. One strand of the literature sees policy as remaining within the hands of a political 
elite, in Japan's case, consisting of the LOP, big business, and the bureaucracy.16 The 
relationship between these three entities is regarded as intimate, reinforced by an exchange of 
personnel after retirement (amakudafl), and impervious to outside influence: '[iJt is not co-
incidental that administrative guidance can produce the best effects on the premise of such 
government offICials [as the1 hiring of retired government officials by business firms.'17 
The Japanese bureaucracy is regarded in much of the literature as playing a central role in 
Japan's foreign policymaking process with a related strand of the literature portraying the 
bureaucracy as being hand in glove with the LOP and the business wortd, reinforced by the 
interchange of personnel between the three poles of power.18 During the occupation period the 
Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MOFA) held a central role in Japan's policymaking process due to the 
close ties it had with the American forces. Under the Yoshida Doctrine, the security relationship 
with the US was of central importance and the MOFA was one of the strongest advocates of it. 
Thus, the MOFA dominated this central policy and even the Defence Agency saw its role 
diminished to a purely operational role at the expense of the MOFA. The MOFA's strength was, 
and still is, its specialised knowledge and ability to co-ordinate disparate opinions; the 
government of the day is seen to rely upon the bureaucracy for the expertise, specialised 
knowledge, experience, and manpower that the bureaucracy can provide. Other traditions of 
post-war Japanese politics, like the regular shuffling of ministers, has led to ministers being 
dependent on their bureaucracy for information. Thus, the dominant role of the bureaucracy in 
Japan's post-war political climate is a result of a number of factors, including the historically 
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powerful pre-war role of the bureaucracy, and the Supreme Command for the Allied Powers 
(SCAP) post-war reforms with relations between the ruling triad of the bureaucracy, the LOP, and 
big business also strengthened by the common fear of what would happen if the Socialists were 
to gain power. 
Moreover, remembering that Japan is a country of few natural resources and the resulting 
dependency on international trade, it may be said that it would be natural for the business world 
(zaik81) to influence the nation's foreign policy.'9 Large business associations, like Keidanren and 
Nikkeiren, dominate business in Japan and through various consultation bodies attached to the 
ministries, representatives of these organisations are able to meet members of government and 
exchange views on foreign policy issues. The LOP, the bureaucracy, and big business are able to 
work together for the common goal of Japanese economic prosperity. Japan's recognition of the 
People's Republic of China in the 1970s represents a classic example of this phenomenon.20 
Business has often been held responsible for much of the economic nature of Japanese foreign 
policy as seen in the payment of reparations to East Asia, and for its power as kingmaker within 
the lOP, with most Prime Ministers coming from the Ministry of Finance (MOF) rather than, say, 
the Defence Agency or the MOFA. From the earliest days of the lOP, big businesses came 
together to support the LOP in return for promotion of pOlicies favourable to the business world. 
The Economic Reconstruction Council was created in 1955 by the head of Keidanren at that 
time, Uemura Kogoro, with the expressed aim of providing election funds for the LOP: 'lp}ut the 
contributions into a blender to remove their colouring, so to speak. consolidate them, and use 
them to implement policies for reconstructing the Japanese economy and stabiliSing people's 
livelihood.'21 Oespite strong critiCism, Keidanren continued to make these election fund 
contributions, often using scare tactics to ensure payment. 22 Moreover, the old-boy network of 
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university and marriage added to the ability of the business world to influence policymaking. 
Furthennore, through the process of amakudari, the bureaucracy and the bigger businesses 
have been able to promote an intimate relationship.23 
Finally, in the post-war period Japan's political system was dominated by conservative 
elements and particularly by the LOP in the form of the 1955 system which only collapsed in 
1992, but has recently been reconstituted to an extent with the election victory of the LOP in 
1996, the decline of the Socialists, and constant rumours of a merger with elements of the now 
defunct opposition party, ShinshintO.· The LOP has often been characterised as a monolithic 
structure penneating every aspect of Japanese society joining together with the bureaucracy and 
big business to produce a ruling triad of policymaking. 
Thus, the Japan Inc. model portrays the Japanese state as an all-powerful monolith with 
the LOP, the bureaucracy, and big business comprising the mutually reinforcing and omnipotent 
organs of state power. Any other factor, like civil society, international organisations, foreign 
states, is marginalised to the point of insignificance. Furthennore, the conception of the 
bureaucracy as a united monolithic structure, which guides Japanese public policy without 
disagreement, has been challenged as seen In the role of policy tribes. John Creighton Campbell 
has demonstrated the cleavages between various ministries, the Ministry of International Trade 
and Industry (MITI) and the MOF over macro-economics policy, the MITI and the MOFA over 
foreign aid and export promotion.24 Daniel Okimoto also points to this Inter-ministerial wrangling 
stating that, '[h]ere is a stage at which rational factors, reasonably well safeguarded at the level 
of the individual ministry, tend to be overwhelmed by the free-for-all that sets loose potentially 
Irrational forces.'25 One would expect to see the MOFA playing an integral role in the fonnulation 
of foreign policy; however, with a strong economic interest In foreign policy, a variety of agencies, 
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ministries, and private organisations all have an interest in the foreign policymaking process and 
a plurality of influences exist. The MITI has been a great rival with the MOFA. And the MOFA has 
had to second personnel from other ministries and agencies that have the specialised knowledge 
to meet the new challenges of interdependence, like drugs, AIDS, etc. The influence of a 
particular ministry over a certain issue is a great deal more complicated than it may seem at first 
glance. A single issue like the increase in number of US cars imported may involve the MITI, the 
MOFA, and the Ministry of Transport; the number of foreign workers In Japan can cut across the 
jurisdiction of the MOFA, Ministry of labour, and the Ministry of Justice, if not other ministries. 
Thus, the concept of a unified, monolithic bureaucracy is not an accurate reflection because of 
the number of actors involved in a single issue. It may well be this plurality of interests that 
complicates the policymaking process and leads to frustration on the part of foreign counterparts 
who receive 'nothing but promises, promises' from Japanese bureaucrats and then fail to see 
anything materialise.26 
Adding to this plurality, one strand of the literature sees the bureaucracy as constitutionally 
subordinate to the Diet. Politicians do not rely solely upon the MOFA for foreign policy 
information. They tend to refer to other sources, often against the advice of the MOFA 
bureaucrats, like their own k6enkai (support groups), or public opinion. Furthermore the MOFA is 
further weakened by its numeric Inferiority to other ministries and is often regarded as ranking 
low In the pecking order of ministries, losing out to other ministries and regularly coming into 
conflict with other ministries over jurisdictional control. In some ways the bureaucracy can be 
overcome by the politicians, as was demonstrated by Prime Minister Tanaka's avoidance of the 
MOF in raising funds for his own policy objectlves.27 However, with the weakening of ties 
between the LOP and the bureaucracy, and the increase in the number of career politicians 
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rather than bureaucratic politicians, the power of the bureaucracy over the policymaking process 
waned. As Pampel has quipped, 'must as war is too important to be left to the generals, public 
policy had become too important to be left to the bureaucrats.'28 
Some writers have promoted the idea of t6t6 kanta;, with the LOP in a dominant poSition 
over the bureaucracy. Due to the presence of policy tribes or zoku with specialised knowledge in 
certain areas, the LOP has been able to curtail the influence of the bureaucracy in the 
policymaking process and has developed its own expertise and base of knowledge to conduct 
policy. Schoppa has demonstrated how a policy tribe concemed with education reforms was able 
to prevent Prime Minister Nakasone in his attempted comprehensive reform of the Japanese 
education system in the 1980s.29 A policy tribe has been defined as Diet members who have a 
considerable amount of expertise and practical experience about a particular area of government 
policy and enough seniority in the party to influence the ministry responsible for that policy 
area.30 However, the tribes can a/so complicate the LOP's power in the decision-making process, 
as well as increase the LOP's influence over that of the bureaucracy. A clash of interests can 
occur if the Prime Minister is not a member of a particular tribe, as happened with Nakasone and 
the education tribe when this former Prime Minister attempted to impose his vision of the 
education system, ignoring the pleas of this tribe. Furthermore, the tribes can often bring in other 
interest groups, as the education tribe did with private universities, into the poIicymaking process, 
adding to the plurality of Japanese decision-making process. Policy tribes have been 
instrumental in increasing the power of the LOP over and above that of the bureaucracy. 
Members of a tribe often sit on Diet committees for longer than bureaucrats and often acquire 
greater familiarity with an issue and have a commitment to that issue through obligations to local 
constituents. . 
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However, through images such as Japan Inc. and various strands of the Nihonjinron 
thesis, the impression of a monolithic structure of Japanese politics has prospered as the 
mainstream interpretation. This traditional model of Japan's foreign policymaking has been 
challenged but still remains, as Fukui, stated, 'the Single most popular and influential model of 
policymaking in contemporary Japan.'31 The following section has three objectives: first, to 
discuss the various interpretations of Japanese foreign policymaking; second, to highlight the 
norms each approach emphasises; and third, to discuss how each exposition adds to our 
understanding of Japan's UNPKO policy from Japan's admission to the UN in 1956 until the eve 
of the Second Gulf War. 
THE REACTIVE STATE AND ExTERNAL NORMS 
Kent Calder coined the appellation of Japan as a reactive state in the 19808.32 In a single 
sentence this conceptual framework can be summarised as attempting to explain 'the complex 
mixture of strategy, hesitancy and pragmatism that characterizes Japanese foreign economic 
policy behaviour in the late 1980s.'33 The main thrust of Calder's argument is that despite the 
various fields in which Japanese economic strength manifests itself, the formulation of policy in 
Japan is still remarkably reactive to external stimulus, especially from the US. Calder's analysis 
\ has two main strands: first, the Japanese state fails to undertake major foreign economic policy 
initiatives despite the economic power and leverage it possesses; and second, the Japanese 
state reacts to external demand for activity 'erratically, unsystematically, and often 
incompletely.'34 Despite its economic size, population, and a hiStory of pro-activism before 
W.W.II, Japan's behaviour is regarded as more similar to that of a reactive state like Austria or 
Norway, rather than resembling a pro-acuve middle power like Germany or France. For a variety 
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of reasons, existing both in the structure of the intemational system and in Japan's domestic 
political structure, a more independent policy has never materialised. Other terms have been 
used to describe Japan's reactivity, including missing the boat (norl-okure) , diplomacy of 
cowardice (okubyo gaik6) and a kowtow foreign policy (dogeza gaikO).35 Dennis Yasutomo uses 
the phrase acquiescent activism to describe Japan's reaction to extemal stimUli, defining its 
policy objectives in external terms with no policy agenda of its own. Essentially they all add up to 
the same thing, namely, the maintenance of good relations with a majority of states and the 
guarantee of access to global markets and raw materials. 
In the case of Japan, the term state strategy refers to the post-1945 national strategy 
commonly know as the Yoshida Doctrine. This policy continued unchanged through the 1950s 
and 19608 despite the fact that Japan gradually achieved intemational recognition and agreed to 
various international commitments with admission to the UN, the Intemational Monetary Fund, 
the World Bank, and a number of other intemational organisations. Economic growth continued 
apace while security matters continued to be left to the US under the Security Treaty. Further 
policy initiatives ensured this direction of avoiding political-strategic concems and devotion to a 
mercantilist role in the world: the Three Non-Nuclear Principles (1967), the Three Principles of 
Arms Exports, the one percent ceiling on defence spending (1977 to 1986), and an omni-
directional foreign policy being the most obvious examples. 
, The intemational system bome out of defeat in W.W.l1 was the system of bipo1arity. Under 
this system two ideological and military blocs faced each other with other states taking their place 
within a certain bloc, thereby acquiring the economic and security beneftts of the bfoc leader. 
Within this system Japan's place was determined by the signing of the US-Japan Security Treaty 
in September 1951 bringing Japan into the US-centred collective security system.36 Furthermore, 
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due to Japan's lack of natural resources, Japan was forced to receive most of its food, fuel, and 
raw materials from either the US, or states within its sphere of influence. In addition, Japan 
tended to produce manufactured goods for states within this sphere. This only served to heighten 
the relationship of dependence between Japan and the US. In other words, the hegemonic role 
played by the US in the post-W.W.II international system precluded the need for an independent 
Japanese policy. As interests coincided on the issues of a multilateral free trade system and a 
system of stable exchange-rate mechanisms, Japan was willing to put its faith in US world 
leadership, minimise its security expenditure, and conduct a foreign policy in a submissive 
position to that of the US.37 The Cold War symbolised prosperity and stability for Japan in c0-
operation with the US, while other states within the Western bloc were willing to tolerate Japan's 
closed markets and aggressive export policies for the sake of global security. It is argued that 
Japan, having demonstrated an excessive adaptation to the favourable Cold War structure of 
bipolarity, could not begin to adapt its domestic institutions to transformations in the intemational 
system in the 1980s and 1990s, and that out of habit Japan has simply continued to play the part 
of the reactive state follOwing the US.38 Thus, the US has, over time, become a strong norm both 
regulating and constituting Japanese policy. 
,Although concemed with Japan's aid policy and role within multilateral development 
banks, Dennis Yasutomo draws a useful and clear distinction between the concepts of reactivity 
and pro-activity. He develops the term reactive in a broader sense than Calder'S interpretation. 
Initially Yasutomo encapSUlates writing thus far on reactivity in the following terms: 
Japan's reactivity is portrayed as a congenital defect of the body politic, deeply embedded in the post· 
war national psyche and the policy process. It constitutes the identity of the Japanese state and nation. 
This picture argues or implies that reactivity applies to Japan's entire diplomacy, not just to the political 
dimension, that it subordinates indigenous motives or interests, de-emphasizes will or choice, and 
makes few efforts to shape, rather than take the shape of, the environment. This is not the profile of a 
great power; it is the profile of a dysfunctional state and a passive, stagnant diplomacy.39 
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The result of what is described above is that the only force for change comes from outside 
Japan. Inoguchi puts it in the following terms, I".[p)ressure from overseas seems to be the only 
force that can transcend the framework of Diet operations, strike down the vested interests 
syndicate, and remodel Japan into a fair society eager to contribute to the intemational 
community.'40 Moreover, it is argued, repeated pressure from outside does not tend to produce 
healthy debate on issues and thereby create the appropriate environment for promoting a pro-
active foreign policy. Thus, as far as Japan's contribution to intemational society is concemed, 
this analysis would point to the role of the US in encouraging Japan's contribution, in a similar 
way to the neo-realist approach ouHlned in Chapter One. The US-Japan security alliance has 
repeatedly been called 'the world's most important bilateral relationship-bar none.'41 For the 
time being, a strong relationship between the two most important economies in the world seems 
likely to persist. This is in the interests of the US as 'there is no more important bilateral 
relationship than the one we have with Japan. It is fundamental to both our Pacific security policy 
and our global strategic objectives ... the lynch pin of US security policy in Asis.'42 
Tying this interpretation of Japan's foreign and security policies specifically to the field of 
peacekeeping, the influence of the US as a norm in forcing Japan to playa subservient role 
during the Cold War period is evident. The institutionalisation of the relationship with the US can 
be seen in opinion polls throughout the post-war period: 
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TABLE II: SHOULD JApAN JOIN THi FREE WORLD, THE COMMUNIST CAMP, OR BE NEUTRAL? 
(Answers in percent)43 
, , 
Year 
1960 
1963 
1966 
1969 " 
1972 
1975 
1978 
1980 
" ' 
Communist World 
1 
1 \ 
1 
2 
2 
2 , 
2 
2 
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Be Neutral 
32 
28 
31 
30 
34 
29 
, 25 
25 
Free World 
44 
45 
41 
44 
37 
41 
49 
55 
Despite vocal and violent opposition to the security ties with the US, it would be foolhardy 
to downplay the importance this arrangement has had upon Japan's national identity and 
policymaking process. Especially in the late-1970s and early-1980s with the US withdrawal from 
Vietnam and the intensification of Cold War tensions, the security ties with the US were 
expanded in scope. As a result, the 1978 Guidelines on US-Japanese Defence Co-operation 
promoted exchange between the SDF and US military. Under the Nakasone administration, this 
trend was actively pursued as Japan attempted to shape itself as an unsinkable aircraft carrier as 
part of the US global strategy against Communism. . 
Thus, with the US providing for Japan's security, a norm developed in Japan's foreign and 
security poliCies that dictated that there was no need or desire to partiCipate in UNPKO when 
attention was being paid to economic recovery and the US could be relied upon. The initial high 
rate of coincidence in voting patterns between Japan and the US provides evidence of thiS.44 
Ueki contends that dependence upon the US rendered Japan's policy reactive and that reliance 
upon the US ensured that Japan could not openly criticise its ally. However, although certainly 
true for the early period of Japan's entry into the UN, the 1980s saw Japan take independent 
initiatives as voting patterns started to diverge from those of the US. The 1980s was a period 
when the US turned away from the UN. However, in contrast to Calder's thesis, Japan viSibly 
increased its contribution. The reasons for this dichotomy in policy can be explained by an 
inability on the part of Japan to ally with the extreme and non-participatory policies of the US, 
policies which left a vacuum to be filled. The US Ambassador to the UN, Jean Kirkpatrick's policy 
of never consulting Japan on UN issues, and the Kassebaum amendment capping US 
contributions to the UN budget provoked Japan into sponsoring reform plans of PKO and the UN 
as a whole in order to assist the functioning of the UN and to bring the US back into the UN 
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fold.45 
A Singaporean diplomat, Tommy B. Koh, encapsulated the role of the US as a norm in 
stating that the US-Japan Security Treaty of 1960 is an important pillar of peace and stability in 
Asia and the Pacific: 'If Japan stopped relying on the US nuclear umbrella and became an 
independent power, it would destabilize the region .'46 It was the strong encouragement of the US 
which led to the creation of the National Police Reserve in 1950, converted to a National Safety 
Force in 1952 and finally assuming the title of SDF in 1954. During this period minesweepers 
were sent by Japan to assist the UN forces after a request from the US. This is another area 
where the norm of paCifism clashed with the norm of the role of the US in the intemational 
system. Furthermore, US pressure in 1968 was evident in US Ambassador to the UN, George 
Ball, remarking in Tokyo that the UN's ability to send observers and armed contingents on 
peacekeeping missions to the world's danger spots would be vital to future peace.47 Once again 
this call for action, as with the other cases mentioned above, was met with immobile statements 
on the paramount position of the Japanese Constitution. 
The attitudes of East Asian nations, especially China and the two Koreas, who suffered 
under the yoke of Japanese imperialism from the tum of the century, have also had a regulative 
norm, like the US, rendering Japan's foreign policy reactive to outside stimulus. The areas in 
which this norm has been most salient have included the controversy Over Yasukunl Shrine in 
Tokyo dedicated to the spirit of Japan's war dead, the revision of Japanese schoolbooks and how 
they address Japan's modem history, and Japan's level of militarisation.48 Although Shigemltsu 
in his initial speech to the UN proposed to play the role of a bridge between East and West. 
Japan rarely managed to do this, although on occasions this role has prompted Japan to behave 
In a pro-active manner. One successful attempt was in 1959 when Laos. faced with military 
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incursions from Vietnam, brought the matter to the UN. Japan was seen by the West and the 
parties to the conflict as an acceptable mediator and a potentially explosive Cold War conflict 
was averted.49 However, the Japanese inability to take an active stance over certain policies for 
fear of alienating fellow East Asian nations was evident in the adoption of a conciliatory policy in 
the Congo, Cyprus, and can be seen Japan's tradition of working with nations of the non-aligned 
movement. 
However, in general, both Japan's UNPKO policy and its foreign policy in general was 
deeply influenced by the regulatory norms of the relationship with the US and the attitudes of 
East Asian neighbours and as a result Japan's policy tended, until the 1980s, to be reactive. Only 
in the 1980s and the 1990s, with the collapse of the Cold War structure the growth in the work of 
the UN, did Japan's policy come under the influence of a differing international norm, as will be 
shown later. 
THE JAPANESE STATE AND DoMESTIC NORMS 
Calder also attempted to examine Japan's reactivity at the domestic level by looking at Japan's 
political and social structure. In Calder's investigation, Internal constraints could be witnessed 
during the 1980s in the fragmented character of state authority, as Karel van Wolfaren put it, ' ... a 
complex of overlapping hierarchies .. " There is no supreme institution with ultimate policymaking 
jurlsdiction.'5o In addition to the structure of the ministries in Japanese state authority, the 
structure of the Japanese electoral system also, in Calder's opinion, before its reform, failed to 
encourage a pro-active foreign policy. These ideas are supported by Peter F. Cowhey who put 
forward the idea more strongly that domestic institutions colour a state's policy, 'a country's rise 
to great power [status} does not assure a conversion from International free riding. Increased 
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power may make it logical for a country to become ,a Mgood citizen- internationally, but its political 
institutions may not support that position.'s1 Calder states that with the fragmented character of 
state authority in Japan, decisive action was more difficult to achieve than in countries with a 
central chief executive. The problem is still today exacerbated by overlapping hierarchies and the 
issue of which ministry has jurisdiction over a particular issue.52 Japanese politics is 
characterised by factional divisions, a slow process of consensus building, a weakened Prime 
Minister who is 'the custodian of the national consensus, not the creator of it,' and a heavy 
reliance on the bureaucracy. 53 The bureaucracy is seen by some to be more influential than the 
political parties or individual politicians.54 
In Calder's thesis, the existence of regional chambers of commerce, dominated by small 
agricultural federations and small businesses with no interest in intemational affairs, except to 
resist foreign encroachments into Japan's domestic markets, precluded any pressure to conduct 
a pro-active foreign policy. To further compound this state of affairs, during the 1970s and 1980s, 
these groups entered into quasi-alliances with politicians and diplomats to enforce an even more 
reactive policy. Calder mentions in passing larger business federations, like Keidanren, which are 
dismissed as too nebulous to conduct a consistent policy encompassing all members' interests.55 
Calder cites the existence of medium-size electoral districts which forced as many as five 
members of the same party to run against each other. As a result, extremely small shifts in the 
vote became central to a candidate's chances of success and candidates were forced Into a 
state of extreme sensitivity to constituency affairs, particularly the concerns of agriculture and 
small businesses. This necessity led to the issues of international affairs slipping down a 
candidate's list of priorities. Politicians tended to concem themselves with parochial issues at the 
expense of vision and expertise in foreign affairs. Calder claims that empirical research has 
92 
demonstrated that politicians specialising in foreign affairs tended to do badly at the polls. 56 
Cowhey supports this view of particularist politics, stressing that foreign policy is not a rewarding 
undertaking for Japanese politicians.57 
As Calder's thesis deals chiefly with economic foreign policy in the 1980s, it would be 
overly harsh to criticise this exposition for not addressing issues more relevant to current security 
and foreign policy. The important point is that, this study, like Calder's, also perceives a domestic 
norm influencing foreign policymaking. However, it is rooted not in the electoral and ministerial 
systems in Japan, but in the pacifist norm of Japanese society. This internal norm originated in 
the post-W.W.II settlement and Constitution, particularly the Preamble and Article IX, and the 
efforts of intellectuals, social movements, political parties, especially the Socialists, to give them 
roots in Japanese civil society. The importance of this particular internal norm as a constraining 
factor can be seen in the fact that a number of Japanese Prime Ministers, including Kishi 
Nobusuke and Sat6 Eisaku, were wholly in favour of expanding Japan's military support for the 
US in Asia, but still were limited by the domestic, societal norm of pacifism institutionalised in the 
Constitution. Addressing the norms and core beliefs of Japanese civil society, lacking in a neo-
realist or neo-liberal approach, is crucial to understanding its security policy, as over time they 
evolve into what Emile Durkheim has termed, 'social factS.'58 Pacifism in Japan has a deeply 
social Origin, unlike Western pacifism which is rooted in Christianity. 59 Before W.W.II there was a 
small, but vocal. tradition of pacifism led by thinkers such as Andt> ShOeki, Shidehara KijOr6, and 
Nitobe Jnaz6. The sociaJ element and durability of Japanese pacifism can be seen in the Ashio 
copper mine incident of 1903 where pollution from a copper mine supplying the military infected 
the local water supply and resulted in a number of protest marches in Tokyo.eo However. this 
early pacifism was greatly put in the shadows by Japan's militarism and Invasion of East Asia. 
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Yet, defeat as encapsulated by the two atomic bombs, the firebombing of Tokyo, and the 
American occupation provided the experience which gave this pacifist norm meaning in 
Japanese society as seen in recurrent opinion polls.51 There is a sense that any expansion of the 
military in Japanese society will jeopardise the democratic society Japan has become since 
W.W.lI.-a particularly prominent theme during the 1960 demonstrations surrounding the 
extension of the US.Japan Security Treaty. The idea of pacifism in one country is still very strong 
in Japanese society; in other words, although other nations may adopt an aggressive stance, 
Japan should rise above this and maintain a peaceful approach to the conduct of its foreign 
policy. A pacifist public' opinion also stems from a belief that concentrating on economic 
development and prosperity should shape Japanese foreign polley, ensuring Japan's economic 
welfare and leading to a world free from conflict. Japan's pacifist stance has been manifested In 
both the Constitution of 1947 and the Kyoto school (gskuhs) interpretation that the spirit of the 
Constitution is always the same and should not be changed by interpretation due to the whims of 
particular politicians in power at that time. This norm is reinforced by the SDF Jaw, several policy 
documents, and adopted resolutions like the one percent limit on military spending or the three 
non-nuclear principles. These elements that make up Japan's limited military stance either 
originated from outside stimulus (e.g., the Constitution, which although accepted by the 
Japanese people and hardly imposed by the US, was a result of the occupation period), or were 
domestic responses to either external or internal pressures to limit Japan's military growth (e.g., 
the one percent spending limit). 
Traditionally, Japanese civil society has always partiCipated actively In elections. However, 
public opinion has usually been an abstract constraint on policymaking, not a solid, preventive 
barrier. As witnessed in the government's policy towards the recognition of South Korea and the 
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revision of the US-Japan Security Treaty in 1960, public opinion only delayed government 
policy.62 Altematively, public opinion can act as a stimulus to undertake a particular policy, as in 
the case of the reversion of Okinawa and establishment of diplomatic ties with China.63 Public 
opinion has manifested itself successfully and actively in the form of citizen's movements 
especially concerned with the environmental problems caused by Japan's rapid post-war 
economic growth which 'became a noisy, smelly, overcrowded, unhealthy testament to human 
greed.'64 The citizen's groups organised around, most famously, the Minamata disease, and 
victims of the A-bomb attacks (hibakusha), can be regarded as successfully forcing the LOP to 
recognise the issues and eventually pay compensation. These kind of pressure groups have 
been more successful than the traditional Western trade union-centred form of political protest. 
Trade Unions have traditionally been tied to the Social Democrats who themselves have almost 
constantly been in a position of opposition and after the October 1996 Lower House elections 
lost its role as the major left-wing party to the Communists. Not a great number of Japanese are 
members of any given trade union that adds to the inefficacy of unions. Student activism has also 
waned in influence from the days of pro-activism in the 1960s to a position of apathy and 
conservatism amongst students in the 1980s and 199Os. However, the power of civil SOCiety In 
Japan may be regarded as on the Increase in the future with the changes to the electoral system 
in 1994. There is an argument that the extent to which politicians can now be punished and must 
remain accountable to the electorate has increased. An age of coalition govemments will mean 
that small shifts In the vote will lead to the fall of govemments the populace falls to support.56 
Relating the role of domestic pacifism to Japan's UNPKO participation, during Diet 
debates on the draft Constitution, the extent of Japan's contribution to the UN has been raised 
including the possible need for constitutional revision. Immediately after the war Nanbara Shigeru 
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raised the issue in terms of the world community expecting a peace based on justice in which 
Japan would be expected to participate, especially in the UN's peace activities.56 Sasaki S6ichi 
also raised the issue in the House of Peers stressing co-operative efforts to attain intemational 
peace and the importance of Japan's active role therein. In both these cases, the Yoshida 
administration's reaction was to stress specifically the centrality of Article IX to Japan's foreign 
policy and refused to postulate on how Japan may react upon joining the UN.67 The government 
continually stressed Japan's right to individual self-defence but not collective self-defence. Thus, 
in 1954 the SDF Laws made to include contain articles prohibiting the despatch of SOF troops 
abroad mainly in consideration of what Japan might be obliged to do under the terms of the 
treaty with the US, although with obvious implications for UNPKO. 
When in 1956 Japan did join the UN it was maintained by the government that the 
Constitution forbade any despatch of military forces for the purpose of using armed force and 
that the UN's peace activities was a manifestation of this. Soon after Japan served its first term 
as non-permanent member of the UNSC and played an integral roJe in the drafting of the 
resolution establishing UNOGIL. Ambassador Matsudaira Koto was asked by UN Secretary-
General Dag Hammarskjold whether Japan would be in a position to despatch military observers 
but was turned down due to the controversy surrounding the newly created SDF. Thus, upon 
admission to the UN in 1956 fears were widespread in government, public and media circles 
about what role Japan would play in security arrangements, and whether the Charter would 
compromise and militarise Japan's role in the world. During this period Article IX was an oft-
quoted restricting factor of some significance. For example, upon being questioned by LOP 
" 
politician Namagi Yoshio, Foreign Minister Okazaki Katsuo acknowledged the argument for 
"" 
sending troops abroad but insisted that in the case of Japan, due to Article IX and its denial of 
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the right of belligerence, it would be improper for Japan to contribute and overstep the bounds of 
the Constitution.68 This opinion was reiterated by Shimoda TakezO, Chief of the Treaties Division, 
stressing the despatch of Japanese troops within the limits imposed by the Constitution as being 
'impossible'.69 However, an equally important legal obstacle was the Self-Defence Force Law 
which had to be altered to allow the despatch of Japanese troops. During the Cold War period 
this was impossible due to domestic and Socialist opposition within the Diet.TO The Constitution, 
Article IX, and the SDF's lack of a legal framework to allow SDF despatch were prohibiting 
factors leading to a policy of what has been termed 'chequebook diplomacy' and chiefly financial 
and minimal personnel contributions to the UN. The opposition parties supported co-operation 
with the UN but regarded the LOP's motives as being based upon a desire to expand the 
interpretation of· the Constitution.71 It must be remembered that in this period classic 
peacekeeping operations involved the carrying and use of weapons; therefore, Japan's 
participation was limited to the financial sphere. 
Early on, sections of the Japanese government did make clear that they wished to 
promote expansion of Japan's role within UNPKO and that the Constitution and Article IX would 
not be regarded as an impediment. In 1963 the Budget Committee declared: 
Inspection activities of the UN Forces not accompanied by any military action would lie outside the 
scope of Article IX; nor would the participation of Japan in an intemational police force in the true 
sense of the word be prohibited under ArtIcle IX of the Constitution. 72 
And in 1966: 
if Articie 42 [of the UN Charter] were to be set in motion, the actions taken would be that of the UN 
and not military activities of individual Member States, and thus would not amount to the exercise of 
the belligerent right of each state participating in it.73 
However, these attempts at widening Japan's role invariably led to a related restricting 
, 
factor in the form of East Asia and the debt of history ensuring that Japan's policy vis-a-vis 
peacekeeping would be minimal. In general Japan's war experience was a constraining factor; 
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shock of defeat in W.W.II and the occupation, the poverty that followed, the Yoshida Doctrine's 
emphasis upon economic prosperity, and, as will be seen in a later section, a desire not to 
alienate East Asian neighbours limited the debate on PKO participation within Japan.74 
Public opinion was both a source of activity and passivity. The UN has always been highly 
thought of in Japan with opinion pofls regularly expressing a very high percentage of support for 
the security mechanisms of the UN, and the UN in general. However, public opinion has also 
been a constraining factor whenever issues involving the despatch of the SDF were raised,15 The 
MOFA has described this period as providing the Japanese people with a 'psychological cocoon 
that had protected them from the world at large throughout the post-war years'.76 By the 1990s 
the pacifist norm had become so embedded in Japanese society that it was true to the degree 
that the 'post-war military restraints have become the core of the country's self-image'.n One 
analyst has asserted that Japan 'has no goals and ideas of its own to offer the world and thus 
lacks the ability to lead effectively ... the values that shape the Japanese paradigm are not, by 
definition, designed to benefit the rest of the worId'.78 This is an extreme and inaccurate 
interpretation, and, as will be seen in the following chapter, this norm came into conflict with other 
norms described below with the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait and the consequent Second Gulf War, 
as will be seen in the following chapter. 
THE RISING STATE AND INTERNATIONAL SOCIETY 
The literature, which contends that Japan, once a reactive state, has recenUy begun to pursue a 
more pro-active foreign ~icy, yet stopping short of a full·blown political big power, is linked 
strongly to the idea of relative decline of US hegemony. The Yoshida Doctrine served Japan's 
national interest well until the relative decline of US hegemony, shifts In the configuration of the 
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international system, and the changing security environment with the onset of the Second Cold 
War in the 19705 and 1980s forced Japan to pursue a more independent security policy. The 
decline in US hegemony could be seen in the withdrawal from Vietnam, the achievement of 
superpower strategic parity in nuclear weapons and the oil crises of the 19705. Akaha Tsuneo 
argues that with the declining ability of the US to stabilise the intemational system, as seen in 
Vietnam, Japan was forced to pursue a more independent policy of economic security, 
encouraged by President Reagan's emphasiS on burden sharing. This Situation was 
compounded by the onset of the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan, the appearance of Soviet bases 
on the Kurile Islands, the Korean Airlines Incident, and the military build-up of forces in East Asia, 
In other words the Second Cold War of the 19808. Akaha contends that the policy initiatives 
Japan took in reaction to these developments demonstrated a growing desire to playa more pro-
active role.79 During the 19808 it was believed, among govemment circles, that 'US military 
power can no longer provide the security it once did to its allies to strengthen their self-help 
efforts and particularly in the area of conventional forces, and the credibility of the US 'nuclear 
umbrella' can no longer be maintained without their co-operation with the US.'80 Thus the role of 
a rising Japan, but also a Japan supporting the existing system, developed .. 
Furthermore, with the premiership of Nakasone Yasuhlro In the 19805, a domestically-
based call for a more pro-active Japanese state became more vocal, ', .. the first necessity is a 
change in our thinking. Having ·caught up·, we must now expect others to try to catch up with us. 
We must seek out a new path for ourselves and open it up ourselves.'81 
Japan's role as a rising state was first witnessed In the 19808 when a more pro-active role 
went by the name of 'intematlonalisation'. In a variety of fields, not solefy military, Japan's 
growing desire to move away from Its formerly passive role and undertake a more pro-active role 
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was discemible. It is contended that Japan was seemingly aspiring to playa more visible and 
responsible international role without threatening or challenging the US role as world leader. The 
decline of military power with the end of the Cold War and the growth in importance of economic 
power enabled Japan to make a greater international contribution. With high savings rates and a 
large trade surplus Japan was in a position to underwrite global public policy undertakings. 
Sasaki argues that it was not just the economic success of Japan which led it to assume a 
more pro-active role but the subsequent global recession and necessity to restructure the global 
economy. He also contends that the col/apse of bipolarity in the late 1980s contributed to a more 
independent, pro-active role.82 On a military level, advocates of the rising-state model contend 
that Japan has displayed an 'incremental adaptation within an agreed policy framework.'83 
Nakasone's rise to power also heralded the rise of the defence zoku and meant that attention 
was not paid solely to economic interests. Nakasone was willing to promote Japan as a partner 
of the US, as seen in the portrayal of Japan as an 'unsinkable aircraft carrier' and the removal of 
the one-percent barrier on military spending. With the growth in its economy so the expansion of 
Its military capabilities could be witnessed. The relationship with Washington was strengthened 
but acquired aspects of an alliance, rather than Japan as the junior partner of the US: host nation 
support increased, and Japan co-operated in the SOl program. Particularly in the form of Ozawa 
IchirO a new desire to 'step up to the broad array of global responsibilities ordinarily bome by 
major nations' can be witnessed. 'We have learned that just being a peaceful nation is not much 
of a philosophy if it is not backed up by a willingness to take action In defence of freedom and 
peace.'M Vis-a-vis the fears of other Asian nations over a growing Japanese military role and the 
possibility of Japan as the next world leader, advocates of the rising state thesis would propose 
that the growing role of the SOF can be justified as a growth in the intemational security role of 
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Japan and not the military-defence role of Japan. A non-combat role within UNPKO should not 
be equated with either an increased self-defence role for the SDF or an attempt to project 
Japan's military power abroad. With the increased role of the UN as a peacekeeper Japan is 
increasing its international contribution but stopping short of a blatantly military and hegemoniC 
role. With this argument Japan has defended itself against accusations of growing militarism. 
Domestic apathy was cited in Calder'S work as an obstacle to a pro-active role, yet by portraying 
an increasingly pro-active role as a contribution to the intemational good, domestic (and 
international) fears over the despatch of the SDF can be assuaged. After the Gulf Crisis domestic 
opposition seemingly quickly evaporated as govemment-sponsored public education strategies 
took effect. Even the issue of Article IX and revision of the Constitution are now firmly on the 
agenda of public discussion, an event that a decade ago would have seemed unlikely. Domestic 
support for Japanese pro-activism is very much in evidence with opinion polls demonstrating the 
acceptance of Japan's military role albeit only within the framework of the UN.as According to 
Aurelia George Mulgan, this direction will change the whole outlook of Japan's foreign policy as 
through peacekeeping activities Japan will come into contact with other states on an independent 
basis, not within the framework of its relationship with the US. To this end the UN is the body 
through which Japan aims to promote this new activism and can be seen in the political cartoons 
from the Japanese press included in Appendix II. 
Within the framework of the comprehensive security, Japan also expanded its non-military 
contributions behaving with greater autonomy from the US. This contribution was seen in Japan's 
increasing financial contribution to various agencies of the UN and deployment of electoral 
supervisors in the 1980s on UNPKO.86 Japan has also Increased its aDA contributions as one 
element of its comprehensive security policy to become the largest donor in the world in 1989. 
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Moreover, its one-time deficit in UN personnel and participation in areas other than the social and 
economic field was addressed in the 1980s.87 With the approval Japan has received in public 
opinion polls, its continued growing role seems to have been sanctioned.sa 
. - Yasutomo's interpretation of pro-activism sees Japan as purposive, unaffected by inertia, 
not based solely upon extemal stimuli. The pro-activist stance is differentiated into induced 
activism and promotive activism. Promotive activism shows no signs of reactivity aI/owing for a 
purposive behaviour with no sign of immobility in poUcymaking. The state has a clear conception 
of national interest and attempts to mobilise public opinion in its favour. Induced pro-activism 
al/ows for some reactivity exerting an influence, but this is not the dominant role. Extemal stimuli 
may instigate a policy change but does not shape the resultant policy. Both forms of pro-activism 
concentrate on Japan's own policy decision-making process as the dominant factor imbuing 
reactivity with a peripheral catalytic role. Another form of activism posited by Yasutomo is 
anticipatory activism. Developing the Idea of Induced pro-activism, Yasutomo claims that extemal 
stimuli can play not only a catalytic role but also a formative role. Resultant policy predicts a 
future stimulus from outside. The resultant policy is neither a defiant stand (defensive activism), 
nor excessively pliant (acquiescent activism). Yasutomo describes policymaklng as Ian exercise 
In preventive diplomacy,' with the state in control of domestic and International influences making 
strategic decisions.89 
Under this Interpretation of the Japanese state, a more pluralist viewpoint Is adopted with 
sources of activity originating not only from the US, as the reactive state would suggest, or simply 
from the ruling triad of the LOPI bureaucracy and big business, as the Japan Inc. model would 
suggest. This new pro-activity has targeted the UN as the forum for Japan's International 
contribution. With the end of the Cold War, the UN has been liberated from the East-West 
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confrontation that did so much to curtail its work. 'The UN plumbing has been in place for many 
years, even though nothing was flowing through the pipeS.'90 The end of the Cold War seemingly 
has allowed the water to run freely through the pipes again and the UN has gained in specificity, 
durability and concordance. Furthermore, with a widening in the definition of the term 'security' to 
include economic, environmental, and cultural dimensions the UN appears to be well positioned 
to address the issues of the post-Cold War international system. The reasons given above for 
participating within the enhanced UN system all apply in the case of Japan. Yet there are 
additional catalytic incentives to participate. Robert Immerman has outlined a number of 
elements at play: first, the idealistic way in which the Japanese population regard the UN. The 
UN has regularly polled upwards of 80 percent popularity in opinion polls in Japan and is seen by 
," 
the Japanese population as a yardstick to measure how Japan stands in the international 
community. Furthermore, support for UN agencies' like UNESCO and UNICEF Is especially 
strong in Japan.91 This popularity can be seen in govemment circles If the recent plethora of 
'vision' books by Japanese politicians and the references therein to the UN are taken seriously.92 
Second, the desire of Japan's political and business communities to gain recognition for Japan's 
post-W.W.II economic achievements needs to be mentioned. The political and business 
communities have regula~y attempted to acquire status within the UN by maintaining seats on 
organisations like the OECD and the Economic and Social Council (ECOSOC). Third, the 
Japanese bureaucracy desires to increase' Japan's global contributions incrementally. Fourth, the 
LOP and the MOFA are campaigning to gain a permanent seat on the UN Security Council. The 
MOFA (and particularly the UN Bureau of the MOFA) has, since the 1980s and the US's 
withdrawal from much UN work, attempted to increase Japan's financial contributions and 
personnel, Namibia and Cambodia being 'earty examples of the MOFA's activlsm.93 In addition to 
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Immerman's points, the external influence of the Secretary-General must be taken into account. 
With the increase in UNPKO Japan appears to be in a position to pick up an ever-increasing 
cheque and the Secretary-General can encourage, in the way Robert Cox suggests, Japan to 
underwrite UN expenses and contribute personnel by offering support for Japan's UNSC seat 
bid. 
With the influence of international society embodied in the UN, the realisation of the 
following tenet of Japan's foreign policy can be discerned, and will be examined in more detail in 
the next section: 
. The strengthening of the world organization as a means of maintaining International peace and 
security is one of the fundamental policies of Japan.94 
UN..cENTRED DIPLOMACY 
The UN system was welcomed by most shades of Japanese political opinion upon Japan's 
admission in 1956. From the point of view of the Yoshida administration, the UN was a 
mechanism by which the Security Treaty with the US could be justified. If the treaty made 
reference to the UN Charter and its principles then the Japanese public could be persuaded into 
accepting American bases on Japanese soil as a duty under the popular principles of the UN 
Charter.95 However, Japan's participation in UNPKO was an extremely divisive issue for some 
time, as seen in the divisions in the Socialist Party caused by Sone Eki, the party's Foreign 
Affairs spokesman, who in a 1954 party congress document outiined a new direction for 
Japanese foreign policy which involved a more equal Security Treaty with the US, support for a 
policy of gradual rearmament, and the participation of Japanese troops in UNPKO. Divisions 
were overcome by the suggestion of a permanent UN armed force to deal with peacekeeping 
while the issue of Japan's participation therein was not raised.96 Debates within the Diet also 
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prevailed centring around the question of. whether Japan would be forced under UN membership 
to despatch Japanese troops abroad on missions like that in Korea, or if Japan could fulfil the 
criteria for membership if it were not to despatch troops on peacekeeping operations. In June 
1954 the House of Councillors eventually silenced debate on the issue and approved a resolution 
preventing the despatch overseas of the Self-Defence Forces.97 
Japan's admission to the UN in 1956 saw the proclamation of the three pillars of Japan's 
foreign policy: first, the centrality of the UN; second, Japan would co-operate with the democratic 
nations of the world; and third, Japan would align itself with the nations of Asia. This year also 
saw the creation of the National Defence Council (NDC) charged with the duty of creating 
national defence policies and plans-its pivotal contribution being the Basic Policy for National 
Defence (BPND) of May, 1957. Article I of the BPND stressed the importance of support for UN 
peace activities. However, until such a time as the UN could function as envisaged at the end of 
W.W.II, Article IV called for the Japan's defence policy to be aligned in the event of an external 
threat with the US.98 Thus, although the strength of the US norm was ultimately persuasive in the 
Cold War period, recognition and respect for the norm of the UN was noteworthy from the time of 
Japan's admission to the UN and was used by defence planners in promoting the bilateral 
relationship with the US. This was a similar line to that taken in Article IV of the US..Japan 
Security Treaty of September, 1951 which stated that; , 
This Treaty shall expire whenever in the opinion of the Governments of the United States of America 
and of Japan there have come into force such United Nations arrangements or such alternative 
Individual or collective security dispositions as will satisfactorily provide for the malntenance by the 
United Nations or otherwise of international peace and security in the Japan Area.-
Thus, 'UN-centred diplomacy' was never defined in concrete terms and the early period of 
Japan's membership within the UN was characterised by winning elections and Increasing its 
representation within the UN system in an attempt to establish itself, while relying on the US for 
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its security needs. However, soon after gaining membership Japan was faced with the West Irian 
dispute and managed to play with some success the role of a bridge between East and West, as 
Foreign Minister Shigemitsu Mamoru had envisaged in his advocacy of the three pillars of 
Japan's foreign policy. Japan's aim was to dilute Third World radicalism and find some 
accommodation with the Western nations. 
In 1958 Hammarskjold promoted the idea of active Japanese participation by inviting the 
despatch of personnel on the observer mission UNOGIL in the Lebanon. Despite this early fonn 
of gaiatsu, the Japanese government declined due to the hostile domestic climate and the lack of 
legal provision for the despatch of Japanese personnel on UN peacekeeping operations. 
However, the following year it did decide to despatch a diplomat to a minor fact-finding mission in 
Laos-a policy that was repeated in 1971 and 1982. At this time Professor Sakamoto Yoshikazu 
of Tokyo University published his seminal article, The Defence Structure of a Neutral Japan 
(ChOritsu Nihon no B6ei K6z6), and placed further emphasis on Japan's relationship with the UN. 
Sakamoto envisaged a UN Police Force, similar to that despatched to Egypt during the Suez 
Crisis, as an alternative to reliance upon the US for Japan's security needs. This UN-sanctioned 
multinational force of international officials (kokusai k6muin) would be stationed in Japan and, 
unlike the US-Japan Security Treaty, would guarantee a truly Independent defence policy and 
inspire reassurance within the Japanese people. 1OO In this way, the Idea of reliance upon the UN 
rather than the US was mooted at this early stage. As will be demonstrated in the following 
empirical chapters, the end of the Cold War enabled Sakamoto's ideas of UN-centrlsm to regain 
some currency. 
In 1961 Prime Minister Ikeda contended that despatch of the SDF could be constitutional if 
the particular peacekeeping operation was one of policing and maintaining law and order. Due to 
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oPPOsition objections the government did not attempt to push the issue. Although 1961 also saw 
Matsudaira acknowledge that it was inconsistent for Japan to adhere to UN principles and not 
make its troops available for peacekeeping operations, he was forced by the Diet to withdraw the 
comment. 101 Hayashi SuzOj Director-General of the Cabinet Legislation Bureau clarified the 
government's position in the wake of Matsudaira's comment in the following terms: 
If the UN police activities are conducted in an ideal form, In other words, when 8 country that 
disrupted order within the UN system is to be punished, or in the case of establishing a police corps 
to maintain order, and it a unitary force under the UN ;s created with the participation of personnel 
despatched by member countries, then [Japan's participation In a force] would not be an act of a 
sovereign nation. Also there is a possibility of a peaceful police force which does not conduct military 
activities. These possibilities would not pose problems relating to the First Clause of Article IX. 102 , 
Thus, the importance of the UN as a norm and standard in international society was 
beginning to be evident as Japan sought to respond to intemational expectations. Furthermore, 
Japan sat upon the Special Committee for Peacekeeping within the UN, being appointed in 
February 1965 by the President of the General Assembly with the aim of undertaking a 
comprehensive, review of financing UN peacekeeping operations.103 Japan subsequently 
reported to the 20th and 21st Sessions of the General Assembly In 1966 and 1967 respectively 
. , 
supporting Canada in adopting a broader method of financing peacekeeping operations to 
include permanent members of the Security Council. At the same time, with Canadian 
diSillusionment with its peacekeeping role in the UNEF operation, Japan was considered as a 
likely contender to adopt the role of peacekeeper for the SDF as part of a contribution to the 
, 
international community .104 Subsequently studies regularly appeared suggesting that Japan 
ought to attempt to despatch the SDF on UNPKO, particularly a report in 1970 published by the 
UN bureau of the MOFA and in 1977 by the Nomura Institute. A similar middle road was forged in 
Japan's consequent UNPKO policy. As regards the Congo, Japan had opposed any radical Third 
World proposals that singled out Belgium and the Congolese Army for ,blame, supporting a 
107 
moderate solution put forward by the US and Britain.105 Similarly with the despatch of the 
UNFICYP operation Japan opposed an Asian-African stance that took sides with Greece against 
Turkey, giving its support to a statement sponsored by Afghanistan which preserved respect and 
recognition for Cypriot independence, sovereignty. and territory. 
The 1980s witnessed one of the most active periods of Japan's PKO policy. 1980 saw 
Japan propose certain guidelines for the reinforcement of fact-finding missions to the Committee 
on the Charter of the UN and on the Strengthening of the Role of the Organization. These 
proposals included the strengthening of Article IX regarding the role of the Secretary-General 
and the constraining of Security Council duties. Japan's proposals aimed to see the creation of a 
subsidiary organ to be despatched on fact-finding missions and an end to Security Council 
unanimity on the despatch of these fact-finding missions. The govemment made clear its 
Interpretation of Japanese partiCipation in UNPKO in 1980: 
It Is impossible to discuss the right or wrong of Japan's participation In a UN force In general 
because the so-called UN forces have different objectives and minions. If the objectives and 
missions of the UN force in question Include the use of force, we believe that the Constitution does 
not allow the participation of the SDF in it. On the other hand, If their objectives and missions do not 
Include the use of force, the Constitution does not prohibit the participation of the SDF. But because 
the current SDF law does not give such a mission to the $OF, the SDF Is not aI/owed to participate 
in it.106 
. Prime Minister Suzuki Zen tarO addressed the 37th General Assembly in June 1982 
proposing 'the possibility of establishing a mechanism whereby both global and regional military 
situations could be monitored and made public as deemed proper', stressing 'the modalities of 
co-operation by Member States in peacekeeping operatlons'.107 Later that year, Japan proposed 
a resolution to. the 37th General Assembly working closely with nations of the non-aligned 
movement, such as Yugoslavia, Austria. India, Sweden, and Egypt. In reaction to Secretary-
General Perez de Cuellar's appeal in his annual report highlighting the global insecurity of the 
time, Japan's proposal aimed to strengthen the peacekeeping aspects of the UN by creating a 
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small group of experts under the Secretary-General 'to undertake technical studies regarding the 
strengthening and expansion of UN peacekeeping functions',108 Although the plan for a panel of 
experts did not materialise, Japan did manage to pass successfully resolution 37/67 in the face 
of Western major power opposition, a resolution stressing 'the imperative need to strengthen the 
role and effectiveness of the UN',109 The logical conclusion of promoting this kind of proposal 
was that Japan would be called upon to make a greater contribution, Furthermore, these 
proposals were made at a time when public opinion was beginning to shift to allow greater 
participation (including manpower and not just financial aid) by Japan within UNPKO.110 Before 
the opening of the General Assembly both houses of the Japanese Diet unanimously passed a 
declaration of support for disarmament, particularly nuclear disarmament, and Suzuki was, thus, 
fully oognisant of the acceptance of and support for the promotion of peace through the UN, as 
he addressed the General Assembly: 
I stand here today in this Assembly Hall, representing the collective wi" of the Japanese people, as 
expressed in those resolutions. I am convinced from the bottom of my heart that the common 
aspiration for peace of all peoples of the world is concentrated in this room, our mission here is to 
combine our efforts in response to this common aspiration of mankind and to move decisively 
together on the road to peace. 111 
These proposals were re-emphasised by Foreign Minister Sakurauchi Yoshio in October 
1982 by proposing 'a system of prior registration and organisation of the personnel and 
equipment which the member states are ready to contribute to future operations; and the 
seouring of effective financial backing', and that 'Japan, for its part, is ready to co-operate more 
actively in the strengthening of the peacekeeping operations of the UN.'112 Soon after there was 
talk in the press and in government circles of Japan revising the SDF law to allow the despatch 
of the SDF on election monitOring operations. '13 The Suzuki administration was keen to continue 
Japan's long-term. commitment to the UN as a global peacekeeper and expand the role of the 
SDF in UNPKO, However, the strength of the internal pacifist norm ensured that any despatch 
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would be highly sensitive and that the MOFA would have to skirt around the issue by proposing 
such ideas as sending observers to the UN, SDF medical teams and retired SDF members.114 
Despite the constraint of the pacifist norm, the centrality of the UN to Japanese security and 
foreign policy was evident and Ogata is correct in surmising that the further increase in Japan's 
role was dependent on the UN and in particular the role of the Secretary-General-a theme that 
will become more evident in the next chapter as peacekeeping establishes itself more solidly as a 
norm with the end of the Cold War as in the case of Japan is able to 'circumvent this [the 
Constitution] barrier to SDF role expansion.'115 
. In 1983 the MOFA enthusiastically promoted the 'blue ribbon' committee report on Japan's 
role in UNPKO despite opposition which finally sank the proposal. The report promoted a more 
active and broader role for Japan in UNPKO by advocating participation in police operations, 
logistic support, transportation and communications, medical activities, election supervision, and 
the despatch of military personnel on patrol and supervision missions. It recommended the 
strengthening of the UNSC and Secretary-General yet with an incremental approach so as not to 
alienate Japanese public opinion. '16 In 1984 Japan again declared explicitly its intent 'to c0-
operate with the world body's mission to be despatched to monitor the partial cease-fire between 
Iran and Iraq ... by providing civilian personnel, necessary equipment or financial assistance.'117 
However, this avocation was softened somewhat by the subsequent distancing comments made 
by Foreign Minister Abe ShintarO that 'Japan will neither attempt to become a major military 
power nor send numbers of its Self-Defence Forces on overseas peacekeeping missions.'118 
In 1988 Japan's proposals were eventually adopted aiming at encouraging member states 
'to prevent in their international relations the emergence or aggravation of disputes or situations'; 
encouraging the Security Council '[to send], at an early stage, fact-finding or good offices 
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missions 'or establishing appropriate forms of UN presence, including observers and 
peacekeeping operations'; and encouraging the Secretary-General 'to consider using, at as a 
early a stage as he deems appropriate, the right that is accorded him under Article IX of the [UN] 
Charter.'119 
The UNTAG operation in Namibia provided an opportunity for Japan to expand its 
participation within UNPKO. The Japanese delegation to the UN stated the intention to contribute 
civilian personnel to the election monitoring process in Namibia as early as 1980.120 Thereafter, 
Secretary-General Perez de Cuellar suggested in 1983 that, 'Japan should playa more positive 
and broader·ranging role in peacekeeping operations', and UNTAG, with a considerable civilian 
element, was seen to be the perfect forum for this expansion .121 This came to fruition in 1989 
, 
with the despatch of 31 electoral observers to Namibia with the duties of monitoring elections and 
continued with the despatch of a team of six to monitor elections in Nicaragua under the 
ONUVEN operation. In fact 1987 had already seen the despatch of two MOFA representatives to 
the UN operation in India and Pakistan (UNMOGIP) at a time when Japan's financial 
contributions to UNPKO was steadily on the rise. 
In summary, as posited by Robert Cox in his article on the executive head, the Secretary-
, . 
General of the UN at times petitioned Japan and solicited support, aid and personnel. Although 
Originally always considering but refusing requests for assistance, in the 1980s Japan began to 
meet requests from the Secretary-General and contributed personnel and financial aid to the 
UNIIMOG and UNTAG operations. Internally, this is because the MOFA has always been in 
favour of a greater role for Japan in peacekeeping operations with the aim of enhancing Japan's 
chances of a permanent seat on the UN Security Council.122 Throughout the Cold War period the 
MOFA attempted to increase Japan's contribution whenever the opportunity arose although at 
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times was forced to tone down any blatant support for despatch of the SDF on UNPKO. 
THE JAPANESE STATE IN THE POST-COLD WAR WORLD 
Susan J. Pharr developed the defensive state model of the Japanese state, particularly in the 
post-Cold War world, as a reaction to the two depictions of Japanese foreign policy discussed 
above. Japanese foreign policy is regarded as: 
a low-risk, benefit-maximizing strategy that has served Japan's national seIf·lnterest extraordinarily well 
in the past, and that continues to do so today. The strategy is essentially defensive In character; yet to 
call it 'reactive' misses the point, for what is impressive is the degree to which Japan, faced with a 
barrage of pressures from the United States and other industrial nations, hes actively and successfully 
manoeuvred to advantage among them while seeking to avoid risks of all klnds.123 
Pharr uses the analogy of defensive driving to describe the defensive state. Under this 
analogy driving defensively is regarded as neither aggressive, nor passive. She regards Japan 
as not behaving according to a grand design but choosing its policy from a variety of paths 
available. In this sense, Japanese foreign policy acQuires a certain degree of activism, yet 
decisions are made through a process of debate coloured by internal and external pressures. 
The 'defensive state' model is seen to exhibit a number of characteristics of activism: aversion to 
risks, low cost, and continuity in objectives throughout the entire post-W.W.II period. To illustrate 
. this strategy Pharr has taken the issue of defence burden sharing between the US and Japan. 
Military security is selected as an area of study as it is regarded as an Important international 
public good and because of the fact that the debate has influenced other debates like ODA and 
the deregularisation of markets. Regarding this particular issue, Japan's overriding aim is to gain 
the maximum number of benefits and simultaneously minimise the costs. 
These four factors can be witnessed in Japan's participation in the US led security 
framework; first, risk aversion was demonstrated in Japan's attempts to avoid alienating nations 
which were targeted as adversaries by the Security Treaty with the US. This could be seen in 
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continuing trade with North Vietnam and China, on the one hand, and participating in the policy 
of containment, on the other hand. Furthermore, risks were minimised with the introduction of 
restrictive measures like the three non-nuclear principles, the one-percent military spending 
ceiling, and restrictions on the despatch of the SDF abroad. Second, the low cost of Japan's 
foreign policy was maintained by what Pharr labels 'substitution policy'. This policy entails Japan 
redefining and repackaging defence contributions as various types of aid and debt relief. The 
introduction of comprehensive security in the 1970s was the logical upshot of this policy. Third, 
the activism in Japan's defence posture exists but is masked by a veneer of pacifism. Japanese 
support for US action in Vietnam and Korea and Japanese permission for US vessels carrying 
nuclear weapons to utilise Japanese ports are quoted as manifestations of this policy. Finally, 
continuity can be witnessed in Japan's consistent denial of mltitarisation. In the 19508 the priority 
of economic recovery was cited as the main reason against miHtarisation. The 19608 witnessed 
the 'allergy' of the Japanese to a military role. The 19708 saw the one percent spending barrier, 
and finally the 1980s saw the nationalism provoked by US Japan"bashing used to refute burden-
sharing responsibilities.124 
By Utilising these methods Japan's foreign policy: 
far from being the passive strategy of a reactive state, was a carefully cak:ulated set of actions 
blending well-timed verbal endorsements of US overall policy, dissociation from any overt role In US 
interventions, lucrative back stage support within carefully prescribed limits, and a variety of self· 
containment measures-a blend, in short, that minimized security risk·by·association with the US 
while reaping maximum economic benefits.125 
In contrast to the advocates of the rising state thesis, Pharr proposes that Japanese 
foreign policy did not display any aspects, of change in the 19808· and 1990s. The self-
~ontainment policies continued in the 19808 with military spending at a lower level in 1990 than it 
was in 1955, or 1965.126 Substitution policies continued with the expansion of ODA. The 
Japanese govemment utilised Asian fears of remilitarisation to contain its own military spending. 
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Various forms of co-operation continued between the US and Japan in tandem with risk 
minimisation as Japan co-operated in various UN sanctions but avoided direct, belligerent 
policies. Thus, it is argued that Japan's role in the Second Gulf War was a continuation of the 
defensive state model as no direct role was undertaken, except in the background. 
In a similar fashion, Martin Weinstein addresses the issue of Japan's reactivity through a 
state-centred framework and argues that in the field of security the Japanese govemment had 
clear policy goals and achieved them in a manner elaborated by Pharr, i.e. by absorbing and 
Sidelining pressure from the US but maintaining its objectives.127 A good example of the 
defensive state in action is the role Japan has managed to playas a go-between in regional 
conflicts. Despite gaiafsu from the US in the 1950s for Japan to follow its lead and sever relations 
with Communist China in favour of the Taiwanese government, Japan continued to conduct 
relations with both countries so that by the 19605 China was Japan's largest trading partner.128 
It appears that within the framework of the defensive state, Pharr would argue that 
pressure from the international system and the societal level to make a full-blown or limited 
contribution to the international system is being resisted in Japan and any concessions the state 
may make to the intemational system are to maximise its own benefits, deflect criticism of Japan, 
and continue what Wan would call the 'first strategy' or Yoshida Doctrine. Thus, pressure from 
domestic or extemal sources would only be regarded as possessing explanatory power insofar 
as it could be used to promote Japan's national interest. The defensive state thesis fails to allow 
for a role in intemational society for Japan by placing too much emphasis on govemmental 
actors resisting extemal pressures in favour of emphasising their own agenda. Although the 
focus on US-Japanese relations and the Cold War structure is comprehensive, Pharr's approach 
suggests that a change in policy could only originate within the Japanese state. Describing the 
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state as impervious to external influence, a Japan that constantly says no, portrays the state as 
an independent body acting regardless of outside pressure, which, as the following empirical 
chapters will demonstrate, is evidently not the case. Furthermore, societal pressures are totally 
ignored. Domestic constraints, like the norm of pacifism, embodied in the Constitution, are solely 
regarded as tools the government can manipulate in the realisation of its policy goals, rather than 
documents 'living' within Japanese civil society. Pharr, like Calder, fails to examine societal 
pressures thoroughly enough, as well as pressure coming from above originating from 
international society and its organisations. Pharr's analysis admittedly cites these constraining 
and encouraging norms, but cannot comprehend them beyond a framework centring upon the 
imagined unitary actor of the Japanese state. 
Each of the traditional approaches to the Japanese state has contributed something to our 
understanding of Japan. However, in their own ways they have failed to recognise the 
explanatory power of ideas and norms in Japanese policymaklng and appear to be deeply 
entrenched in Cold-War thinking. The reactive state places too much emphasiS on the US and 
gsiatsu with the claim that change cannot appear from within Japan. Equally, the pro-active state 
approach again falls into the realist trap of looking to the international system and the most 
powerful state within that international system in order to understand Japan's UNPKO policy. The 
defensJve state attempts to relax this assumption and look within Japan to understand how policy 
is developed but fails to include a societal element in its analysis by examining purely 
governmental actors. 
A more pluralistic view of Japanese politics places emphasis on factors like public opinion, 
opposition parties, norms and ideas both within and outside of Japan, and divisions within the 
LOP, bureaucracy, and big business in an attempt to explain events which the Japan Inc. model 
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fails to address. Thus, power is diffused, not concentrated in an elite, and policymaking is 
rendered divisive and often an attempt to build a compromise between various groups, very 
much in contrast to the rational choice approaches' which regard decisions as interest· 
maximising, rational and the product of individuals. Writers such as Eliss Krauss and Muramatsu 
Michio have characterised Japanese politiCS as pluralistic with the term 'patterned pluralism' used 
to describe the various points of reference policy-makers must acknowledge.129 Nakane has 
attempted to develop a model of Japanese society somewhere between the two extreme models 
given above. By placing an emphasis on consensus (wa) in Japanese society, Nakane Chie sees 
the state deriving its power and playing an integral, but not necessarily dominant, role in 
achieving consensus between various inputs into the policymaking process. The state is the 
guardian of the public interest and as it cannot use force to achieve its ends must mediate, 
between the various public and private interest groups in Japanese society without becoming the 
puppet of either group to achieve the national interest. In this paradigm, the concept of wa is the 
goal of Japanese policymaking. This approaches the study of ideas and norms within Japan; this 
thesis seeks to supplement this approach with attention given to international norms such as 
peacekeeping. 
The objective of this study is to overcome the short-sightedness of traditional 
Interpretations centring on the ruling triad and focus on the marginalised factors such as civil 
society, opposition parties, and the norms of both Japanese and International society. A number 
of norms and ideas can be discerned which have shaped Japan's foreign and security po/icy and 
which tend to be ignored in traditional approaches to the Japanese state. For example, Peter 
Katzenstein has pointed to the uncontested norms of economic security to reduce Japan's 
economic wlnerabilify-a norm which can be regarded as responsible for both Japan's militarist 
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episode and its post-war policy of aligning itself with the US.130 Furthermore, the Peace 
Constitution has created a norm strong in specificity and concordance within Japanese society of 
what is and is not possible in the despatch of the JSDF. Rooted in the defeat of W.W.II, anti-
militarism has become deeply rooted within Japanese society, seen repeatedly in times of crisis, 
like the revision of the Security Treaty with the US and the UNPKO legislation, and in an 
unambiguous opposition to any attempt at militarisation in opinion pollS.131 The only way in which 
this opposition has been compromised is when the despatch of the JSDF is within the aegiS of 
the UN; in other words, one norm reinforcing another. This norm (like the norm of PKO in the 
international system outlined in the previous chapter) has been marginalised in the traditional 
literature. A more pluralist approach to the Japanese state has been posited by many, like 
Richard Samuels,' T. J. Pempel, and Gary Allinson who all regard conflict between various 
centres of power as important to the decision-making process in Japan.· Thus, an approach 
which recognises both the domestic norms of a civil society and the international norms of 
international SOCiety is necessary in order to push our understanding beyond traditional analyses. 
These domestic norms can be combined with the international norms· created and 
institutionalised within the UN, as demonstrated in the previous chapter. 
SUMMARY 
Evidently a noticeable increase in Japan's contribution to UN peacekeeping operations took 
place from admission to the UN until the eve of the Second Gulf War. From Japan's first refusals 
to actively partiCipate in UNPKO in the 19508, through to the despatch of personnel and 
considerable cash contributions in the 1980s, a shift from passivity to activity is discernible with 
this decade representing an important watershed. The period saw Japan break free from an 
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overly restrictive relationship with the US, target the UN with the support it commanded at home 
as an area within which to improve its international contribution, and sponsor independent 
initiatives. A clear dichotomy exists between its initial policy in the 1950$ and 19608 of refusing to 
Involve itself in any issue too controversial, while the Japanese government and the MOFA 
slowly established itself within the organs of the UN (more like Pharr's defensive state than 
Calder's reactive state) and the activism of the 1980s. The two decades after Japan's admission 
to the UN may appear, and have usually been characterised, as reactive in the style described 
by Calder with Japan subservient to the US, failing to undertake Independent initiatives, and 
adhering closely to the Yoshida Doctrine. Thus, the norm of the security relationship with the US 
was of crucial importance in shaping Japan's identity and defining what Japan would and would 
not do. To this end, the norm of the relationship with the US played the role of both a constitutive 
and restrictive norm shaping and constraining Japan's behaviour. Calder's explanatory model of 
Japan's foreign policy to an extent can explain Japan's policy In this period, with Japan in a 
position of reliance for its security upon the US. However, Calder's model falls to explain the 
instances of Japanese activism in this early period, like gaining non-permanent seats on the 
Security Council and winning elections and representation in other areas of the UN, the 
Incremental increase in despatch of personnel, and involvement in conflict resolution in West 
Irian and Laos. However, it was not the only norm at playas seen In the fact that despite the 
withdrawal of the US from UN activities in the 1980s, Japan began to playa more active role. 
DUring this period, Japan (unlike the United Kingdom in the case of UNESCO) resisted pressure 
from the US and continued to gradually Increase Its contribution to the administration of UNPKO 
and the UN as a whole. Thus, with galatsu not only being resisted. but Japan actively stepping 
up to assume the previous responsibilities of the US, Calder's reactive state model falls to 
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provide an adequate explanation. 
This is where the UN, the Secretary-General, and the utility of PKO as norms come into 
play. Having previously refused to contribute to UNPKO, the Japanese government began, in the 
face of increasing financial commitments to the UN and calls from within the UN, to step up its 
visible contribution and, thus, the first civilian personnel were sent on monitoring missions. 
Moving on from the period straight after Japan's entry to the UN, the 1980s saw Japan's UN 
policy take on a certain activism. Robert Immerman outlines the following four elements at play in 
Japan's UN policy in the 1980s: first, the idealised view of the UN in the Japanese public's 
opinion; second, the desire of business and political elites to gain recognition for its successes; 
third, the attempt to secure the alliance with the US, but also to increase an international 
contribution incrementally; and fourth, the LOP and MOFA's desire to get a UNSC permanent 
seat.132 However, Japan's participation was still limited to non-combat situations and the 
despatch of civilian personnel due to the strength of the Internal norm of pacifism. The 
characteristics of Pharr's model-aversion to risks, low cost and continuity-can all, in varying 
degrees, be witnessed in Japan's UN peacekeeping policy affected by the pacifist norm. Low 
cost and aversion to risks are seen in Japan's desire to play the role of mediator within Asia and 
Japan's refusal to comply with Hammarskjold's request for a greater Japanese contribution in 
1958. Continuity is evident in the manner in which Japan concerned itself with steadily 
establishing itself within the various organs of the UN system gaining admission and 
representation on the ECOSOC, the International Court of Human Justice, etc. Immerman, 
despite noting sources of activism, sees Japan as simply trying not to alienate anyone, pay lip 
service to certain causes, and pay its UN bills on time: a categorisation in keeping with Pharr's 
defensive state model. Examining Japanese delegates' declarations in the UN in the 1980$, it 
119 
appears that Japan hoped to avoid the institutionalisation of the practice of UNPKO as a 
burgeoning norm. Japanese delegates at the UN repeatedly expressed their wariness of the 
despatch of missions after hostilities have broken out, their suspicions regarding ad hoc 
missions, and doubts about voluntary contributions. Japan supported the creation of a permanent 
force funded by all member states on an obligatory basis, emphasising the role of the Secretary-
General over the Security Council and exhibiting a truly multinational composition. Thus, Japan 
saw UN peacekeeping in this period as a stopgap measure on the road to a more tangible and 
, 
"-. -- ,. 
well organised security system. 
By 1990 and the outbreak of the Gulf crisis, the situation in Japan was that the traditional 
norm of pacifism was largely intact as was the militarily restrictive nature of relations with the rest 
of East Asia. The relationship with the US was equally of great importance but one could begin to 
see the UN, and in particular its peacekeeping functions, beginning to be established as a new 
norm in an embryonic form of the intemational society (the policymaking matrix in Diagram II 
demonstrates this interplay of norms during the period with which this chapter deals). With the 
outbreak of the Gulf War, as will be seen in the next chapter, these norms came into conflict with 
each other and called Japan's identity and political-military culture Into question. 
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DIAGRAM II: Poi.ICYMAKING MATRIX FOR CHAPTER THREE, 
JAPANESE FOREIGN PoLICY AND UNPKO, 1956 TO 1990 
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CHAPTER FOUR: THE SECOND GULF WAR1 
INTRODUCTION 
Although the Second Gulf War of February 1991 can in no way be considered as a typical 
example of UNPKO, any study of Japan's evolving UN peacekeeping policy and the role and 
influence of the UN as a norm in the development of this policy must begin by necessity with an 
analysis of the Second Gulf War. As was demonstrated in the previous chapter, pressure on 
Japan to contribute to UN peacekeeping operations was hardly a new phenomenon. However, 
before the Second Gulf War this pressure had failed to reap any concrete benefits from the point 
of view of the international community-the only exception being Japan's financial contributions 
to the UN budget encouraged by the deeply embedded domestic norm of pacifism and the 
externally-based norm of the relationship with the US. However, it was In the aftermath of the 
Second Gulf War that Japan began a process of politica', social, and legal soul-searching, with 
traditional norms coming into conflict with newer norms In an attempt to make a 'visible 
contribution' to the international community's efforts in the Persian GUIf.2 For this reason, the 
Second Gulf War is to be the first case study In this Investigation of Japan's international 
peacekeeping contribution. 
A BRIEF HISTORY OF THE SECOND GULF WAR 
Iraq's claims on Kuwaiti territory originated with the creation of the Kuwaiti state In 1961, met by 
Iraq with threats of invasion. This Initial crisis was averted by the creation of an Arab League 
force to protect the newly created Kuwaiti state and was settled by the eventual recognition of 
Kuwait by Iraq.3 However, thereafter relations were characterised by border disputes over the 
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Shatt ai-Arab waterway, the islands of Bubiyan and Warba, and disputed Kuwaiti oil-drilling 
techniques in contested regions. This tense state of affairs again boiled over into aggression in 
1973 with a partial occupation of Kuwait by Iraq whose withdrawal was eventually bought by 
Kuwaiti cash payments. 
Faced with the First Gulf War, Kuwait decided to support Iraq against Iranian Shiites and 
extended Saddam Hussein's regime millions of dollars in loans with which to conduct the war. 
This eventually led to Iraq emerging victorious after the war, but economically and militarily 
exhausted. US estimates put the cost of the war at $500 billion. Moreover, Kuwait was one of the 
most vehement in its demands for the repayment of $10 to $14 billion in interest-free loan5.4 
Faced with Kuwaiti intransigence over the relaxation of repayment terms, Saddam behaved in a 
similar fashion and at an Arab Council Co-operation meeting in February 1990 refused to repay 
the money, altematively demanding more money from Kuwait in order to re-build Iraq. In July 
1990, Iraq threatened to use force against any Arab oil-exporting state that pumped excess oil 
and thereby forced the price of oil down creating difficulties for Iraq's post-war reconstruction-a 
threat aimed at Kuwait which was the main offender In overstepping its allocation decided by 
OPEC (Organisation of Petroleum Exporting Countries) agreements. This threat was followed by 
a build-up of Iraqi troops on the border with Kuwait. possibly with the belief that the US would not 
intervene in any conflict between tellow Arab states.S Iraqi demands of wiping out Its war debts 
and the acquisition of Bubiyan were issued during talks in Jiddah, when the talks failed to 
produce any resolution of differences. 
Events culminated in the Iraqi Invasion of Kuwan on the moming of August 2, 1990 with 
Iraq quickly overcoming any Kuwaiti resistance.6 The permanent occupation of Kuwait and the 
creation of the 19th province of the Iraqi state were announced duly. The reaction of the UN and 
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the international community is examined in the next section, but faced with almost universal 
condemnation and the build-up of multinational forces in Saudi Arabia against the Iraqi invasion 
under the Desert Shield operation, Saddam attempted to link the conflict with Kuwait to the 
general situation in the Middle East by agreeing to withdraw from Kuwait if Israel agreed to 
withdraw from the Golan Heights, the West Bank and the Gaza Strip. Iraqi forces were also 
strengthened in Kuwait, seemingly with the aim of either consolidating the occupation of Kuwait 
or continuing Iraqi aggression into Saudi Arabia. It was at this stage in the conflict that Saddam 
began to move foreign nationals in Kuwait and Iraq to military Installations as 'human shields' 
against any military strikes on these bases from the multinational force. Eventually the hostage 
Incident passed with their release before Christmas 1990 for reasons that remain unclear. 
Nevertheless, the Iraqi military build-up in Kuwait continued to frustrate any diplomatic attempt, 
investigated below, to resolve the dispute peacefully before the UN deadline for Iraq's withdrawal 
of January 15, 1991. 
The Second Gulf War began with the passing of this deadline. The Initial stages of the 
conflict were characterised by the air campaign designed to destroy Iraqi air defences and 
command and control structures with a massive demonstration of force (In the first twenty four 
hours of the air campaign over 1,000 sorties were made) and the objectives of preventing Iraqi 
Interference In Allied air operations, grinding down Iraqi air defences in Kuwait, and a sustained 
attack on the Iraqi field army were largely achieved with minimal casualties In preparation for the 
ground campaign. Saddam's policy in reaction to the air war included the use of Scud·B missile 
attacks on Saudi Arabia and Israel, particularly from mobile missile launchers, a threat which was 
addressed with the use of Patriot missiles but would continue to be a military and diplomatic 
issue until Iraq's defeat. 
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As the air campaign ended, the allied ground offensive began on February 24, 1991, 
postponed by three days due eleventh-hour diplomatic attempts to broker a deal. The ground 
offensive, sometimes called the 100 hour war, was a 1990s version of the Schlieffen Plan.? The 
multi-national force shifted to the West, attacked the Iraqi divisions in Kuwait from the rear and 
westem flanks in a swift encirclement movement. The strategy was successful in ejecting Iraqi 
troops from Kuwait and minimised Allied casualties. On February 27, 1991 the multinational 
troops liberated Kuwait City, but operations were only called to a conclusion after retreating Iraqi 
troops were bombed back to Iraq in the north. Discussions began on March 3, 1991 between 
Iraqi and Allied military leaders at the Safwan airstrip with the aim of agreeing a cease-fire. There 
followed a political process which culminated in a UN-mandated cease-fire in mid-April. At the 
same time the process of poliCing and clearing up the polluted battlefrald began. 
THE ReSPONSE OF THE INTERNATIONAL COMMUNrrv 
Iraq's invasion of Kuwait was met by near universal condemnation by the intemational 
community. On August 2, 1990, President George Bush condemned publicly the invasion and 
called upon the UN to adopt resolutions demanding Iraqi withdrawal. This happened the same 
day with Resolution 660 being adopted by a 14-0 vote with only Yemen abstaining.8 This 
resolution called on Iraq and Kuwait 'to begin immediately intensive negotiations for the 
resolution of their differences and supports all efforts in this regard.'9 A few days later President 
Bush met with Prime Minister Thatcher of Great Britain in Aspen, Colorado and discussGd the 
possibility of using force against Iraqi aggreSSion in Kuwait. Similarly, Soviet Foreign Minister 
Sherardnadze condemned Iraq's invasion of Kuwait, deSpite the number of Soviet military 
advisors in Iraq at that time. The EC imposed broad sanctions against Iraq in response to the 
125 
invasion and a number of states froze Iraqi and Kuwait assets. However, condemnation was not 
universal and King Hussein of Jordan, mainly due to domestic pressures, cast Saddam Hussein 
as a leader of the Arab world. 
On August 7, 1990 the military response began to take shape. After having carefully 
obtained the agreement of King Fahd of Saudi Arabia, President Bush ordered the despatch of 
US troops and aircraft to the Gulf. US ships already in the Gulf were supplemented In number, 
Egyptian troops augmented the Saudi and US forces, and were added to by the troops of 
Australia, Great Britain, Canada, France, Italy, and the Netherlands, with the aim of enforcing the 
blockade under the operation, 'Desert Shield', Turkey closed oil pipelines from Iraq, leaving 
Jordan the only route for Iraqi oil and goods to escape the embargo initiated under UN 
Resolution 665. The Arab world supported this military build-up with the Arab League meeting in 
Cairo on August 9-10, 1990 where thirteen of the twenty-one member states agreed to send 
military forces. 
The military build-Up continued with the call-up of US reserves on November 8, 1990, and 
the despatch of another 200,000 troops to the Gulf with an eye on the possibility of a military 
solution. However, in these final months before the start of Operation Desert Storm there was a 
flurry of shuttle diplomacy with figures such as King Hussein, Kurt Waldheim, Edward Heath, 
Willy Brandt, Yasser Aratat, Nakasone Yasuhiro, Mikhail Gorbachev, and naturally, the UN's 
Perez de Cuellar all attempting to find some non-military solution to the conflict. On January 9, 
1991, Secretary of State James Baker met with Foreign Minister Tariq Aziz in Geneva in an 
attempt to find a last-minute solution as the January 15, 1991 deadline approached. This three-
day meeting came to nothing as did a last-minute meeting with Perez de Cuellar In Baghdad on 
January 12, 1991. All the while the multi-national force was being assembled and by the January 
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15, 1991 deadline had reached the level of 700,000 troops comprising 28 nations. However, 
diplomatic manoeuvres were in evidence, with Gorbachev's renewed aHempts in mid-February to 
find a solution through his personal envoy, Yevgeny Primakov. The Soviet aHempt appeared to 
meet with success as Iraq responded that it would respect UN Resolution 660. This peace 
proposal put plans for the ground offensive back by three days to February 24, 1991 in order to 
assess the seriousness of the Iraqi response. Vet, like the other diplomatic efforts, this also 
ultimately came to nothing and the ground war began. 
What followed after the January 15, 1990 deadline-the air war, and the subsequent 100 
hour land war commencing on February 28, 199O-has been mentioned above and need only be 
referred to as the culmination of the international community's efforts to find a solution to the 
crisis. 10 This was the area where the generals took over from the UN, the diplomats, and the 
pOliticians. After the short land war had been concluded, the international community's efforts 
began again with the aim of reconstructing Iraq, Kuwait. and the Gulf region. Problems like the 
transport of refugees, the continuing presence of Saddam Hussein as head of the Iraqi state, and 
the Kurdish rebellion within Iraq continued; thus, on April 28, 1991 Operation Provide Comfort to 
assist the Kurdish populations began. In May the UN began to establish its presence in the 
Turkish border areas where the Kurdish populations were centred, with aI/ humanitarian tasks 
handed over to the UNHCR on June 7, 1991. 
JAPAN'S RESPONSE 
INTERNAL NORMS: PACIFISM 
Japan's political response up until Christmas 1990 began with a burst of activity and focused 
upon the hostage crisis. The MOFA busied itself with ensuring that the Japanese nationals in 
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Kuwait were safe and in contact with the Japanese Embassy. The Japanese government was 
informed on August 17, 1990 that Japanese nationals would not be allowed to leave Iraq, in 
response to which the government offiCially complained and termed the decision, 'a clear 
violation of international law which is absolutely unacceptable.'11 Japan refused to close its 
embassy for some months as the crisis proceeded and kept the Hinomaru national flag flying 
outside its embassy in Kuwait City until August 29, 1990. Towards the end of August Iraq moved 
all Japanese nationals to Baghdad in accordance with the Iraqi claims to close foreign missions 
in Kuwait. In reaction to the deteriorating situation, Prime Minister Kaifu Toshiki met with Chief 
Cabinet Secretary Sakamoto Misoji and other MOFA officials on August 24, 1990 and as a result 
declared that Japan would tum to international organisations to secure the release of Japanese 
nationals.12 The first hostages consisting of 69 women, children and sick men were released at 
the beginning of September and at the beginning of October Kaifu became the first head of state 
of an industrialised democracy to meet with a member of the Iraqi leadership, Deputy Prime 
Minister, Taha Yassin Ramadan in order to secure the release of the hostages.13 By the end of 
the month former Prime Minister Nakasone Yasuhiro decided to make a visit to Baghdad to 
attempt to negotiate the release of the remaining hostages, returning at the beginning of 
November with 74 freed hostages. During a lower House Committee Meeting on Security, 
Foreign Minister Nakayama TarO stressed that Japan would rely upon the efforts of the UN and 
in particular, Secretary-General de Cuellar. in attaining the release of the hostages.14 The issue 
was finally resolved in the first week of December with the sudden release of all the hostages. 
Yet, at these early stages In the crisis, it can be seen that Japan's contribution was to be In 
keeping with its traditional reactive pacifist line stressing a minimal contribution. 
While· Japan was attempting to resolve the hostage crisis the package of financial 
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assistance which was to define Japan's contribution to the Gulf crisis was delayed. The package 
was announced eventually, however, on the same day that Japanese nationals were first forced 
to appear on television broadcasts, condemned by Sakamoto as a 'meaningless attempt to give 
the world an impression that foreign nationals in Iraq are safe', stressing that this was a problem 
for the international community and not just for Japan.15 This package contained: first, an 
unspecified amount of aid to the Multi-national Force (MNF), rumoured at the time to be $1 
billion; second, the despatch of government chartered civil aircraft and ships to be used in the 
humanitarian effort; third, one hundred civil medical experts; four, financial aid to Turkey, Egypt, 
and Jordan; five, ¥1.5 billion in aid to Kuwaiti refugees in Jordan; and six, a new bill entitled the 
UN Peace Co-operation Law to allow the SDF to participate in the international community's 
effort. 16 
The response of the US was both respectful and critical. While describing elements of the 
package as 'useful first steps', it was stressed that 'we want to see the Japanese flag [in the Gulf 
area). This [the package of measures] is not what we had in mind."7In response, the limitations 
of the Constitution were cited by Fujii Kazuo of the Defence Agency's Policy Bureau when faced 
with demands for financial, diplomatic, and military assistance by a four-man team of visitors from 
the US: Henry Rouen, assistance secretary of defence; Carl Ford, Deputy Assistant Secretary of 
Defence; Allen Holmes, Ambassador at Large for Burden-sharing; and Carl Jackson, National 
Security Advisor.18 
. OpPOSition within Japan was highly vocal and ~ great deal of criticism originated from 
organisations such as the Japan Trade Union Congress (Reng6), the W.W.II Victims' Relatives 
Association (Wadatsumika/), the Japan Taxpayers' Association and all opposition parties with the 
exception of the Democratic Socialist Party (DSP). Two female citizens in Kagoshima filed a 
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lawsuit with the district court claiming that aid for the Gulf War was unconstitutional. Ishida 
KOshirO, Chairman of the KOmei Party, regarded the financial package as unclear and, therefore, 
unacceptable-it was necessary to know whether the contributions would be spent on arms and 
ammunition or not. Doi Takako, of the Socialist Democratic Party of Japan (SDPJ), argued along 
the same lines that ;f the money were spent on aggressive weapons this would be against Article 
IX of the Constitution.19 The SDPJ to this end pledged at its party convention to oppose the 
government package.2o With these reactions in mind the government undertook an advertising 
campaign in an attempt to secure public understanding on the issue. The DSP stood firmly by the 
government's decision emphaSising, 'positive co-operation befitting its status as an internationally 
minded nation and in accordance with the spirit embodied in the Constitution.'21 Government 
policy as regards financial contributions was to donate the cash directly to a Gulf Steering 
Council, whereas the opposition parties were demanding in the Diet that the government ensure 
that the money would not be spent on arms. On this issue the government did back down and 
Kaifu agreed to lodge a request with the Gulf Co-operation Council (GCe) Fund to prevent the 
use of Japanese money on arms: a result of the govemment's need for the KOmei Party's votes 
in the Diet as well as an expression of the power of the norm of paCifism in Japan. The power of 
the minority parties was also seen in the govemment's decision to raise 40 percent of the 
contribution through defence budget cuts as the KOmei Party and DSP had been opposed to the 
tax hikes. It was with this approval of the DSP and KOmei Party that the Lower House approved 
the Second Supplementary Budget and tax increases on February 28, 1991, and the Upper 
House on March 7,1991. By July, the government found itself contributing an extra ¥70 billion to 
help post-war peace efforts in the Gulf through the GCC to make up for the shortfall which 
occurred with the collapse in the value of the yen from the time of the pledge to the actual 
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payment. ' 
The initial reaction of the Japanese business community was highly cynical of active 
participation in any punitive action against Iraq and was demonstrative of the strength of pacifism 
and reactivity within Japan. Due to private sector claims on Iraq and the plummet in share prices 
by 1,106 points in the first few days after the invasion, MITI and the business community were 
wary of antagonising Iraq any further with harsh sanctions.22 The leading members of the Tokyo 
Chamber of Commerce and Industry were gathered in Karuizawa at the time of Iraq's invasion of 
Kuwait and were warned by Kaifu that, 'if this conflict should drag on, it could very possibly 
adversely affect Japan. Japan must proceed to play an active role.'23 The reaction to this calf was 
tardy and slight. Chairman Ishikawa Rokuro issued a statement minimising concerns for the 
business community by stressing the co-operation of the two superpowers.24 When asked to 
respond to Ozawa IchirO's similar call for activity the Keidanren Chairman, SaitO Eishiro, failed to 
address the issue specifically. 25 The Japanese business community's apparent lack of interest in 
the crisis was certainly connected with the minimal dependence on Iraq and Kuwait for its oil 
supplies, but also was rooted in the traditional adherence to the Yoshida Doctrine and a desire to 
maintain good relations with the majority of states. 
The business community's reaction to the financial contribution was similarty polarised. 
Nikkeiren's President, Suzuki Eiji, stated that: 
I don't believe the military situation will be smoothed over. Japan stili has taken no concrete 
measures to respond to this crisis. It Is not reasonable to rely on private-sector medical assistance 
and measures of that sort. Surely the government must take the lead. However, there are problems 
involved in sending minesweepers to the Persian Gulf. And what about our financial contribution? 
First it was one billion dollars, then two billion. And the demands will keep on coming. What we need 
is a more Independent attltude.26 . 
Thus, the financial contribution was supported but needed stabilising. Ishikawa suggested 
that a nation-wide Gulf fund should be set up to allow the Japanese population to contribute what 
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they wanted to.27 However, more active members of the business community appeared to be 
more than ready to contribute to the Gulf, as seen in Keidanren's creation of a special fund to 
provide food and medical aid to refugees in response to a request from Ogata Sadako in 
UNHCR. Keidanren also supported payment of the $9 billion in extra assistance.28 
Another issue in the first month of the crisis, which was affected by the norm of pacifism, 
was the visit of Prime Minister Kaifu to the Gulf region which had been planned before the 
invasion of Kuwait. By the weekend of August 11-12, 1990 the visit was to go ahead, although 
Kaifu had described the invasion as 'intolerable', and Foreign Minister Nakayama had declared 
he would urge Kaifu to cancel the visit. 29 The US poSition on Kaifu's visit was made clear by 
Clayton Yeutter, the US Agriculture Minister, expressing support for the visit as a symbolic 
expression of support for the deployment of the multi-national force In the region.30 The decision 
came on August 13, 1990 with Kaifu cancelling his trip and Nakayama taking his place. The 
reason behind this decision was a desire to keep Kaifu In Tokyo while a response to the crisis 
was hammered out and fears that Kaifu could be faced with demands from Gulf nations to 
contribute militarily which he would have to decline on constitutional grounds. The visit was 
tentatively rescheduled for October depending on the resolution of the hostage crisis. Thus, the 
speCifiCity, durability and accepatnce of the pacifist norm in constraining the extent of the 
government and business community's financial and diplomatic contribution continued to play an 
important role . 
. The key issue of despatch of Japanese personnel, as included in the government's 
package, first manifested itself with demands for Japan to contribute aircraft and ships to help in 
the transportation of refugees, personnel and weapons. These proposals were met with protests 
from Japanese unions about the degree of safety In the Gulf region: four Japanese seaman had 
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died in the Iran-Iraq war and fears of repetition were high. It was this opposition from both unions 
and commercial airlines that eventually pushed the government into using the ASDF to transport 
the peace co-operation team. With the outbreak of hostilities in the Gulf, Kaifu met with 
opposition leaders to discuss the despatch of ASDF aircraft to aid refugees. Doi had referred to 
the despatch of the ASDF without discussion as a 'fascist act and a denial of parliamentary 
procedures.'31 The Communist Party referred to the plan simply as 'unconditional support for the 
war.'32 Again, the DSP expressed support for the plan but opposition was expressed by both the 
SDPJ and the KOmei Party on the grounds of the Constitution and the fear that the SOF's role 
may escalate into a blatantly military one.33 
However, in the face of opposition, the government decided not to despatch the ASDF 
until such a despatch was requested by a relevant international organisation. And until that time 
no new ordinance would be introduced to expand the transportation clauses of the SDF Law to 
include refugees as well as foreign dignitaries. As the refugee crisis passed and with the 
absence of any request from international organisations for assistance, it was decided that the 
ordinance based on Article 100 of the SDF Law that would facilitate the despatch of the ASOF 
would be scrapped.34 
However, opposition based on durable, traditional pacifism existed in several quarters-
see Table IV. The Socialists refused to consider any despatch of the SOF or any other action 
beyond what the UN called for.35 Doi stressed that this would be 'making an open declaration to 
the world that Japan intends to part with the one thing of which it truly could be proud-
adherence to peace.'36 The SDPJ's report entitled Points Regarding the Act Creating a UN 
Peace Organization (Kokusai He/we KiM Secchi H6an Y6sht), published on January 4, 1991 
outlined the SDPJ's support only for the despatch of Japanese civilian personnel to assist in a 
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limited definition of peacekeeping.37 The KOmei Party's position was summarised in an edition of 
the K6mei Shimbun favouring the despatch of SDF lold boys' limited to electoral, medical, and 
refugee-related duties.38 The KOmei Party's aim was to contribute to UNPKO with personnel 
widely removed from the SDF. The fact that troops participating in PKO are referred to as lpeace 
soldiers' and 'soldiers without enemies' was stressed through the media and Diet debates.39 The 
JCP's position· was declared in a letter to Secretary-General Perez de Cuellar in March 1991. 
Although emphasising its support for the non-military aspects of the UN's work, this letter 
stressed the importance of the Constitution within the strictest interpretation regarding the very 
existence of the SDF, even within Japan, as unconstitutional.40 The Communist Party's stance 
was encapsulated in the report, Lessons from the Gulf War in Bringing about Peace in the 
Persian Gulf and the World. Although disapproving of legislation to allow the despatch of the 
SDF because of its perceived militarist overtones, the report did support international contribution 
based on the Constitution and the UN Charter, rather than the US-led effort.41 Citizen groups like 
the New Japan Women's Association and the Japan Council of Christianity also opposed any 
despatch on the grounds of Article IX. Municipal Assemblies began to pass resolutions 
demanding the bill's rejection, including Sapporo, Chiba, Miyagi and Kanagawa prefectures. 
Public opinion at this time was firmly against any despatch with 21 percent supporting the bill as 
opposed to 57 percent against; moreover 67 percent of those polled regarded despatch of the 
SDF abroad as unconstitutional, with only 15 percent regarding despatch as constitutionally 
unproblematic.42 One poll of the KyOdO News Service estimated that half of the electorate was 
against the bill and two-thirds generally against the despatch of the SDF due to constitutional 
reasons, with only 13 percent in favour. 
During the 119th regular session of the Diet, debate was polarised between, on the one 
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hand, the opposition parties criticising the despatch on the grounds of the Constitution, with 
extreme views within the Communist Party against even aid in transportation as an act of war. 
On the other hand, the government and OSP's position supported the despatch on the grounds 
of co-operation 'to keep global peace as a member of the international community', and the role 
of the UN in the post-Cold War world as stated by Sasaki Man of the LOP.43 However, the Abe 
and Takeshita factions of the LOP began to express reservations on the chances of passing the 
bill as seen in Table III. Within the LOP, divisions emerged as to the content of the bill; 
particularly the Abe, Miyashita and Watanabe factions were demonstrably against the legislation, 
with the large Takeshita and KOmoto factions (the latter being Kaifu's home faction) strongly in 
favour of the bill.44 A similar pattern could be witnessed as regards other issues like the despatch 
of minesweepers with the Abe and Miyazawa factions the least supportive.45 
TABLE III: FACTIONAL SUPPORT 
The following figures demonstrate the factional support in the LOP for the UN Peace Co-operation Bill. 
(Source: Wangan Sen~ to Nihon: towareru Kikl Kannt Tokyo, Asahl Shimbunshs, 1991). 
.~ Disagree NoAnswerL 
Doo'tKOIm 
LOP 115 (63.5 percent) 20 (11.0 percent) 46 (25.4 percent) 
T.keahlta 32 (72.7 percent) 3 (6.8 percent) 9 (20.5 percent) 
Abe 20 (51.3 percent) 8 (20.5 percent) 11 (28.2 percent) 
Mlyaz.wa 23 (53.5 percent) 7 (16.3 percent) 13 (30.2 percent) 
Watanabe 19 (61.3 percent) 2 (6.5 percent) 10 (32.3 percenij 
K6moto 14 (82.4 percent) 13 (17.6 percent) 
The debate moved onto the possibility of transferring SOF personnel to a newly created 
peace co-operation team to allow them to participate in the Gulf. The creation of a new category 
of public servant including 1,000 to 2,000 members for military,' medical, and transportation 
assistance was proposed to avoid violation of the Constitution. This idea, however, was 
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dismissed by Ozawa and Ishikawa as too complicated and it was thought that efficiency would be 
maintained by retaining SDF status and SOF structures. Kurihara YOko, chairman of the LDP's 
Research Commission on the Constitution, stated that Japan would be able to despatch the SOF 
to UN cease-fire monitoring and emergency relief activities overseas. However, the Cabinet 
Legislation bureau regarded this as excessive and unconstitutional. The eventual outline of the 
proposed UN Peace Co-operation Law stated that the SDF members will be registered with a UN 
Peace Co-operation team under direct control of the Prime Minister to ensure civilian control. 
During deliberations on this first bill, the govemment officially distinguished on October 27, 1990 
between participation in and co-operation with UN military forces. Participation in would involve 
~ the despatch of the Peace Co-operation Corps under the command of the UN military force. C0-
operation with would be characterised by support activities outside the command of such 
forces.4S This distinction would play an even greater role in the subsequent debate about the 
second bill. The OSP agreed with this plan. However, the Socialists and the KOmei Party 
expressed reservations, although the KOmei Party began to extend its support with certain 
conditions attached, including the emphasis on non-military activities, unarmed personnel, and 
SDF participation as individuals not units. 
, This issue caused public disenchantment with the Kaifu administration, despite the 
government using the LOP's victory in an Alchi-ken by-election in an attempt to portray public 
agreement with the bill.47 Partly due to this and due to time restrictions in the Diet, the LDP 
appeared to give up any chance of passing the bill in the 119th session of the Diet and began by 
November to start petitioning the opposition parties for support of a new bill. In the face of this 
pressure, the bill was eventually withdrawn but not before the LOP, KOmei Party and DSP agreed 
a three-party accord to introduce new legislation allowing the despatch of Japanese personnel on 
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UNPKO.48 
With the failure of the first bill, other plans were mooted as to how Japan should frame its 
international contribution. The Forum for Foreign Policy Innovation suggested that a PKO unit of 
private citizens without any government involvement should be established as this would avoid 
the issue of the Constitution.49 The SDPJ outlined a bill to create a permanent peace corps for 
UN peacekeeping limited to non-military activities based on UN resolutions and under the 
command of the Secretary-General. 50 Miyazawa called for the creation of a UN force including 
personnel of each UN member state as public servants as one way to navigate through the 
Constitution.51 Sakamoto envisaged the despatch of civilians upon Iraqi acceptance of the UN 
cease-fire terms, 'Japan will contribute with UN activities as much as possible and will continue to 
make active contributions to restoring peace in the Middle East. '52 In addressing both houses of 
the Diet, Kaifu stressed that Japan would do as much as possible in collaboration with 
international organisations respecting both the UN Charter and the Constitution.53 
This trend of replacement of one internal norm of pacifism with an external norm of the UN 
was beginning to become increasingly salient. Furthermore, with the success of the ground 
offensive in the Gulf, changes in opinion could be witnessed. Domestically, opinion polls began 
to suggest that the Japanese population would support a limited role in UNPKO for the SDF: 54 
percent in favour of some kind of role in disaster relief and 30 percent against. In addition to this, 
48 percent now supported a non-combat PKO role, with 38 percent against. 54 By the end of 
August, according to a Jiji press poll, 60 percent support for some kind of contribution to UNPKO 
existed; however, disagreement emerged over the scope.55 As regards the OPPOSition parties, a 
dissident break-away section of the SDPJ supported SDF despatch on PKO. Faced with election 
failure, the SDPJ began to rethink its traditional policies and drafted revisions to recognise the 
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SOF and the right of self-defence in order for Japan to take some role in the post-conflict 
international effort in the Gulf.56 
Connected with this, the idea of despatching minesweepers to the Persian Gulf was first 
mooted soon after the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait. Based on a constitutional interpretation going 
back to 1987 and the First Gulf War, proposals were made by Watanabe Michio, the senior LOP 
Diet member, that protection of Japan's oil supply could be incorporated easily within the 
definition of self-defence. It was further argued that this would also add to Japan's 'visible 
contribution' and that Japan should consider increasing aid for the MNF in the Gulf.57 However, 
disagreement with this plan was to be found not only amongst the expected sources of the 
opposition parties, but also in former Prime Minister Nakasone, who argued that the situation in 
1990 was very different from that of 1987 and that Japan should consider its contributions purely 
within the confines of a strict interpretation of the Constitution.58 However, the issue was not 
raised again until after the ground war had been concluded and the post-war reconstruction of 
Iraq was under discussion by the international community. In March, 1991 the government 
declared its intention to search for a role for the SDF in Iraq's post .. war reconstruction within the 
framework of the three-party consensus.59 By mid-March, pressure from the US had begun to be 
applied again specifically with a request for the despatch of minesweepers to the Gulf. Armacost 
urged the despatch of minesweepers to the Gulf at a meeting of LOP Diet members.50 In 
response, the LOP sought to gain the support and understanding of the DSP, KOmei Party, and 
the SDPJ.61 The initial response from the other parties was one of caution with fears that the 
despatch of minesweepers could lead to a more active role for the SDF. In reaction to these 
fears, Nakayama tried his utmost to stress the fact that hostilities were over and that this 
contribution was part of an international effort, 'the Japanese government has to be interested in 
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the issue of how to ensure the safe passage of ships in the Gulf.' Watanabe joined in this line of 
argument by stressing that, 'it would only be normal to remove dangerous objects. Since many 
ships bound for Japan pass through the Gulf, it would be a natural action for Japan. And the 
public would understand it.'62 With this in mind the Defence Agency began to make the 
necessary technical preparations to despatch minesweepers and Kaifu. stressed to the Diet the 
legality of the despatch of minesweepers and Nakayama stressed to Secretary-General de 
Cuellar the non-military PKO role Japan was ready to assume.63 
The MOFA regarded this issue as one within which Japan could do a great deal to improve 
its image.54 Simila~y, the Defence Agency called upon the MSDF to consider the despatch of 
minesweepers. According to one government source it appeared that the government would be 
able to rely on the support of the DSP; however, the KOmei Party stood against the despatch and 
the SDPJ stressed the necessity to prepare new legislation to precede the planned despatch.65 
In order to address this problem Kaifu met with the opposition parties in the last week of April 
stressing that the despatch was part of an international effort, occurring in peacetime, as part of a 
duty to maintain oil supplies, but was only able to illicit the support of the DSP with the remaining 
opposition parties requiring debate in the Diet before any despatch.ss Opposition was also 
expressed by domestic civil groups, like the group, 'Peace Now! We Won't Pay Taxes for War,' 
which filed an injunction with the Tokyo District Court against the despatch of minesweepers. 
Furthermore, eight members of the MSDF declared their unwillingness to go to the Gulf. The 
fears of East Asian nations will be examined at a later stage but were expressed by Beijing 
urging prudence in resolving the issue, and expressing concern about Japanese actions through 
Foreign Minister Oian Oichen to Nakasone.67 
Finallv, ·on the night of Wednesday, April 24, 1991 the decision to despatch the 
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minesweepers was made at an extraordinary Cabinet meeting. Four minesweepers (Yurishima, 
Hikoshima, Awashima, and Sakushima), one flagship (Hayase), and a support ship (Tokiwa) 
were to leave Japan by the end of the week. Captain Ochiai T aosa was appointed commander of 
the operation only a week before the departure of the task force. On the day before the 
despatch, faced with protests near the Defence Agency and even the torching of vehicles, Kaifu 
underlined to the House of Representative's Foreign Affairs Committee the peaceful nature of 
Japan's actions, 'it is quite important for those countries (which are capable of contributing to 
peacekeeping in this area] to co-operate in safety in the region:sa The minesweepers finally left 
on April 26, 1991 with the farewell address given by Oshima Tadamori, Deputy Director-General 
of the Defence Agency, making pains to characterise the despatch as part of an intemational 
contribution. The minesweeper episode came to an end on October 31, 1991 with the retum of 
the task force to the port of Kure after having detonated thirty-four mines without incurring any 
casualties . 
. With the minesweeping aspect of Japan's contribution resolved, the flnal details of the 
PKO Bill, as it came to be cal/ed, were settled in September 1991 several months after the first 
bUi had died in the Diet while attention was drawn towards the leadership crisis in the Soviet 
Union, on the one hand, and scandals in the banking and securities industries in Japan, on the 
other. A Japan Times editorial was correct in observing that the major issue was the kind of PKO 
Japan would partiCipate in and how this would sit with the Constitution.69 This was resolved in 
August and September 1991 within the framework of the three-party agreement and resulted in 
the drafting of five conditions demanded by the DSP and the KOmei Party which would have to 
be met in any SDF despatch on UNPKO: 
• a cease-fire accord must be reached. 
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• . Japan's participation must have the agreement of the parties directly involved in 
the conflict. 
• The UN force must remain neutral. 
• When the above three conditions are not met, Japanese personnel must 
withdraw. . 
• Japanese personnel can use firearms only to defend themselves.7o 
The bill stated that Japanese personnel would be allowed to participate in all non-military 
UNPKO, including supervising elections and transporting refugees. Monitoring of cease-fires 
would be undertaken by members of the SDF and they would be allowed to partiCipate in a UN 
force separating OPPOSing troops while retaining their SDF status. The use of firearms would be 
limited to the minimum necessary for self-defence. A limit of 2,000 troops were designated as 
Japan's uppermost contribution. 
Dispute arose within the three-party agreement over the necessity of Diet approval each 
time the SDF is despatched on UNPKO, a result of demands from the OSP in order to strengthen 
the concept of civilian control opposed to the LOP and KOmei Party's policy of only reporting 
back to the Diet on the despatch and completion of a mission. This led the LOP to approve the 
bill on September 18, 1991 and submit it the next day without the primary support of the DSP. 
The role of the DSP was crucial to the successful passage of the bill, as seen In Table IV, and its 
objection to the LOP's demand that Diet approval was unnecessary proved to be one of the 
major stumbling blocks in the Diet discussion. The KOmei Party was satisfied with the five 
conditions as· an assurance for civilian control, leaving the OSP In a pivotal position with the 
deciding votes, at one stage even threatening to sink the bill unless Diet approval was 
recognised.71 On November 27, 1991, the bill was forced through the House of Representatives' 
Ad hoc Committee on International Peace Co-operation by the LOP and KOmel Party without the 
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approval of the DSP as the issue of Diet approval was not resolved. The LOP did concede some 
ground on the issue of Diet approval by including a clause calling for Diet approval if an operation 
continues for over two years. Despite this, the DSP, JCP, and SDPJ all voted against the bill but 
to no avail as the LOP called an early vote and railroaded the bill through to the Upper House. 
Ultimately the bill was sent back to the Lower House for further debate to be passed at the 
. beginning of December and sent to the Upper House for further discussion. This passage was 
facilitated by the LOP agreeing to ,re-open the ad hoc committee in the face of SDPJ pressure 
and threats of using delaying tactiCS: 
Debate was concemed a/so with the specificity of the Constitution and whether it allowed 
Japan's participation in a peacekeeping force using force like that witnessed in the Congo 
operation. An Asahi Shimbun survey of 172 constitutional experts demonstrated that roughly 80 
percent of those experts asked regarded Japan's participation as unconstitutional, and only 10 
percent expressed support. In the same edition of the Asahl Shimbun, it was reported that the 
Ozawa committee was considering the participation of the SDF within a UN army as 
constitutional under the term 'intemational security' (kokusalteki anzen hoshO) as different from 
'right of collective self-defence (shOdanteki jieiken).72 The LOP seemingly regarded contribution 
to UNPKO as only one facet of the expansion of Japan's intemational contribution. This could be 
seen in the policy package submitted to the party convention which called for greater activism In 
UNPKO as well as expansion of overseas development assistance and' contribution to fighting 
environmental problems. In this way, Japan would be in a poSition to justify any level of 
contribution to UN-sponsored peacekeeping from.election observation to enforcement measures. 
As regards the Constitution's stress upon the non-use of force to settle intematlonal disputes, the 
Ozawa Committee's use of the term 'intemational security' stressed the maintenance of peace--.:. 
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a cause upon which the Constitution was constructed in its preamble and which coincides with 
the objective of UNPKO as seen in its award of the 1988 Nobel Peace Prize.73 As Professor 
Kitaoka Shinichi, then of RikkyO University, now of Tokyo University, pointed out. the Constitution 
was based on the concepts of paCifism, internationalism, freedom and democracy, similar to the 
underpinnings of UNPK0,74 In this way, the specificity of the pacifist norm could be seen to 
merge with that of the UN Charter. 
TABLE IV: DIET SUPPORT FOR THE UN PEACE CO-oflERA TION Bill 
{Source: Asahi Shimbun opinion poll taken on October 29-30, 1991 among the Diet members 
demonstrated the following results (number of Diet members)). 
1) 00 you support or oppose the UN Peace Co-operation Bill? 
LOP SOPJ KOme! Party JCP DSP Others 
Yes 115 0 0 0 0 0 
No 20 134 46 16 1 6 
Not Sure 43 0 0 0 13 0 
No Answer 3 0 ' 0 0 0 0 
2) Should the SOF be despatched on PKO not involving the use of force? 
LOP SOPJ KOmei Party JCP DSP Others 
Yes 130 0 0 0 13 0 
No 37 134 45 16 0 6 
Not Sure 7 0 1 0 1 0 
No Answer 7' 0 0 : 0 0 0 
3) In the case of a UN army allowing the use of force, should the SOF be despatched? 
LOP SOPJ KOmei Party JCP DSP Others 
Yes 50 0 0 0 4 0 
No 79 132 46 16 10 6 
Not Sure 42 2 0 0 0 0 
No Answer 10 0 0 0 0 0 
4) If the answer to no. 3 was yes, then should the Constitution be reinterpreted and revised? 
LOP SOPJ KOme; Party JCP DSP Others 
Revised 16 0 
Reinterpreted 29 4 
Not Sure 5 0 
The extent to which public opinion had changed by this stage from Its traditionally stalwart 
pacifist stance can be seen in a number of opinion polls. The largest trade union In Japan, which 
is seen as a base of support for the SOPJ, Japan Prefectural and Municipal Workers Union 
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(Jichiro), expressed two-thirds support for SDF despatch overseas on UNPKO restricted to non-
milftary activities,15 Public opinion during the debate clea~y sanctioned a PKO role for the SDF. A 
poll published on Constitution Day demonstrated that 45.7 percent of people supported a role 
encompassing medical, election observation, etc., a further 12.1 percent supported an unarmed 
cease-fire observation role, while 10 percent supported an armed role. Alternatively, only 24.4 
percent opposed any kind of despatch of the SDF. Support for the UN remained high at 88 
percent of people polled backing the actions of the UN. Even 38.4 percent of the SDPJ showed a 
desire to despatch the SOF on a limited role as opposed to 37.5 percent opposed.76 Divisions 
within the SOPJ over the issue of participation in UNPKO emerged with the 1992 Upper House 
elections with SOP J candidates diametrically opposed to each other and arguing in public over 
the issue of the SDF's despatch.77 Seemingly, the UN had become an arena in which Japan's 
military contribution could be justified and co-exist with the concordance and specifiCity accorded 
to the traditional norm of pacifism as the Ozawa committee clearly recognised. 
However, in order to gain enough votes in the Diet, the LOP eventually was forced to come 
to some compromise with the KOmei Party and the OSP in order to pass the bill before the 
session finished in June 1992. Thus, the LOP had to give in to the more traditional pacifist norm 
and proposed barring SDF participation in UNPKO forces until the Diet approved separate 
legislation allowing for this.78 Chief Cabinet Secretary, KatO KOjl, and LOP Deputy-Chairman, 
Kanemaru Shin, met with the chairman of RengO, Yamagishi Akira, towards the end of March in 
an attempt to secure the opposition's understanding and ensure passage of the bill in the 
opposition-dominated Upper House where the bill had been shelved as priority was given to the 
Budget. 
Debate began in earnest towards the end of April 1992 with the OSP stiD refusing to back 
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down over the issue of a mandatory Diet approval of each SDF despatch but supportive of 
placing the troops under UN command. Ouchi Keigo did appear willing to compromise if the 
elements of the bill allowing for SDF participation in UN armed forces were frozen. Despite only 
having 14 seats in the House of Representatives and 10 seats in the House of Councillors, the 
DSP and its chairman appeared to be playing a high profile role in the Diet discussions. Equally 
the KOmei Party objected to certain issues, chiefly the placing of Japanese personnel under UN 
command. However, the party came round eventually to the OSP's demands for Diet approval. In 
his attempt to secure the successful passage of the bill, Prime Minister Miyazawa Klichi was 
willing to compromise with the centrist parties and modify the LOP line. With the Upper House 
elections approaching in July 1992 no party, at this stage, wanted to risk alienating the electorate 
with an aggressive approach to the issue. RengO also touted its own proposals to set up a force 
that may include SOF personnel if they are on leave or retired; Diet approval and non-combat 
missions were also regarded as essential.79 The SOPJ's plans continued to develop wtth the 
proposal of a 2,000 man corps separate from the SoF taking part in non-military activities and 
maintaining an unarmed status.80 However, the role of the SOPJ was marginalised as the LOP, 
oSP and KOmei Party through backstage negotiations came closer to a modified bill that could 
be passed through the Upper Hauss, prompting Ouchi to suggest that there was a 80 percent 
likelihood of the bill passing through the Diet by the end of June.81 The LOP had moved closer to 
accepting the prinCiple of UN command over Japanese personnel which the OSP had been 
demanding. As far as the LOP was concerned the centrist parties held the key to successful 
passage of the bill and the SOPJ and Reng~ could be Ignored, criticised or pillOried. The KOmel 
Party's Ishida KOshirO and LOP Chairman, Watanuki Tamisuke, did attempt to court the RengO 
and the SOP ~'s understanding and co-operation in a successful passage of the bill and 
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avoidance of aggressive resistance in the Diet but to little avail as the Socialists refused to 
compromise.82 
The real influence seemed to lie with the DSP and the KOmei Party as they began to 
discuss the modifications they would request of the LOP including a freeze on certain military 
activities and civilian control through the Diet.83 By the end of May, the LOP and centrist parties 
had re-found their understanding and agreed on certain modifications to the bill, including the 
freezing of the bill's sections that dealt with participation in military activities of UNPKO, review of 
the bill three years after its enactment, and the need for Diet approval when these sections are 
unfrozen. The discussion on the command of the despatch resulted in an addition to Article VI of 
the bill to the effect that the government would seek approval of the Diet if a particular despatch 
were to be continued over the period of two years. The three main issues under debate at the 
time were: first, would the SDF or a separate organisation carry out duties in a UNPKO; second, 
the use of weapons within these operations; and third, where would command of the despatched 
personnel lie-with the UN or the Japanese Diet? The tri-party consensus sought to resolve the 
first problem by creating a separate organisation which would avoid the debate over whether the 
SDF's existence was constitutional or not-a concession to the SDPJ and the KOmei Party. 
However, the idea of a separate organisation was rejected in the face of the efficiency the SDF 
could bring to a role, the public support for the SDF after the Gulf War, and the administrative 
and funding problems for the new organisation. 
As regards the use of force, a careful study of peacekeeping operations was undertaken 
by the Diet that contributed to the speCificity of UNPKO by demonstrating the peaceful and 
unarmed nature of the vast majority of UNPKO respecting concepts such as strict impartiality, 
recognition of a cease-fire, consent of the parties involved, and the non-use of force. It was 
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demonstrated that force was only used when peacekeepers were prevented from completing 
their duties. The inter-agency committee wondered if Japan would be in a position to withdraw its 
troops in the event that the level of violence escalated. Again, precedence suggested that other 
countries had withdrawn their troops (Sweden from UNFICYP in 1987, Iran from UNIFIL and 
UNDOF in 1979, and Tunisia from ONUC in 1961). Thus, with this in mind, the government 
formulated five guidelines, based on the three-party consensus talks of August-September 1991, 
to regulate the withdrawal of Japanese peacekeepers and provide criteria to follow on occasions 
when peacekeepers were prevented from fulfilling their duties: 
• Agreement on a cease-fire will have been reached among the parties to the 
conflict. 
• The parties to the conflict, including the territorial state(s), will have given their 
consent to the deployment of peace-keeping forces and Japan's participation in 
such forces. 
• The peacekeeping forces will strictly maintain impartiality, not favouring any 
party to the conflict. 
• Should any of the above guidelines cease to exist, the Govemment of Japan 
may withdraw its contingent. 
.• Use of weapons will be limited to the minimum necessary to protect personnel's 
lives, etc. 
These principles were the basis for the law and were explained to and accepted by the 
. ' 
UN. These issues also were resolved in discussions between the MOFA, the Defence Agency, 
the Cabinet Counc.illor's Office on Extemal Affairs and the National Legislation Bureau of the 
Prime Minister's Cabinet. This inter-agency drafting group, consisting of thirty-three staff 
members from eleven ministries headed by Nomura Issei, Deputy Director-General of the 
Treaties Burea~ of the MOFA, concluded that the use of weapons in self-defence does not 
contravene the Constitution. As most UN peacekeepers had experienced their lives being put in 
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danger when obstructed from fulfilling their duties, this was seen as another area that was 
constitutionally defendable.B4 
The SDP J and the minor opposition party Reng6 Sangiin which was linked to RengO 
refused to participate in this modified bill demanding further debate on the issue. 85 The bill was 
eventually revised and submitted to the Upper House at the beginning of June. Initial debate was 
marked by paralysis as a special Upper House Committee continued to debate through the night 
as the SDPJ questioned the legality of certain clauses contained in the bill despite LDP calls for a 
rapid and calm resolution of the bill. The opposition techniques of delaying the passage of the bill 
included raising no confidence measures in the government and particular members of the 
govemment and the 'ox-walk' (gyOhO) technique of delayed voting. These tactics led the LDP to 
force the bill through an Upper House committee by calling a plenary session vote on the bill-a 
vote which lasted the weekend of June 6·7, 1992 due to the opposition delaying tactics including 
,,-
questioning the LDP's move to call for an immediate vote as compromising the legislative 
supremacy of the Diet. The bUl eventually passed the Upper House In the early hours of 
Tuesday,June 9, 1992 with the bill sent back to the Lower House for approval of the revisions 
the LOP, KOmei Party, and OSP had agreed. In the Lower House, the opposition used similar 
tactics by calling no-confidence measures in the government. However, in the face of the LOP· 
KOrnel Party·DSP consensus there was little the other opposition parties were able to do except 
delay the passage of what was inevitable. The bill became law on the evening of June 15, 1992 
with a vote of 329·17 in Its favour with the SDPJ boyCotting the vote and registering mass 
resignations, ignored by the government, and with only the JCP voting against It." 
Opposition reactions regarded the PKO Bill as one step in the beginning of the dismantling 
of the Constitution and the beginning of Japan's active military participation In the global strategy 
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of the US by abusing the name of the UN.a7 The SDPJ disagreed with the Ozawa Committee's 
interpretation of 'international security' and the rationale for despatching the SDF overseas. The 
SDPJ regarded UNPKO and the PKO Bill as two very different concepts. Unlike UNPKO, the 
PKO Bill had failed to gain the understanding of the Japanese public, the Diet and the other 
nations of East Asia.88 As far as the SDPJ was concerned the PKO Bill was an attempt to take a 
road to becoming a military superpower and was a result of political bargaining and compromise 
by the LDP, KOmei Party, and DSP rather than a deeply considered attempt to contribute to 
international society. This was one reason why the SDPJ tried to force a dissolution of parliament 
and force an election on the issue. The SDPJ envisaged Japan's contribution being based on 
economic and technological ability, as mentioned in the SDPJ reSignation statement.89 Yet, 
ultimately. the opposition parties, in the face of a fluid public opinion questioning its traditional 
opposition to participation in UNPKO, failed to derail the government's legislation. This was due, 
not only to the changing attitudes of civil society, but also, as I will demonstrate next, because of 
external norms at play. In particular the emerging norm of UNPKO found some common ground 
with the traditional norm of pacifism in Japan, encapsulated by the Ozawa committee's definition 
of 'international security.' 
ExTERNAL NORMS: THE UNITED STATES 
As stated above, Japan's first financial package in reaction to the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait was 
introduced rapidly and involved the freezing of Iraqi and Kuwaiti assets, a ban on ail Imports, and 
the suspension of credit and loans to Iraq. In addition, Japan abided by UN resolutions 
concerning the cessation of trade with Iraq. As regards aid for Middle Eastern nations affected by 
the invasion, Foreign Minister Nakayama guaranteed aid to compensate for any economic 
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damage arising out of participation with UN sanctions against Iraq.90 Yet, by mid-August, 
pressure from the US had become apparent with President Bush demanding an increase in aid 
from Japan to Middle Eastern nations, while at the same time praising Japan for respecting and 
behaving in line with the UN resolutions dealing with sanctions.91 Soon after this request a 
government source declared that it was constitutional for Japan to contribute financially to a UN-
backed MNF, but stressed the requirement of UN approval.92 
The package, announced on August 29, 1990, incfuded an unspecified amount of aid to 
the MNF (rumoured at the time to be $1 billion), the use of government chartered civil aircraft and 
ships for evacuating refugees, the despatch of one hundred medical experts, a sizeable, but 
unspecified, amount of financial aid to Turkey, Egypt and Jordan, ¥1.5 billion to aid Kuwaiti 
refugees in Jordan, and a proposed new law to allow the despatch of the SOF, dealt with in a 
separate section.93 The next day. it was announced that a GuH Fund would be established to 
help Middle Eastern nations hit by the GuH crisis. The US reaction to the package was. like 
President Bush's first attempt to pressurise Japan, both encouraging and critical. Ambassador 
Armacost also stressed to a LOP seminar the necessity of increasing Japan's contribution: a 
figure of $2 billion in aid to Egypt, Jordan, and Turkey was mooted by the US, In response to 
which Nakayama cancelled his attendance at the APEC conference in Vancouver so that a 
revised package of funding proposals could be negotiated. The perceived tardiness of Japan's 
financial contribution to the MNF in the Persian Gulf provoked the US House of Representatives 
into voting 370-53 to withdraw 5,000 troops a year from Japan until it began 'to support their own 
defence and to support our efforts in the Gulf. '94 The Japanese government hastily attempted to 
deny any link between its financial contribution in the Gulf and US bases in Japan. However, the 
next day after this demonstration of US will, Sakamoto announced an extra $1 billion dollars for 
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the MNF and the extension of $2 billion dollars in aid to Egypt, Jordan, and Turkey.95 Kaifu took 
pains to explain to the US public the package of measures Japan would be undertaking by 
appearing on CNN. Furthermore, the Japanese embassy mailed explanatory briefs to prominent 
scholars and media heads to ensure understanding of Japan's contributions in the package. 
Thus, US pressure had come to play the role as a norm in encouraging Japan's active response 
manifested both as criticism and praise with efficacy. 
Further expansion of Japan's financial contribution came In October with $250 million in 
loans to Jordan extended in order to tighten up sanctions against Iraq, $300 million in aid to 
Turkey to compensate for losses resulting from the Gulf Crisis, and a further $150 million In loans 
to finance a World Bank-sponsored industry and trade project in the region.96 The Japanese 
contribution was further expanded in January 1991 with $38 miIJion contributed to help alleviate 
the refugee problem. In these final days before the air war started US pressure continued with 
Armacost attempting to determine what assistance could be expected from Japan in the event of 
the outbreak of military operations and suggesting to Miyazawa and Watanabe that the financial 
support for the MNF and refugee relief be increased.57 With the outbreak of hostilities, Kaifu 
promised to increase Japan's aid contribution but faUed to specify a figure. This figure was 
specified towards the end of January when the Finance Minister, Hashimoto RyOtar6, and US 
Treasury Secretary, Nicho/as Brady, agreed on an additional $9 billion to be paid to the MNF. 
This financial contribution was to be raised through tax increases, mostly through corporate, 
petroleum, and tobacco taxes-the equivalent of ¥10,OOO per person." Japan had discovered 
that the traditional norm dictating reliance upon the US to provide for Its security was not a 
feasible policy and was faced with a US seeking to encourage Japan to playa larger role while 
maintaining the traditional security structure. 
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However, the likelihood of despatching the SDF at this early stage was remote as 
demonstrated by Nakayama's statement to King Fahd of Saudi Arabia that 'Japan will do its 
utmost in terms of extending measures of assistance in co-operation with other countries, but it 
cannot send the military.'99 Kaifu met with Sakamoto and MOFA officials on August 22, 1990 to 
discuss Japan's response and the possibility of despatching personnel to aid in transport, 
medical, and communications' duties.1OO Soon after this, US pressure was to be witnessed with 
Ambassador Armacost calling for an active and military role for Japan: 'the importance of [Japan] 
being involved directly in multinational ventures in the area to support and enforce UN sanctions 
incfuding direct participation .. .in the region, either through miUtary presence, minesweepers, or 
other ships, or some form of SUpport."0' US Defence Secretary Richard Cheney called for Japan 
to participate in multi-national peacekeeping. '02 Pressure also came from Canada with 
Nakayama stressing in reaction to Joe Clark, the Canadian Foreign Minister, that Japan attached 
the greatest importance to UNPKO.103 
At the same time, support for the bill was expressed by the US State Department stressing 
Japan and Germany's role in the post-Cold War world. 10. Vice-President Quayle and a number of 
world leaders in Tokyo for the enthronement ceremony of the new Emperor in November used 
the opportunity to call on Japan to contribute personnel to the Gulf. And in reaction to this, Kaifu 
addressed US and Japanese policymakers stressing the 'unlfied efforts from the International 
community' and the 'greater emphasis on the role the UN can play [In the resolution of post-Cold 
War conflictsJ."05 
The attitude in the US to the despatch of Japanese personnel was one of despair and 
annoyance that an ally had acted so belatedly and minimally, with phrases such as 'burden-
shirking' and 'bogus constitutional excuses' used in the US press.1OG Specifically in reference to 
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the despatch of minesweepers, one academic referred to the event as the 'belated despatch of 
four small wooden minesweepers two months after the hostilities ended.'107 Others regarded it as 
contributing to an incremental process encapsufated in a quote from the Wall Street Joumal 
regarding the despatch as a 'cautious but significant step in [Japan's] effort to define an 
international role beyond that of banker and trader.'108 
As shown in the previous section, the business community's reaction to events in the early . 
stages of the Gulf conflict was similarly evenly split down the middle depending on the 
interpretation of the Constitution. However, the business community can be seen to have been 
more susceptible to outside pressure and the fear of ruining a good relationship with the US. This 
was seen as the impetus behind Keidanren's Chairman Hiraiwa Gaishi's statement of April 8, 
1991 calling for the deployment of minesweepers to the Gulf under certain conditions Including 
the existence of a cease-fire and the acquiescence of East Asian nations.108 The statement was 
received generally well by the rest of the business community, notoriously sensitive to outside 
pressure, and in particular by the US. This was witnessed at the US Business Conference in 
Pittsburgh in July 1991 where the Japanese delegate came under severe criticism for his 
government's reaction to the Gulf crisis. The Japanese business community began to look for 
ways in which the government could despatch personnel abroad as part of an effort by the 
international community.11o In line with Its reaction to Japan's overall contribution to the Gulf 
crisis, the business community's reaction to the despatch of minesweepers was tempered by the 
effect inactivity could have upon relations with the US. Hiralwa declared his support of MSOF 
minesweeper despatch in April 1991 overcoming dovish voices In the business community but 
still conditioned by the reaction of the nations of East Asia.111 Thus, the norms of Japan's 
security relation with the US and the attitude of Japan's Asian neighbours overlapped. The 
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reJationship with the US represents a constitutive norm, attempting to create and shape Japan's 
identity to a degree within the bilateral relationship. In contrast, relations with East Asian nations, 
as will be seen later, represent a more restrictive norm, seeking to limit and curtail Japan's 
actions. 
ExTERNAl NORMS: UNPKO 
As negotiations broke down between Iraq and Kuwait, Sakamoto stressed that 'Japan is deeply 
concerned about the deteriorating situation.'112 This was demonstrated in the establishment of a 
Foreign Ministry Task Force under the command of the MOFA Vtce-Minister, Kuriyama 
Takakazu, to monitor the situation in the Persian Gulf and protect the 267 Japanese nationals in 
Kuwait, as well as in discussion of prolonging the suspension of economic co-operation with 
Baghdad which had been in force since the First Gulf War and which Japan had been looking to 
overturn prior to the invasion.113 Although surprised by Iraq's invasion of Kuwait, Japan was 
quick to impose its own economic embargo even before the UN-endorsed embargo. Sakamoto 
announced the freezing of Kuwaiti assets on August 3, 1990 in response to a request from the 
Kuwaiti embassy in Tokyo, in addition to promising to consider other punitive economic 
measures in line with the US and European response. A ban on oil imports and the suspension 
of ¥400 billion in credits and loans to Iraq and Kuwait were among the suggestions. Japan's 
response was to be declared once Sakamoto and Kuriyama had talked with Prime Minister Kaifu 
who had to cancel his holiday in Gunma../(en. At this stage US pressure had already corne into 
play with a request for 'concerted action' from Japan and the first of many phone conversations 
between Bush and Kaifu. tt• Kaifu's commitment to economic sanctions at this stage involved no 
determined response except to stress that if a UNSC Resolution called for sanctions Japan 
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would respond favourably. Generally, the political response from Tokyo was rapid, assertive and 
in keeping with the response of the intemational community during this early period of the crisis. 
Despite the apathy of the business community, the govemment Imposed a ban on oil 
imports and all other trade with Iraq and Kuwait, suspended financial transactions with both 
nations and froze the ¥400 billion in economic assistance with Kaifu characterising the invasion 
as 'unpardonable conduct for a sovereign state.'115 In announcing this package of retaliatory 
measures, Ishihara Nobuo, Deputy Chief Cabinet Secretary. stressed the concept of c0-
operation with the international community. To this end, Japan was seemingly waiting for the 
UN's response which would act as a framework within which Japan would develop its own 
response. Moreover, Japan's desire to address the crisis through the UN was further 
demonstrated by Foreign Minister Nakayama's announcement with regard to the UN order to 
cease trade with Iraq, '[t]he government of Japan regards as of the highest significance that the 
intemational community has decided, through the UN, to combine their efforts to act towards the 
withdrawal of Iraqi troops and restoration of peace in the region.'116 Japan complied with UN 
resolutions by invoking two proviSions under the Foreign Trade Control Law freezing Iraqi and 
Kuwaiti assets in Japan.117 The government also cited the UN in Its support for the US effort In 
the Gulf when Prime Minister Kaifu stressed that the 'use of force as an unavoidable last resort 
by the US and the other countries concemed seeking to push back aggression and to restore 
peace in accordance with UNSC Resolution 676.'118 
As mentioned above, with the outbreak of hostilities, Kaifu promised to Increase Japan's 
contribution and aid but failed to specify a figure. The eventual figure of $9 billion was agreed 
upon at the end of January by Finance Minister Hashimoto and US Treasury Secretary, Nicholas 
Brady.119 This contribution, one of the most controVersial within Japan, was expfalned to the 
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public by Prime Minister Kaifu using the UN as a justifying factor. IAlthough the financial 
contribution needs to be borne by each member of Japanese society. I want the public to 
understand the necessity of Japan's international contribution based on the UN's activities [my 
streSS}.'120 Foreign Minister Nakayama a/so justified the contributions to a lower House Foreign 
Affairs Committee Meeting with reference to various UNSC resolutions and Japan's 
responsibilities to international society .121 
Kaifu's plan was to despatch the ASDF based on a broad reading of the SDF law allowing 
for the transport of refugees as well as foreign dignitaries, and thus. negating the need for any 
revision of the legislation. In this way, Japan would be capable of responding to calls from the 
United Nations Disaster Relief Office (UNDRO) and the International Organisation for Migration 
for aircraft to aid the refugee situation by simply adding a new ordinance to the SDF law. In Diet 
debates, Kaifu defended his position, when questioned by Dei and Ishida, by emphasiSing that 
Japan's response would respect both the Constitution and the UN Charter, the transportation of 
refugees did not constitute a military activity, and that the possibility of despatching the SDF on 
this duty would still be investigated.122 Kaifu still envisaged a role for the US.Japan Security 
Treaty alongside a UN-centred policy based on Article X of the Security Treaty which expresses 
the hope that the UN would be in a position to secure the peace and security that the Security 
Treaty aims to provide untit that day comes. 123 Similar sentiments of a duty to co-operate with the 
International community were expressed by Matsunaga Nobuo, an advisor to the MOFA. 
streSSing the role of the UN in the post~Cold War wond and stating that, 'if n [a UN police force] 
were set up, we should co-operate with it, including by military means. That does not mean 
renouncing our anti~war Constitution.'124 In this way, the amalgamation of the pacifist norm and 
the extemal UN was becoming increasingly evident. 
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One of the first mentions of despatching Japanese personnel to the Gulf was suggested 
by Australian Prime Minister Bob Hawke with the aim of maintaining the blockade against Iraq. 
The MOFA rejected this suggestion citing the constraints of the Constitution and pledging to limit 
Japan's response to financial contributions.125 The issue re-surfaced when Terashima TaizO, the 
Self-Defence Force's Joint Staff Council Chairman, stated publicly that SDF members were 
eager to participate in the MNF gathering in the Gulf, '".we are ready to go abroad anytime and I 
am confident the SDF is confident [sic] of carrying out whatever missions are required.'126 Ouchi 
Keigo, leader of the OSP, suggested the despatch of the SOF because of the fact that financial 
contributions were regarded as insufficient by the international community but limited its role to 
purely non-military matters.127 
Japan's package of measures in response to the Gulf crisis was announced on August 29. 
1990 with emphasis placed not only on the aid to be given to refugees and the medical aspects 
but also the logistical support that Japan could offer to the MNF. Kaifu presented this idea in 
these terms: 
I believe that, within the framework of international society In the years ahead, It will be necetsaI'y to 
review our exisHng laws, regulations and systems, to consider what can be done for peace within the 
framework of the Constitution, and, for instance, and this Is my personal opinion, to seriously 
consider fresh legislation, such as a UN Peace Co-operation Law, with a view to enabling Japan to 
perform its duties appropriately with regard to co-operating In UN activities for keeping and 
maintaining peace and for Intemational efforts by the member states In support of those aetlvIties.121 
Kaifu and Ouchi were in agreement that personnel could and should be despatched and 
began to plan the first legislation to facilitate despatch. Nakayama also seems to have changed 
his opinions in line with Kaifu and Ouch; upon returning from his tour of the Gulf. stating that, 'it is 
high time that Japan considered what kind of contributions it can make as a member of the 
international community and what kind of legislation Is needed [to make such contributions)' ,129 
The LOP defence-related committees agreed on a more visible effort to contribute to the Gulf and 
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suggested revision of the legislation on the despatch of personnel overseas. Sakamoto also 
called for a new law to allow Japanese participation in UNPKO with an announcement on 
September 5, 1990 that 'the govemment is considering whether and to what extent the SDF 
should playa role in achieving peace in the Gulf.'13o Ishikawa YOzO of the Defence Agency called 
for Diet debate to clarify what the SDF was allowed and not allowed to do.131 Kaifu's statement 
demonstrated a certain vagueness but also a desire to contribute to the international community 
particularly through the UN: 
I have no intention of sending armed personnel [to the Gulfl to join miitary activities. But Japan, as a 
major economic power, must fulfil its international responsibilities by providing personnel as well as 
financial assistance to help peace activitias by the UN .... In the days when Japan was still In the 
process of rebuilding Its war-battered economy, financial contributions alone may have been enough. 
But now Japan is one of the seven most industrialised democracies and must fulfil Its International 
responsibilities. l32 ' 
Thus, the UN and its peacekeeping activities had become a constitutive norm enabling 
Japan to construct a new identity for itself in the pursuit of peace through the UN. 
Another argument put forward by supporters of a visible Japanese contribution was based 
on Article 98 of the Japanese Constitution which states that Japan will honour other international 
treaties over and above the Constitution as a norm of international society. Furthermore, as 
Japan had agreed to the UN Charter upon jOining the UN, Article 43. stating that each member 
state will make various materials available to the UN to fulfil Its numerous duties. had to be 
respected. This was raised in a Diet committee meeting by ItO Kenichi. of the Japan Intemational 
Forum Foundation (Zaidan H6jin Nihon KOKusai FOl'8fflU). He also stated. In answer to the claim 
that Japan was denied the right to collective self..cJefence. that. although Japan may have denied 
this right, it cannot deny the responsibility that Japan's position In the worid has been 
accorded.133 Similar opinions were expressed. including a portrayal of Japan as an economic 
superpower failing to provide the blood and sweat that the US was ready to contribute. Japan's 
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responsibility to support the emerging international order, and the Interpretation of Nishihara 
Tadashi of the Defence Agency, which the Ozawa report would later put forward, that the 
Constitution in focusing on the attainment of peace could sanction various kinds of contribution to 
UNPKO including both non-military and military activities.134 
The eventual bill presented to the Diet allowed the SDF to retain their status and split 
control between the Prime Minister and the Defence Agency, but would allow the team to 
participate in various activities deemed necessary by the UN. In defending this bill during the 
119th extraordinary Diet sessions, Kaifu underlined changes In the post-Cold War world, the 
prominence of the UN and the 'inevitable cost arising from Japan's International posltion.'135 To 
this end Kaifu agreed to accept a reinterpretation of the term 'collective self-defence' which had 
rejected military co-operation with other nations but was now seen to be constitutional when 
based on the UN Charter and its resolutions. 136 Other LOP sources agreed with Kaifu that 
peacekeeping based on a UN resolution does not constitute collective defence and 'collective 
security' was used and regarded as a post-Cold War term to replace collective defence and allow 
for a peacekeeping roJe in Japan. This thinking could be seen when the Diplomatic Bluebook was 
published in mid-October 1990 with stress placed on the contribution of personnel on UNPKO. 
Ozawa regarded any activity falling under the title of UNPKO as behaviour working towards 
peaceful goals in line with the Constltution.137 
, Swedish Prime Minister, Ingvar Carlsson, stressed this appearance In urging 'Japan to 
adopt the identity of a nation like Sweden with a pactfist image, but a high profile In UNPKO.138 
This was an opinion echoed by UN Under-Secretary-General, Ronald Spiers, In urging 
Nakayama to adopt a position like Sweden and Canada in contributing actively to UNPKO.139 
And again reiterated by Brian Mulroney, Canadian Prime Minister, by offering to share Canada's 
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expertise in this area.140 The MOFA concurred with this interpretation with one official stating that 
'the revitalization of the UN will offer a good opportunity for Japan to gain a higher profile in the 
, ' 
world political scene.' and thus Japan could begin to orient its foreign policy around the UN rather 
than the US.141 
In a round-table discussion of prominent academics, Diet members, and bureaucrats 
conducted by a journalist from the magazine, BungeishunjO, the overwhelming feeling was that if 
SDF personnel had to be despatched overseas then the only acceptable way of doing so would 
be under the UN flag. This would imbue Japan's peacekeeping contribution with the degree of 
, 
concordance accredited to UNPKO. Yamasaki Taku, acting chairman of the liberal Democratic 
Party's General Council, expressed the opinion that, 'Plf the multinational troops are re.organized 
under the UN flag, amending the law will be easier .... Japan upholds the UN as the cornerstone 
of its diplomacy' and defence; this means that our country has a duty to support UN 
operations.'142 Even the SDPJ agreed on the centrality of the UN with Dol stating that. '[nJow is 
the time to make use of the UN. We in the Japan Socialist Party are drawing up aeancrete 
-., \ 
proposal for UN leadership, and we'll be announcing the main points shortly .... One of the main 
roles of the UN is to preserve peace and work out political resolutions of conflicts. The JSP is 
now considering the establishment of a UN peacekeeping fund. In the event of religious or ethnic 
conflicts-and we'll be seeing more of them-the UN would use this money to seek political 
solutions. Japan; of course, would actively provide a fair share of the funding.'143 Moro; Ken, 
chairman of Chichibu Cernent Company, voiced similar concerns that. 'partlcipation in a UN force 
is not a matter of our rights; it is a matter of our duties as part of the International communlty,'144 
Opinion polls seemed to change as the success of the Gulf campaign became evident. As 
in the words on of one KOmei Party spokesman: 
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There has been a national change of mind in this country. The Gulf War had 8 strong impact. We 
watched the war on TV, with newscasters and scholars and pundits talking about what Japan's role in 
the world ought to be. And the new consensus that merged Is that our strong anti-war pacifism is still 
there. But. beyond that, shouldn't Japan have some role in helping the UN preserve peace? ... How 
can our country lock itself out of the world and stt here behind the closed door of anti-war pacinsm?l4S 
Indicative of the conflict of norms, despite displaying shades of pacifism, elements of the 
business community demonstrated a degree of hawkish·ness in their attitude to the despatch of 
SDF personnel from the SDF to the Gulf, but expressed also support for despatch under the UN 
I . 
flag. The President of Sony, Oga Norio, supported the despatch of troops in the face of foreign 
pressure: 
Young Americans are suffering out there in scorching heat. That Is being widely reported on in the 
American press, and it plays on people's minds in unpredictable ways. They are exasperated by the 
lack of action in the Diet. We must not forget those young Americans .... The world Is watching the 
Diet and I believe we should contribute our fair share of sweat'l~ 
Other members of the business community went as far to promote constitutional revision. 
Vice-Chairman of Keizai D6yOkai, Kaku RyQzaburO, stated that: 
This problem has arisen because Japan has left unchanged things that ought to have been changed. 
We should have reviewed also the Constitution, but we left it as it was. We need a military force In 
order to protect the international order from fanatical elements. We should have given thought to 
contributing [to International security), and the fact that we did nothing hIS brought the contempt of 
the rest of the world upon US.147 
This reflected the business community's frustration at the lack of progress of the UN 
Peace Co-operation Bill in the Diet. The bill's eventual demise was met with regret by the 
President of Nikkeiren, Suzuki Eiji: 
It is extremely regrettable that the UN Peace Co-operation Bill WIS rejected. There ought not to be 
any stigma attached to this nation taking part in UN peacekeeping activities. As It stands, Japan Is 
going to end up in the terrible position of an orphan among nations.1• ' 
This statement was followed up on the outbreak of war In the Gulf with the comment that, 
'(tlhere are a lot of Japanese companies in the gulf region. We should be drawing 'on a/l our 
resources and taking action. We ought to do everything possible within the limits of the law, and 
if there are obstacles, we must think about changing the law.'149 Kelzal D6yOka/'s Ishihara 
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echoed a popular theme of support for UNPKO in stating that, 'Japan would have a greater voice 
in world affairs if the Self-Defence Forces could be used for the preservation of world peace as 
well as for the defence of Japan. We have to contribute people, not just money. There is nothing 
wrong with Japan co-operating in police operations under the auspices of the UN [my streSS].'150 
A subsequent Special Hearing of the Lower House centred upon the role that the UN 
could play in the post-Cold War world now it was freed from the constraints of the US-Soviet 
confrontation. Foreign Minister Nakayama and Defence Agency Director Ishikawa emphasised 
the preventative peacekeeping role the UN could play in the international order and that Japan's 
traditional UN-centred foreign policy could now come to fruition.151 This factor, which had initially 
been responsible for the demise of the first bill sanctioning the despatch of SDF personnel, 
overcame the vocal opposition within and outside of Japan. 
DUring special committee hearings, Kaifu stressed the fact that traditional peacekeeping 
depends upon a cease-fire being in place and the UN force taking a neutral, independent, and 
non-enforcement stance. These conditions, it was argued, would minimise the danger of a 
particular PKO and be in keeping with the Constitution and Japan's traditional UN-centred foreign 
policy. 152 In a subsequent hearing, Nakayama stressed the demands that Secretary-General de 
Cuellar was making on Japan to release money and personnel to meet the requirements of 
expanding PKO missions.153 
The Diet's session ended in October 1991 and the debate on the bill carried over to the 
. next session in 1992. In the meantime, Kaifu was replaced as Prime Minister by Mlyazawa Kilchl, 
a keen supporter of Japan's participation within the UN who refused to drop the bill in Diet 
debate, envisioning Cambodia as the anticipated first despatch for the SDF. Mlyazawa stressed 
the necessity of despatching personnel abroad as part of Japan's international contribution and 
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emphasised the central role UN would play in realising this contribution.154 The centrality of the 
UN was also witnessed in the Socialists submitting an alternative bill to the Diet at this time 
constraining contribution to civilian roles including election observation and medical help. SDF 
personnel were required to first resign their position before participating. Diet approval and UN 
command were also points which differed in this opposition party's bill.155 
In February 1992 the SpeCial Study Group on Japan's Role in the International 
Community, commonly know as the Ozawa committee, reported its findings. The main themes 
included the end of the Cold War, the importance of the UN, the strengthening of collective 
leadership, and the role Japan would have to play in the future after the Persian Gulf War as one 
of the main members of the international community, 'the recent war In the Persian Gulf has 
made it clear that appeals for peace are not enough, that peace in some cases cannot be 
realised without united action by the intemational community.'156 VIewing the UN as 'a forum 
where the world can express its will on security issues, conferring legitimacy on any actions 
taken, the security function of this organisation can be quite meanlngful.'157 Within this 
framework, the report called on the govemment to strengthen ties with the US, co-operate and 
. strengthen the G-7, promote stability in ASia, and actively participate In UN activities. To this end, 
a distinction was drawn between active and passive pacifism In the reading of the Constitution to 
allow for a more· active role within UNPKO rather the passive role Japan had played In the post· 
W.W.II world: 
It can be argued that If Japan were to employ Its forces overseas In such an Instance (when 
international action is being taken in line with an agreement by the community of nations], It would not 
be contravening its constitutional renunciation of war and of the use of force to settte disputes. taa 
Moreover: 
Japan should not assume this role in the international community only because other countrlet have 
asked it to do so. Since the role is essential for realising the ideals expressed In our own Constitution, 
we should assume it as one that Japan has a duty to perform at its own responsibility and on the 
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basis of its own judgement. 'S9 
On the issue of Japan participating in an armed UN force the report is clear in stating that: 
As long as the force is acting under the authority of the UN, though, Japan should give It personnel 
support in areas that do not entail the use of force, such as medical care, transport, and 
environmental protection. The question of whether to co-operate with personnel in areas that go 
beyond these should be judged on the basis of a careful examination of the characterlstk:s and 
functions of the multinational force, including the number of countries involved and the nature of the 
decision-making set-up. leo ' 
Essentially, the message of the report was that 'no nation is responsible to itself alone.'161 
Under this interpretation, the MNF was regarded as working towards the goal of creating peace 
and order, the same goal of the Constitution and international co-operation.162 
This line of argument was taken up by many, including Professor KatO Hiroshi of Keio 
University, who stressed the interpretation of the Constitution lay in the preamble which calls for 
international co-operation to preserve peace and this sanctioned Japan's participation in 
UNPKO. Professor Kitaoka rejected Japan's post-W.W.II stance and urged Japan to put the SDF 
under the command of the UN which would avoid violation of the Constitution. 
In late January 1992, Prime Minister Miyazawa Klichl addressed the UN Security Council 
in the spirit of the Ozawa committee urging major reform of the UN's organisations and functions. 
Implicit in this was the desire to see Japan become one of the permanent members of the 
Security Council. 163 And in late March Miyazawa stressed. 'it is significant for the SDF to respond 
to expectations from the international community and to demonstrate Its ability.'164 The UN was 
regarded in this speech as the logical channel for Japan's international contribution, as Robert 
Immerman of Columbia University has suggested, 'participation in this multilateral organization is 
perhaps the only aspect of Japan's post-war foreign policy on which there has been virtual 
agreement across that country's political spectrum."65 However, Prime Minister Miyazawa was 
unwilling to expand the interpretation of the Constitution to allow the peacemaking roJa envisaged 
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in the Ozawa Report, stressing Japan's right to self-defence only.166 
At this time foreign opinion was also in evidence supporting a UNPKO role for the SDF. 
German politicians and academics who were themselves going through a debate on contributing 
to UNPKO supported Japan's participation even if constitutional revision was necessary. Gareth 
Evans, head of the Australian Foreign and Trade Ministry at that time, also supported Japan's 
planned despatch of the SDF on UNPKO.167 Boutros·Ghali added his voice to the despatch of 
Japanese personnel to the UN.168 The importance of the UN Secretary-General's statements can 
be seen in the inaccurate reports stating that Boutros·Ghali had rejected Japan's projected 
personnel contribution as unnecessary. Despite the fact that it was later revealed that Boutros-
Ghali had made no such claim, reports suggested that it was therefore no longer necessary for 
Japan to enact PKO Iegislation.169 
Article III, Paragraph I of the Law states, 'UN peacekeeping operations conducted under 
the control of the UN based on resolutions of the General Assembly or Security Council.' 
Therefore, Japan can only despatch peacekeeping troops under the remit of the UN and not any 
state or International organisation outside of the UN. Investigations were carried out as to the 
viability of participation in non-UNPKO but it was believed that the UN could guarantee the 
impartiality of an operation and had a track record of approaching some kind of definition of 
peacekeeping. The concept of peace enforcement was still at this stage unclear and was only 
given theoretical meat to the bones after the publication of Agenda for Peace In June 1992. 
The MOFA h~iled the law as a step to a more visible global role which will Improve Japan's 
role in the UN and the bilateral relationship with the US. Despatch to the UNTAC mission in 
Cambodia was the next objective of the MOFA. The nations of ASEAN also welcomed the bill 
and urged Japan to play a role in Cambodia. The overall tone of the ASEAN response was 
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encouraging as long as Japan participated within the UN and its resolutions to reduce the fear of 
a resurgence in Japanese militarism.17o Some domestic opposition was voiced but the UN was a 
legitimising factor if Japan kept its military within the remit of the UN's mandate. Particularfy 
Cambodia, as will be seen in the next chapter, urged Japan to quickly Implement the law and 
despatch the SDF to the UNTAC mission.171 . 
. After this stage the debate began to be characterised by the question of the suitability of 
the case of Cambodia and the necessary preparations for the SDF despatch. Again public 
opinion had completed a volte-face with 52 percent supporting the despatch of the SDF to 
Cambodia and 36 percent opposing any despatch, although the mood was still predominantly 
against the non-use of force, with 71 percent of those polled favouring a non-military role.172 
Japan had previously been unable to actively participate within the UN as Shigekl Suml, First 
Secretary of Japan's Permanent Mission to the UN, declared at the 46th Session of the UN 
General Assembly held in October 1991: . 
. The International community owes 8 profound debt of gratitude to those countries that contribute 
personnel to UN peacekeeping operations. Japan Is deeply grateful for the contributions they have 
made to the maintenance of world peace and security and is eager to join them In that noble 
endeavour. My government is studying ways in which it might broaden Its participation In PKO 
activit/88.m 
In contrast, with the passage and successful implementation of the UNPKO legislation, 
Sumi Shigeki was able to announce a year later that: 
The international community owes 'a profound debt of gratitude to UN peacekeeping ~ration8. 
When I addressed this Committee last year I announced that my government had been studying 
ways In which' Japan might broaden its participation In this Indispensable endeavour .... The 
Govemment of Japan is pleased to join the countries that contribute personnel to UN peacekeeping 
oparations, and intends to co-operate to the maximum degree allowed within the framework of this 
new law.174 
Reflecting upon Japan's response to the Second Gulf War, the traditional reference points 
and identities of Japan's policymaking process appear to have been blurred. The business 
community appears to have been almost mute on the topic and the LOP was far from free to 
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initiate policy. The smaller opposition parties demonstrated their ability to wield influence in a 
world of coalition politics. Furthermore, the role of the UN as a legitimislng factor was integral to 
any despatch of Japanese SDF personnel, both in justifying it to the Japanese public and 
oPPOsition parties. The UN and its peacekeeping duties in the post-Cold War era was becoming 
a new norm of international society, and began to supersede the traditional norm of pacifism in 
Its specificity, durability and concordance by merging with it and redefining what kind of overseas 
despatch was and was not permissible. In failing to recognise this trend, the SDPJ suffered in the 
polls and eventually changed its security position under the leadership of Murayama Tomiichl. 
ExTERNAL NORMS: EAST ASIAN NATIONS 
The traditional fears of East Asian nations about any sign of Japanese remilitarisation were 
aroused at an early stage when Kim Dae-Jung, head of the South Korean opposition party for 
Peace and Democracy in Korea, called upon Japan to make it explicit that It would not contribute 
military to the MNF.17sln addition, the Chinese Foreign Minister, Qian Qichen, declared that: 
The people of China and some other Asian countries cannot but be concerned over the Japanese 
government's plan to despatch members of its SDF to [the] UN peace co-operation corps abroad as 
that unfortunate part of history remains fresh In our minds.... It Is our hope that the Japanese 
government will deal with this matter prudently. 178 
These fears were acknowledged by Foreign Minister Nakayama In stating that, 'Southeast 
Asian countries, which suffered durtng W.W.!I, have shown a serious Interest In [the law]. It Is 
extremely important to draw up a flawless bill:177 Nakayama took the opportunity of the UN 
General Assembly· meeting in New York towards the end of September to approach 
representatives of East Asian nations and allay any concern. Kaifu also took pains to mitigate 
fears in East Asia, 'Japan has pledged since the end of W.W.!I that it will never become a military 
power and launch a war of aggression agaln.'118 Kaifu's statement stressed the non-military 
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nature of Japan's contribution but also the role of the UN and Japan's responsibilities to the 
international community-again grafting the concordance with the UN onto Japan's 
peacekeeping contribution. 
All this time, East Asian nations continued to express their fears with South Korean 
Foreign Minister, Choi Ho Yoong, referring to the bill as 'worrisome' and Beijing referring to the 
despatch as a 'mistake'.179 The Chinese President. Yang Shangkun, went as far to say that 
despatch would cause 'severe and emotional repulsion' amongst the Chinese people.180 The 
feelings of the nations of East Asia were articulated in the following terms, 'the most extreme 
foreign critics suggest that a SDF overseas peacekeeping despatch could be the precursor to 
Japanese forces marching abroad under the battle flag of the Rising Sun .... Most important to all 
parties is the question of what SDF despatch abroad might indicate about future Japanese 
military intentions.'181 And with this in mind, MOFA spokesman, Watanabe TalzO, instructed 
Japanese ambassadors throughout the world to explain to their host governments that any 
Japanese contribution of personnel would be conducted through the UN.182 Hashimoto Hiroshi, 
Japanese Ambassador in Beijing, met with the Chinese Vice Foreign Minister, QI Huaiyuan, to 
reassure China that Japan would uphold UN resolutions. Similarly, Yanagl Kenlchl, Ambassador 
in Seoul, stressed that Japan's action was one of contribution to International society not a 
military action. Senior members of the lOP, however, began to express concern about the 
chances of the bill passing Into law with Kanemaru citing East Asian nations' concerns as he was 
at that time involved in talks on the state of the Korean peninsula. 
Indonesia's President Suharto, after listening to Watanabe stress the despatch within the 
terms of UN resolution, expressed sympathy with Japan's plans for the SDF.t83 Corazon Aquino 
declared in talks with Watanabe that the Philippines would not oppose an SOF role as long it was 
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part of UN peacekeeping.184 Despite being cited as the source of the famous quote likening 
Japan's participation in UNPKO to giving an alcoholic chocolates, Lee Quan Yu also expressed 
understanding for the despatch of the SDF. Even a minority opinion within South Korea was 
expressed by Choi Chang Yoonm, Public Information Minister, that the SDF despatch, 'within the 
UN peacekeeping corps following the Persian Gulf war, I think it is natural that a number of roles 
will emerge. It would be natural for Japan to take part.'185 The Thai ambassador in Tokyo, 
Birabhongse Kaaeusri, stated that, 'despite world-war memories, Southeast Asian countries 
believe the intentions of the Japanese govemment are peaceful and constructive .... It Is 
appropriate for Japan to playa role in UN peacekeeping efforts.'186 Watanabe's tour of Asia also 
met with opposition to the SDF despatch, the Chinese VICe-Premier, Wu Xueqian, stated that, 'if 
Japan's proposed international contribution means the despatch of SDF members, Japan should 
exercise prudence because it would be a sensitive issue."87 However, this Opinion was 
seemingly in a minority. By displaying Japan's effort as in concert with the UN, the impression of 
militarism was avoided and opposition was weakened both inside and outside of Japan. 
As the minesweepers made their way to the Gulf, support was expressed in some quarters 
for the despatch. President Mahathir did not regard the despatch of minesweepers as an act of 
belligerence and in fact welcomed the MSDF despatch as Kaifu arrived in Malaysia to begin a 
tour of East ASian neighbours.188 The tour continued to Singapore where Kaifu again stressed 
that the despatch of minesweepers was part of Japan's Intemational contribution and not a sign 
of resurgent militarism.189 It was with this desire to preserve a pacifist Image of Japan's effort that 
helicopters were not utilised despite the presence of halipads on both the vessels, Hayase and 
Tokiwa. At the same time, Nakasone in Beijing had seemed to make progress in dealing with 
China. Jiang lamin, leader of the Chinese Communist Party, expressed understanding at the 
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MSDF despatch of minesweepers as part of the international effort to clear the Gulf sea lanes.190 
During the Diet debate the government endeavoured to reassure the opposition parties 
and the neighbouring nations of East Asia of the non-aggressive stance of the legislation. 
Furthermore, that the law should be implemented 'after getting consent from all neighbouring 
countries', according to Prime Minister Kaifu. 191 Furthermore, he envisaged, 'Asian countries able 
to discuss ways of joining together to participate in peacekeeping operations and how to divide 
up those roles.'192 At this time, the KOmei Party's Ishida was in China reassuring Jiang Zemin, 
Secretary-General of the Chinese Communist Party, that China had nothing to fear from Japan's 
participation in UNPKO.193 He also stressed the type of UNPKO Japan would participate In, 
namely the more traditional kind of peacekeeping in line with the Constitution, rather than the 
enforcement measures seen in the Congo in the 19605. Kaifu also attempted to stress that the 
command of SDF troops participating in UNPKO would rest with the Prime Minister, not the UN 
Secretary-General. 
In reaction to the opposition's reference to the concerns of East Asian nations, again 
Foreign Minister Nakayama was forced to use the General Assembly of the UN to calm fears of 
neighbouring East Asian nations. It was stressed that 'Japan has an obligation to contribute 
actively to efforts led by the UN to secure and maintain world peace.'194 With this In mind 
Nakayama conducted talks with his Korean and Chinese counterparts, lee Sang Oh and Qian 
Qichen, to assuage any fears of a resurgent Japanese militarism. Although this restrictive norm 
can be seen to have eroded to an extent in the case of East Asian nations such as Malaysia, the 
Phntppines, etc., in the case of China and the two Koreas anxiety was, and is, still pervasive. In 
reaction to the passage of the PKO law, opposition to the bill was expressed by South Korean 
officials fearing the subsequent repeal of the frozen clauses and a consequent resurgence of 
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Japanese militarism. Equally, the Chinese media focused on the Diet debate and urged 
prudence in the matter.195 To an extent, in the case of Southeast Asian nations, the norm of the 
UN and its peacekeeping functions facilitated the relaxation of misgivings among certain nations 
that would rather see Japanese remilitarisation take place under the aegis of the UN (or US) than 
unilaterally. Yet fears of East Asia nations continued to be evident with South Korean Japan 
specialist Song Yong-son stating that '/ don't object to the new US.Japan Security Pact due to 
the lack of alternatives, but the problem lies in the momentum generated by developments that 
started with Japan's participation in UN peacekeeping operations and it will continue with the 
unshackling of devices put in place to prevent it from becoming a military power.'196 Clearly, this 
norm, although weakening Slightly in its durability and specificity in some countries, was still 
deeply rooted in especially China and South Korea despite the justification provided by 
participation based on UN resolutions. The concerns of these nations came to the forefront and 
yet altered in some cases, as will be demonstrated in the next chapter, with the realisation of 
Japan's PKO contribution in Cambodia. 
SUMMARY 
At the beginning of the Second Gulf War the traditional norms of Japan's polltical-mllitary culture 
of the 1940s and 1950s, as discussed in the previous chapter, were In evidence, namely a 
durable sense of pacifism, clearly defined reliance on the US, and deference to the concems of 
neighbouring East Asian nations over Japan's remilitarisation. Japan looked to the US for 
leadership in the crisis and had to adapt its policies In the light of ~S crltlcism-a similar situation 
particular1y with regards to China and South Korea. 
Japan's minesweeper contribution was all part of Kaifu's strategy of las much as possible', 
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rather than 'too little, too late' and fitted into Japan's incrementally salient role, 197 Considering the 
obstacles that stood in Japan's way and the lack of precedence to refer to, the Kaifu 
administration had done what it could, and more, by progressively assuming responsibilities, 
including minesweeping. Faced with the mixed signals from the nations of ,East Asia and civil 
society, it would be expected that Japan's policy would be gradual and time-consumlng rather 
than rapid and path-breaking, The reasons for the despatch of the minesweepers fit more into an 
incrementalist, rather than alarmist, or organisational, interpretation and demonstrates the 
strength of the norm of pacifism and its constraining power. '98 The Defence Agency and the 
MSDF were evidently not prepared to take on minesweeping duties, as was demonstrated 
above, in opposition from the MSDF itself, the lack of precedence on which to base a decision, 
and the fact that they had not had the opportunity to train together before being hastily brought 
together from three bases.199 Moreover, if this was a routine operation then the task force was 
singularly unprepared to undertake this mission, as Captain Ochiai stated, 'We knew the Persian 
Gulf was a very hot place, but that's about all. We knew nothing about such basic concerns as 
prevalent winds, current speed, or seabed contours. We didn't even know what kinds and 
quantities of mines had been laid.'200 Furthermore, leave was never property decided so that 
whereas other naHons' personnel got leave every three months, the MSDF personnel worked 
straight through without leave. In addition, certain equipment was lacking in comparison to other 
nations, like automated devices and computer systems for detecting mines. A hasty departure 
and lack of preparedness led to some embarrassing mistakes, like the loading of fifty chalnsaws 
onto one minesweeper; thus, the despatch hardly constituted a routine of any definition. Woolley 
claims that 'other policy responses involving the SDF simply were not available because IIttte or 
no routine behaviour existed.'201 However, ultimately, this was not a straightforward operation 
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and to categorise it as such is to fail to take into account both domestic and external pulls and 
pushes which were integral to the despatch.202 This episode demonstrates the restrictions 
imposed by the pacifist norm upon the government's available actions, but also demonstrates the 
extent to which pacifism's durability had waned and making a contribution to international society 
had become a norm for the Japanese government in a more constitutive way than the pacifist 
norm. 
With the rise in profile of the Secretary-General and the international community in dealing 
with the crisis, the norm of the UN and its peacekeeping functions developed rapidly from the 
embryonic stage of the 1980s demonstrated in the previous chapter into a liberating and enabling 
norm in contrast to the restrictive norms of the security relationship with the US and the fear of 
alienating East Asia. Thus, this chapter has demonstrated how these norms came into conflict 
; 
with each other, in addition to how the UN gained concordance within the PKO debate in Japan 
as a justifying factor and also the embodiment of a duty to the international community. It has 
appeared that this norm could transcend all other norms in Importance as the Ozawa Committee 
Report gained acceptance both within the Diet, civil society, and in parts of East Asia. Sections of 
Japanese society began to comprehend the new norm of UNPKO and adjust their traditional 
pacifism accordingly. Moreover, a divide developed between the stalwart opposition of China and 
South Korea and the acceptance of South East Asian nations-this development from Diagram II 
can be seen in Diagram III. The reason for this is rooted in the constitutive, rather than restrictive, 
nature of this norm, providing Japan with a new field in which to fulfllits perceived commitments 
to the post-Cold War international community without overtly compromising Its traditional 
identities. The following chapter will continue to interpret events in the UNTAC operation through 
the framework of competing types of norms in order to explain how events progressed with the 
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fulfilment of Japan's first despatch of military personnel since the SDF was established. 
DIAGRAM III: PollCYMAKING MATRIX FOR CHAPTER FOuR, THE SECOND GULF WAR 
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CHAPTER FIVE: CAMBODIA 1 
The international community owes a profound debt of gratitude to UN peacekeeping 
operations. When I addressed this Committee last year I announced that my 
government had been studying ways in which Japan might broaden its participation 
in this indispensable endeavour. Today I am pleased to inform the members of this 
Committee that Japan has in fact provided some 700 personnel, both civilian and 
military, to the operations in Cambodia, in accordance with the recently enacted 
Peace Co-operation Law.... The Government of Japan is pleased to join the 
countries that contribute personnel to UN peacekeeping operations, and intends to 
co-operate to the maximum degree allowed within the framework of this new law. 
INTRODUCTION 
Statement by Sumi Shlgeki. First Secretary. Permanent Japanese Mission to the UN. 
47th Session of the General Assembly, November 10. 1992. 
The UN Transitional Authority in Cambodia (UNTAC) operation was a watershed for a number of 
actors involved. For the UN it was the largest peacekeeping operation mounted in its history, 
embracing unprecedentedly ambitious plans for the administration of an entire counby.2 For the 
Cambodian nation it symbolised the desire to end the institutionalised violence of recent 
Cambodian history and the hope that reconstruction could be promoted. For Japan it was the first 
despatch of military personnel since the end of the Korean War thanks to the legislative process 
outlined in the previous chapter. Japan's contribution to this ground-breaking operation can be 
classified into four areas: first, as cease-fire observers with the duties of overseeing the cease-
fire. monitOring the smuggling of arms into Cambodia and supervising the storage of weapons 
from the disarmament process. In order to fulfil this duty, Japan first despatched two contingents 
of eight personnel each from September 1992 to March 1993 and March 1993 to September 
1993 respectively (see Appendix III); second, electoral observation monitoring and assistance in 
the national election that took place from May 23 to 28. Five national govemment officers, 
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thirteen local government officers and twenty three volunteers were sent by the Japanese 
govemment charged with participating in this mandate; third, civilian police duties to survey local 
police activities for impartiality and the training of Cambodian police in investigation techniques, 
to which end 75 Japanese civilian police were despatched from October 1992 to July 1993; and 
finally, SDF engineering units were charged with the duty of rebuilding roads, bridges and the 
transport of supplies. Two contingents, both of GOO-men, were sent from September 1992 to April 
1993 and March to September 1993.3 
As outlined by Shigeki in the statement above, Japan sought to participate actively in the 
resolution of the Cambodian conflict and the consequent reconstruction. However, this was by no 
means a recent development. Japan's relations with Cambodia always had been amicable, 
although not particularly intimate, since Cambodia's attainment of independence in 1953. With 
the Vietnamese invasion of 1978 Japan's policy was built on the foundations of ASEAN's policy 
of opposition to the invasion. However, with the collapse of the Cold War and the more concrete 
possibility of a solution to the conflict, Japan began to adopt a more salient role In Cambodia's 
conflict resolution .• This chapter seeks to build on the previous empirical material by Investigating 
how the norms upon which Japan's foreign policy and political-military culture are based altered 
in the post-Cold War WOrld, particularly focusing on how the changes witnessed during the 
Second Gulf War (see the previous chapter) continued to develop with the first despatch of the 
JSDF to Cambodia. The introductory review of recent Cambodian hiStory is by necessity and 
without apology brief and uneven due to the emphasis it places on the UNTAC administration of 
Cambodia. With this Itime-chart' in mind the subsequent sections will shed light on the changing 
norms framing, encouraging and constraining Japan's first military particlpatlon In UNPKO. 
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A BRIEF HISTORY OF THE CAMBODIAN CONFLICT 
Cambodia's history is a long and violent one constituting what David Chandler has called a 
'majestic two thousand years of history'.5 For nearly a century Cambodia was a French 
protectorate with an intervening but considerably shorter period during W.W.II. under Japanese 
occupation. Independence was conceded by France in November 1953 and Cambodia was 
subsequently given international recognition in July 1954 by the Geneva Conference on 
Indochina and admitted to the UN in 1955.6 During the Vietnam War, despite Prince Norodom 
Sihanouk's attempt to keep the country out of the conflict, Cambodia suffered carpet-bombing by 
the US airforce, In 1970 a right-wing military coup by General Lon Nol overthrew Sihanouk and 
changed the name of the country from the Kingdom of Cambodia to the Khmer Republic. 
However, the promised stability failed to materiaUse and civil war followed resulting In the victory 
of Pol Pot's Khmer Rouge, the establishment of Democratic Kampuchea in April 1975, Prince 
Sihanouk's relinquishment of the head of state and the horror of the ensuing killing fields. This 
soon led Vietnam to invade Cambodia towards the end of 1978 and impose their own brand of 
communism on the long-suffering Cambodian people with the establishment of the People's 
Republic of Kampuchea, known after 1989 as the State of Cambodia. However, this regime was 
widely accepted by the Cambodian people as a welcome alternative to the 'contemptible Pot', By 
this stage the conflict had acquired regional as well as Internal implications as a struggle 
between Vietnam and China as to who would dominate Indochina. The global Implications were 
seen in the Treaty of Friendship and Co-operation between the Soviet Union and VIetnam which 
was regarded by Beijing and Washington as proof of Soviet expansionist Intentions leading to, on 
the one hand, milHary intelVention by China in northem VIetnam in February 1979 and. on the 
other hand, a concerted effort by the ASEAN member states to find a diplomatic solution to the 
problem. 
The PRK led by Heng Samrin as president and Hun Sen as Prime Minister waged an 
ultimately unsuccessful campaign against the remnants of the Khmer Rouge hiding along the 
Thai-Cambodian border, in addition to Sihanouk's royalist FUNCINPEC and the republican 
Khmer People's National Liberation Front led by Lon Nol's former Prime Minister, Son Sann. With 
the financial backing of China, Thailand, and the West, these three factions formed the Coalition 
Government of Democratic Kampuchea (CGDK) and achieved the privilege of occupying 
Cambodia's seat in the UN General Assembly. In a classic Cold War scenario, in opposition 
stood the People's Republic of Cambodia supported by Vietnam and the Soviet Union. This 
confrontation eventually reached a stalemate with each side unable to defeat the other, thereby 
facilitating the desire to come to some kind of settlement; in Munck and Kumar's words 'a classic 
Iose-Iose situation' developed.1 This situation was of course aided by the improvement of 
external factors, namely the withdrawal of Vietnam in 1989 and the general Improvement of Sino-
, 
Vietnamese relations. Furthermore, the collapse of the Soviet Union ended financial aid for 
Vietnam and the People's Republic of Kampuchea. Finally, the US, fearing a return to power of 
the Khmer Rouge, began to pressurise Thailand and China to rescind their support for Pol Pot. 
The outcome of all this was a series of attempts throughout the 19808 to resolve the 
Cambodian conflict based on multilateral efforts. The UN General Assembly convened an 
international conference in 1980 ultimately failing due to the Soviet Union's and Vietnam's 
boycott. In 1988 and 1989 Indonesia sponsored the two Jakarta Informal Meetings attended by 
the four Cambodia factions, the members of ASEAN, Laos and Vietnam. The result of these two 
meetings was the Vietnamese offer to withdraw from Cambodia which was subsequenUy 
followed by the Paris Conference on Cambodia of July 1989 co-sponsored by France and 
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Indonesia. Progress was made at the conference but it ultimately became deadlocked due to 
Hun Sen's refusal to accept any power-sharing arrangements with the Khmer Rouge.8 
The solution to this deadlock was first mooted by US Congressman Stephen Solarz to 
Australian Foreign Minister Gareth Evans and hinged on the abandonment of any.power-sharing 
arrangements in favour of placing faith in the renewed importance of the UN in the post-Cold War 
world. Thus, instead of power-sharing, the stress was placed on the UN administration of 
Cambodia in the run-up to a UN observed election.s This was developed by Australia into a 
document submitted to the February 1990 Informal Meeting on Cambodia and supported by a 
back-breaking diplomatic effort by Australian diplomat Michael Costello to win the acceptance of 
the nations attending the meeting.1o At the same time the Japanese government launched its first 
ill-fated effort to broker a deal with the Tokyo Conference on Cambodia ignored by, and thus 
doomed by, the Khmer Rouge. The Australian document acted as the basis for the UNSe's 
Framework Document for a Cambodian Settlement accepted by all attendants of the Informal 
Meeting on Cambodia and initiated the creation of the Supreme National Council comprising all 
the factions with the aim of sustaining the peace process through a working relationship." 
With the creation of this body, the attainment of a solid cease-fire and agreement on the . 
scope of the UN administrative role, the Paris Peace Accords were signed on 23 October 1991 
by the four Cambodian factions under the umbrefla of the Supreme National Council of 
Cambodia (SNC), the UNSC Permanent Five, and a number of other states.12 The Accords 
pledged the four factions to maintain the cease-fire and facilitate the cantonment and 
disarmament of military forces along with recogniSing the SNC as the legitimate authority of 
Cambodia through the transitional period. The non-Cambodian signatories pledged to remove 
their troops from Cambodian territory, end mlHtary and financial assistance. and recognise the 
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sovereignty, integrity and neutrality of Cambodia. The UN would administer the country until an 
election (also administered by the UN) could be held and a national government formed. Thus, 
the Accords hinged on the effectiveness of the interaction between the SNC and the UN, 
Specifically UNTAC and the Special Representative of the Secretary-General. This was the most 
ambitious large-scale UNPKO in the history of the UN embracing a mixture of peacekeeping, 
peacemaking, and peacebuilding.13 In detail, UNTAC's mandate incfuded: first, supervision, 
monitoring. and verification of the withdrawal and non-return of foreign troops; second, 
cantonment, disarmament and demobilisation of the four Cambodian factions; third, the conduct 
of a free and fair election; four, promotion and protection of human rights; five, clearing the 
country of landmines; six, repatriation of Cambodian refugees; seven, maintenance of law and 
order, military security and civil administration; and finally, establishment of an economic 
infrastructure and encouragement of sustained development. 
Pre-empting UNTAC's despatch, UN Secretary-General de Cuellar recommended to the 
Security Council that the UN Advance Mission in Cambodia (UNAMIR) be established. With a 
limited mandate, only 268 personnel and led by Ataul Karim of Bangladesh, UNAMIR began to 
address the removal of mines in Cambodia and assisted In the maintenance of the cease-fire. 
The lack of resources meant that cease-fire violations, particularly by the Khmer Rouge, went 
unchecked at this time and corruption continued within the Hun Sen government because a 
strong, neutral UN mediator was essentially lacking. UNAMIR was not envisaged in the Paris 
Peace Accords and, although established, this Initial presence in Cambodia, was ultimately a 
failure. 
However, the main mission, UNTAC, began to take shape follOwing Akashl Yasushi's 
appointment as Special Representative to the Secretary-General and head of UNT AC In January 
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1992. Lieutenant·General John Sanderson of Australia was also appointed commander of 
UNTAC's military force.14 The operation was sanctioned by the UNSC in February 1992 and an 
election date was set for April/May 1993 with the establishment of a new government for August 
1993. A peacekeeping force of 15,900 military personnel was planned with 3,600 civilian police 
and 2,000 civilians with 450 UN Volunteers taken from 46 contributing countries swelling the 
numbers. Indonesia, Malaysia, and Thailand were the first nations to deploy their troops with full 
and complete deployment taking longer than expected. To achieve its aims the UNTAC mission 
divided Cambodia into several regions for the deployment of personnel (see Appendix III). Sector 
one contained Dutch personnel; sector two was under Bangladeshi administration; sector three, 
Pakistani; sector four, Uruguayan; sector five was split into eastern and western zones with 
Indonesian troops in the west and Indian troops in the east; sector six was French; sector seven 
did not exist; sector eight was Malaysian; again sector nine was split into east and west with 
Tunisian troops in the west and Bulgarian in the east; and finally Ghanaian personnel occupied 
the special sector created around Phnom Penh.15 The creation of UNTAC constituted the first 
phase of the operation. The cantonment, disarmament. and demobillsation of the four factions 
constituted the second phase complemented by the repatriation of Cambodian refugees. 
Implemented hand in hand with mine-clearing in arable land. Furthermore, in preparation for the 
election. UNTAC's activities embraced enrolment and registration. in addition to the everyday 
administration of the country. maintenance of law and order, and protection of human rights. This 
stage was complicated by the reports of intrusions by VIetnamese troops still present In 
Cambodia, the intransigence of the Khmer Rouge over this issue, the sporadic attacks on 
Vietnamese residents in Cambodia, and the consequent failure of Pol Pot to co-operate with the 
second phase of the peace process. As the situation escalated over the months that followed the 
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Khmer Rouge began a campaign of kidnapping UN peacekeepers. Moreover, violence was not a 
monopoly of the Khmer Rouge, as the State of Cambodia undertook terror campaigns of drive-by 
shootings and grenade attacks on opposition party election offices and candidates. Throughout 
this time the use of force by UNT AC was never ruled out and was most strongly advocated by 
General Loridon of France. Eventually the peace process proceeded with the disarmament of the 
three C(){)perating factions in the face of Khmer Rouge intransigence, so much so that by 
September 1992 52,000 troops of the co..operating parties had been cantoned and 50,000 
weapons taken into custody. However, this still left a considerable number of trained and armed 
troops on a/l sides. On October 13 1992, the Security Council decided to proceed with the 
election despite the failure to end the civil war and create a peaceful environment, opting to 
pressurise the Khmer Rouge into co-operation through diplomatic efforts on the part of France, 
Indonesia, Thailand, and Japan. 
, The election campaign began on April 7, 1993 having been postponed due to the poor 
security situation, lasting until May 19 followed by a cooling-off period and then polling from May 
23 to 28. Khmer Rouge violence continued and fears of an outright attack on the campaign were 
heightened when in mid-April the Khmer Rouge suddenly closed its office In Phnom Penh and 
withdrew its representatives. Doubts were being expressed by both Australia and Japan about a 
continuing presence in Cambodia. Despite these misgivings and violence, the Cambodian people 
tumed out in millions to cast their votes, thereby allowing the operation to snatch victory from the 
jaws of defeat. In all, close to 90 percent of the those registered to vote came to the ballot box-
a remarkable percentage by any nation's standards-and polling took place in a remarkably free 
and fair atmosphere contrasting dramatically with the run-up period to the election. Khmer Rouge 
soldiers appeared at election stations and declared support for the new government even if it 
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was of a Sihanouk nature. Ultimately, the election was largely free and fair and recognised by the 
international community as well as the four Cambodian factions. 16 
In the aftermath of the election and various political manoeuvrlngs by the four factions, a 
Constituent Assembly was formed and a draft Constitution ratified on September 211993. The 
Constituent Assembly was transformed subsequently into the new National Assembly and 
UNTAC's role formally ended. With no one party assuming a majority, a coalition govemment 
excluding the Khmer Rouge was formed. With the success of the largest election in Cambodian 
history and the largest peacekeeping operation undertaken by the intemational community, 
UNTAC was an enormous confidence-building measure In the short-term to both the Cambodian 
nation and the UN. To assess how Japan affected, and was affected by, the UNTAC operation Is 
the remit of the remainder of this chapter. 
INTERNAL NORMS: PACIFISM 
Japan's contribution to UNTAC was built on the foundations of the traditional norms of Japanese 
foreign policy, as outlined in Chapter Three. These norms were both liberating In that they 
encouraged and shaped policy as constitutive norms, and also constraining in defining what was 
acceptable and unacceptable as regulatory norms. The norm of pactfism was seen to have 
begun to change during and after the Second Gulf War, becoming less of a regulatory and more 
of a constitutive norm. Furthermore, during the UNTAC operation the pacifist norm can be seen 
to have continued to shape behaviour In this direction. 
No issue dominated the debate over Japan's participation In the UNTAC operation more 
than the violations of the cease·fire committed mainly by the Khmer Rouge and the debate over 
whether this compromised the presence of the SDF In light of the five principles of the PKO Law. 
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In reaction to one of the many attacks on a UN installation commonly known as 'Japan House' on 
January 12, 1993, where a number of Japanese officers were regularly resident, then Chief 
Cabinet Secretary, Kano YOhei, stressed that the five principles guiding Japan's participation 
were not compromised and that the cease-fire was still in place. Nevertheless, he stressed that 
the Japanese government would request UNT AC to ensure the safety of Japanese 
peacekeepers, especially police officers, who were grouped in pairs and regarded as particularly 
vulnerable as opposed to SDF units, which were organised in groupS.17 In the face of the 
February 1993 full-scale offensive by the Phnom Penh government against the Khmer Rouge, 
the interpretation that the Paris Peace Accords were still intact was maintained by members of 
UNT AC as well as by the Japanese Prime Minister, Miyazawa Klichl, and Ambassador to 
Cambodia, Imagawa Yukio.18 Foreign Minister Watanabe Michie concluded to Prime Minister 
Miyazawa that the Paris Peace Accords were seen to be intact and there was no need to 
consider withdrawal of Japanese personnel in light of the five principles. Miyazawa thereafter 
reported this to the Oiet.19 A few days later the govemment even agreed to the step requested by 
UNTAC that the Japanese contingents area of operations be expanded towards the north of 
Cambodia but avoiding Khmer Rouge areas.20 
It was at the time of this offensive that Ozawa IchirO made public the final draft of the 
Ozawa Report. This report stressed a reinterpretation of the Japanese Constitution. as opposed 
to revision, allowing Japan to contribute to UN military peacekeeping operations in support of 
Secretary-General Boutros Boutros-Ghali's proposal for more heavily armed UNPKQ. This more 
'active' rather than 'passive' interpretation of the Constitution was framed solely within the UN's 
collective security system with the kind of multinational operations like those undertaken In the 
Second Gulf War and the Korean War; in other words, operations which this report excluded from 
184 
the remit of Japan's expected participation due to the lack of UN consensus. At this time 
Mitsuzuka Hiroshi, head of the LOP's Policy Affairs Research Council, suggested the insertion 
into Article IX of a clause stating that a UN decision supersedes the provisions of the Constitution 
in order to clearly delineate the remit of Japan's actions in a bid for a permanent seat on the 
UNSC.21 
As the violence in Cambodia continued to call into Question the Paris Peace Accords and 
the five principles framing SOF participation, Japanese public opinion began to Question the 
continued stationing of the SOF in Cambodia. Boutros-Ghali's visit to Tokyo on February 15, 
1993 was met with a rally organised by a number of protest groups from the KantO area urging 
the government to resist Boutros-Ghali's call for Japan to increase its UNPKO contribution in 
Quantity and quality and to withdraw from Cambodia as the cease-fire was in ruins.22 
Furthermore, the issue that brought opposition to UNPKO participation to a head was the murder 
of UN volunteer worker Nakata Atsuhito in April 1993.23/n the face of this event, the government 
was swift to express regret and to stress that it would not affect the continuance of the mission. 
In fact, KOno stressed the resolve Japan possessed to continue with the mission despite this 
tragedy.24 In reaction members of the SOPJ called for the withdrawal of Japenese personnel as 
the cease-fire obviously was failing to hold due to the non-compliance and terrorism of the Khmer 
Rouge. In fact, the situation was to some closer to 'a state of war' .• The KOmei Party's 
Secretary-General, Ichikawa YOichl was more restrained in his assessment of whether to 
withdraw Japanese troops stressing a policy of walt-and-see.- The government stressed that 
although an independent pullout was permissible under the five princlptes, Japenese personnel 
would stay in Cambodia until the UN regarded the cease-fire as untenable. One of Gotoda 
Masaharu's first acts upon being appointed Deputy Prime Minister In April 1993, due to the III· 
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· health of Watanabe, was to assure the nation that Japanese personnel would remain in 
Cambodia and confirmed that Mozambique would be the next destination for Japan's 
peacekeepers.27 All this was in keeping with Minister of State Nakayama Kazuo's statement in 
front of the House of Representatives' Committee on National Security of April 6 1993, where he 
stressed the need to make not only a financial contribution, but a human contribution to UNPKO. 
Needless to say, the government regarded the SOF as most suited to the task.28 Thus, the 
govemment met pacifist dissent amongst the population with reference to the UN stressing that 
Japan would only withdraw if the UN decided to withdraw-the regulatory norm of pacifism being 
remoulded as a constitutive norm of peacekeeping under the aegis of the UN. 
Public opposition was demonstrated in protests outside government buildings demanding 
immediate withdrawal from Cambodia and suspension of plans to despatch the SDF to 
Mozambique. The AII..Japan Prefectural and Municipal Workers' Union submitted a petition to the 
Ministry of Home Affairs to ensure its members would not be despatched to Cambodia to help 
with the election. The Gunma Prefectural Government began to advise its staff enlisted to help In 
the administrative preparations for the election in Cambodia to refuse their despatch.29 The SDPJ 
and JCP began to place pressure on Prime Minister Mlyazawa In the Diet to withdraw SDF 
troops from Cambodia and that the UN postpone the eJection from May 23 to 28 as the country 
was in no peaceful state to maintain a free and fair election. However, opposition was not as 
vociferous as the debate over the PKO Law highlighted in the previous chapter, mainly due to the 
electoral losses of the SDPJ in the previous summe(s election and the need to build bridges with 
the centrist parties. KOmei Party members took a middle line recognising that" the Khmer Rouge 
may well have broken the cease-fire but that a hasty withdrawal of SOF troops should be 
avoided. Similarly OSP members feared that a hasty withdrawal could lead to the Isolation of 
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Japan in the international community.30 Thus, one norm of internal pacifism was being replaced 
with the external one of international standards of behaviour, particularly through the UN. 
Throughout this period the government was steadfast in opposing unilateral withdrawal, but 
supporting the maintenance of the original date for the election, and the improvement of the 
security situation for Japanese peacekeepers. Miyazawa reiterated this point, both on the 
domestic stage and the international stage while visiting Australia in talks with Prime Minister 
Paul Keating.31 At this time even participation within a UN army in the peace enforcement 
aspects of UNPKO was mooted as a possible idea with Foreign Minister MutO Kabun streSSing 
the necessity to investigate the possibility.32 The conflict between the two norms of domestic 
pacifism and commitments to the UN was summed up by the chairman of the LOP's Research 
Commission on the Constitution, Kurihara YOko, in asking rhetoricafly whether the government 
'will follow the international community or domestic opinion',33 Moreover, this was demonstrated 
by disagreement within the government, with Kolzuml JunlchirO, Minister for Posts and 
Telecommunications, on the one hand, demanding the withdrawal of Japanese personnel to 
safer areas, while, on the other hand, Miyazawa and MutO led the damage limitation campaign 
and attempted to move the debate on to the frozen aspects of PKO and investigate the 
possibilitY of using weapons.34 The opposition parties demonstrated similar divisions over the 
Issue; for instance, on the one hand, Murayama Tomllchi of the SOPJ opposed any patrols of 
election stations by the SOF as they may encounter violent resistance by Khmer Rouge troops; 
on the other hand, Kamisaki TakehO of the KOmei Party supported the patrols under the PKO 
Law and Kanda Gen of the DSP regarded participation In these patrols as Inevltable,35 In 
addition, KOno sought to expand the remit of the SOF's use of weapons to Include the defence of 
UN volunteers working at the election stations where the SOF were patrolling, thereby 
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broadening the government's interpretation of the five principles.36 
The government, however, at this time rather than reacting to the demands of civil society 
and the traditional norm of pacifism, began to investigate the idea of giving SDF personnel 
weapons in order to address the unstable security situation in Cambodia in addition to confirming 
its future and firm participation. Deputy Director of the Defence Agency, Hiyoshl Akira, indicated 
that in light of the turmoil in Cambodia, the SDF may have been given guns to carry rather than 
limiting the possession of guns to personnel guarding arsenals.37 The decision was made 
eventually to equip the second contingent of SDF peacekeepers with weapons when moving 
around Cambodia, depending on the severity of the situation on the ground, but to leave them 
unarmed when working on road and bridge repairs.38 This was extended a few days later to 
Include the protection of civilians transported to the ballot boxes in their proximity during the 
election. Moreover, military expansion of the SDF's role came from within the SDF gaining 
approval from Prime Minister Miyazawa that the SDF may form 'intelligence-gathering units' to 
act inside Takeo province. The main aim was to ensure the safety of Japanese civilian election 
monitors by visiting local election stations every day Inquiring as to the state of security. 39 
Furthermore, even within the SOCialist Party there existed support for a more active contribution 
to the UN. The Action New Democracy group, founded by Yoshioka Hiroshi, promoted the 
recognition of the expand~d military role of the SDF and also the possible participation by it, or a 
similar organisation, in a UN army in the future.40 
This debate was overtaken by events. On May 4, 1993 a Japanese police officer, Takata 
Haruyuki, was killed in an ambush by unidentified aggressors In north-west Cambodia. In 
response to this event, Murata KeijirO, Minister of Home Affairs, then on a visit to Cambodia 
called on Akashi to move Japanese officers to safe areas. While refusing to give Japan special 
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treatment, Akashi did agree to place Japanese election monitors in the relative safety of Takeo 
province. He stressed that Japan could not be given preferential treatment and was free to 
withdraw its troops if the government so desired, yet sought to establish an understanding with 
Murata to ensure the continued stationing of the SDF.41 At the same time as Japan was being 
refused special treatment, the Defence Agency was readying the SDF for its second despatch to 
Mozambique.42 Moreover, despite a degree of uncertainty amongst the Japanese election 
monitors on the point of being despatched to Cambodia, there was equally a strong sense of 
resolve to participate within the international effort to ensure fair and free elections in 
Cambodia.43 
The institutionalisation of the pacifist norm within certain government circles can be seen 
in Kolzuml JunichirO's assertion that: 
Ever since the gulf war, the Diet has debated the proper nature of Japan's contribution to the 
international community, but the government never claimed that we would have to go so far as to 
shed blood. What it said was that we need to contribute with our own sweat because Ifs no longer 
sufficient to provide only money and material supplies .... Japan differs from other countries In terms of 
its consensus and determination regarding participation In peacekeeping operations. This point musl 
be considered. We should now include withdrawal from PKO activities II one of our options. It's 
important to know when to pull back. If we explain our position to other countries, I think they'll go 
along with us. Their PKO contingents probably also sense the same dangers." 
Nevertheless, in the aftermath of the UNTAC operation, when the Japanese nation began 
to review its behaviour in Cambodia. the DSP came out in favour of lifting the ban on arms for 
Japanese peacekeepers but stopped short of support for the creation of a peace enforcement 
unit as envisaged by Boutros-Ghali.45 Moreover. both during and after the UNTAC operation 
public opinion polls demonstrated a change in people's thinking about Japan's contribution to the 
UN and in particular its peacekeeping functions. By examining Opinion polls taken by the Prime 
Ministers Office and major daily newspapers, this becomes all-too-sallent.46 Immediately before 
the passage of the PKO Law, 41.6 percent of respondents supported SDF participation in 
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UNPKO with 36.9 percent opposed. In addition, SO.3 percent believed despatch to be 
constitutionally problematic with 28.2 percent thinking otherwise.47 Yet, immediately after the 
conclusion of the UNTAC mission a Yomiuri Shimbun poll found 55 percent supportive of the 
PKO Law.48 A NHK poll carried out in May 1993 saw 17 percent of those polled rate highly 
Japan's role in UNTAC and 47.8 percent rate Japan's role fairly highly, making a total majority of 
64.8 percent holding a positive view of UNPKO.49 In January 1994 a Prime Minister's Office 
Survey revealed that 22 percent of pollees believed that international co-operation should be the 
future area in which the SDF should concentrate. In addition, 5.7 percent perceived the main 
purpose of the SDF to be in the area of international contribution. In the same poll 48.4 percent 
supported Japan's participation in UNPKO, an increase from 45.5 percent as polled in 1991. 
Significantly those opposing Japan's participation fell from 37.9 percent to 3O.S percent over the 
same time frame.50 The UN also became the focus of people's attention: 53.S percent of people 
thinking that UNSC reform was necessary because it was an anomaly to have the five victorious 
powers of W.W.II controlling the UN and over 30 percent of people polled believing it to be an 
anomaly that Japan was not represented. 52.9 percent believed Japan ought to be represented 
on the UNSC with only 14.8 percent opposed. The second most popular reason was the 
contribution Japan could make to international peace as a pacifist nation coming after the reason 
that Japan should make a contribution to the international order as an economic superpower. 51 In 
the same poll 41.2 percent stated their support for the maximum possible contribution to UNPKO 
under the existing constitutional framework and 38.8 percent agreed with this as long as military 
contribution was excluded. 16.3 percent sought constitutional revision in order to improve upon 
Japan's contribution. This poll certainly revealed the 'honOUrable allergy' with SO.7 percent of the 
14.8 percent of people against Japan becoming a permanent member of the UNSC due to the 
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military contribution Japan Would be forced to make. Yet, the fact that this is only the majority of a 
very small minority should not be forgotten. 
In October 1994 a Prime Minister's Office Survey on Diplomacy confirmed this trend with 
findings of 35.2 percent regarding Japan's main role in intemational soclety to be the support of 
UNPKO, when support for this in previous years had been 28.8 percent In 1993 and 31.4 percent 
in 1992.52 More importantly, the main field of UN work meriting most Importance was seen to be 
peacekeeping with 66.3 percent. Japan's participation thus far was supported by 43.4 percent 
with 15.5 percent supportive of further qualitative and quantitative participation and only 8.6 
percent suggesting that Japan should not participate.53 Connected with this, 66 percent of the 
population supported Japan's bid for a permanent seat on the UNSC with only 18 percent 
opposing it. The percentage of people supporting the pursuit of Intemational peace and stability 
as Japan's main task in the UN increased to 67.2 percent in a Prime Minister's Survey of April 
1995.54 
A further poll in July 1995 found 74.8 percent regarding UNPKO like UNT AC as resulting 
in concrete improvements, whereas 18.9 Percent failed to" see any benefits from UN 
. " 
intervention.55 In this poll support for Japan's future participation in UNPKO was estimated at 
75.1 percent with 14.3 percent opposed, while an even more emphatic 80 percent supported 
. . . 
. . . 
participation in humanitarian operations with 10.7 percent opposed. 17.3 percent regarded 
international contribution as the "main role of the SDF.56 In comparison. a similar poll taken In 
February 1991 45.5 percent had agreed with participation and 37.9 percent opposed 
participation in UNPKO,57 By the time the poll was taken again In January 1994 48.4 percent 
agreed with 30.6 percent Opposed,58 Compared to these figures the results of the July 1995 poll 
demonstrate a steady acceptance of peaCekeeping amongst the Japanese population as long as 
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it is under the aegis of the UN. Thus, the pacifist norm most strongly held within Japanese civil 
society was continuing to be reconstituted in the light of the revival of the UN-a process which 
began during the Second Gulf War, as demonstrated in the previous chapter. 
Alternatively, within govemment circles, the MOFA has demonstrated its role as the main 
promoter of an active UNPKO policy for Japan and has sought to link this with the issue of 
permanent representation on the UNSC coming into conflict with other domestic agents imbued 
with the pacifist norm. One of the early exampfes of these differences can be seen in Prime 
Minister Hosokawa's speech to the UN General Assembly on September 27, 1993 stipulating 
that: 
Japan is prepared to do all it can to discharge its responsibilities In a UN reformed with the previous 
three points [one of which being the restructuring and strengthening of the UNSC] taken into 
account. 59 
The MOFA had previously submitted a poSition paper to the UN Secretariat not mentioning 
UNSC reform as a condition to Japan's admission. This discrepancy has been attributed to the 
Intervention of Tanaka ShQsei, Special Assistant to the Prime Minister and later head of the 
Sakigake Party, seeking a UN more suited to the post-Cold War world, rather than Japan 
pursuing UNSC membership in order to add to its national prestige. Despite MOFA's 
protestations that consistency was of utmost Importance in Japan's policy, Tanaka's Insistence 
upon Article 41 of the Constitution stressing the supremacy of the Diet over the bureaucracy, and 
the diffusion of power to small coalition parties with the break-up of the LOP system ensured 
Tanaka's modification remained. Then Sakigake Party leader, Takemura Masayoshi, was in a 
pivotal policymaking pOSition as Chief Cabinet Secretary and backed Tanaka ensuring the 
success of this modification. This is a theme which will become more ~Iient in the following 
chapter as coalition govemments began to establish themselves in Japan giving Japan's UN and 
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UNPKO policy a more fractured appearance as new sources of power and influence began to 
diffuse traditional ones. 
ExTERNAL NORMS: THE UNITED STATES 
Similar to the Japanese govemment's policy, the US government's overa" objective was 
concerned with maintaining a Japanese presence in Cambodia. This was publicly declared after 
a two.day conference of the US·ASEAN senior officials' forum calling for all participating nations 
to 'maintain their troops and personnel in Cambodia in line with the mandate of UNTAC' in 
addition to condemning the violence in violation of the cease-fire. so US policy was intrinsically 
linked with burden-sharing and attempting to shift not only the financial burden but also the 
personnel burden onto allied states. For example, on the financial side, towards the end of 
September 1993 President Clinton addressed the General Assembly of the UN with the 
suggestion that his country's financial contribution be cut from 30.4 percent to 25 percent. In 
mind was the idea of particularly Japan and Germany taking a greater responsibility for 
UNPKO.61 US interest also extended to the role that Japan can p'ay in making up the difference 
in the event of a withdrawal of the US. The UNTAC operation incurred start-up costs of $200 
million with the US paying its $60.8 million share and then an additional share of $184.1 million 
out of $606 million estimated by the General Assembly.62 With this being the cosUlest UN 
operation in its history and the central role of the US govemment in funding this expansion of the 
UN's work, interest developed as to how Japan could assume Its burden for maintaining order in 
the post~Cold War world, especially with the backtrlcklng of the Clinton administration from a 
promised active peacekeeping policy and 'aggressive multilateralism'. Due to disillusionment 
over the deaths of eighteen US soldiers in Somalia in October 1993 and Inter-agency conflict 
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between the State Department and the Department of Defence, resultant policy was delayed until 
the release of PDD-25 (Presidential Decision Directive 25) which ultimately failed to decide 
concretely future policy as it just provided a basis from which US policy could act. With the 
Republican electoral gains of November 1994 it appeared that US support for UNPKO would 
continue to stall; thus, the desire to encourage Japan was strengthened and plans to this end 
were put forward, such as the joint training of US and Japanese peacekeepers, shared financial 
contributions, and technological exchange.63 In addition, this contributed to the public justification 
of the Japan-US Security Treaty in a post-COld War worfd lacking an obvious enemy. As the 
range of Japanese military hardware was limited, the US was in the position of providing 
logistical support for Japan in the form of fuel supply ships and planes to assist in the long 
journey to Sihanoukville, Cambodia's main port. In May 1993, there were reports that the 
Japanese government had approached the US about the provision of transport and food-supply 
services to remote areas with Nakayama Toshio, Director-General of the Defence Agency, 
openly supporting expanded US support for Japan's UNPKO contribution.54 In return, although 
the Japanese side was (and still is) constrained in what it can contribute to support the US in the 
field of UNPKO, the private sector in Japan can provide certain airlift and sealift capabilities while 
the government can continue its despatch of personnel limited to certain roles while 
supplementing this contribution with financial assistance. It Is with this In mind that the US 
encouraged and pushed Japan in the direction of a more pro-active role during the UNT AC 
operation. 
On the human resource side of the /edger, during the debate In the aftermath of the death 
of Nakata and Takata, William Perry, US Deputy Secretary of Defence, spoke In Tokyo on the 
need for Japan to exercise leadership in global issues and that the Cambodian operation was a 
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useful step in the right direction. The desire on the part of the US to see Japan playing an active 
role at times led to exasperation at the soul-searching and debate within Japan. The Yomiuri 
Shimbun reported one State Department source as stating that it hoped that Japan would take a 
greater burden for US troops stationed within Japan and in the field of PKO would make more of 
a human contribution even to peace enforcement operations with the majority of American 
citizens believed to have no objection to the despatch of Japanese troops abroad.65 According to 
a Yomiurl Shimbun opinion poll of April 1993 support for Japan's participation in UNPKO 
amongst the Western nations reached a mean of 70 percent (with France at 73 percent, the US 
at 71 percent, the UK at 69 percent and Germany at 68 percent-a higher proportion than in 
Japan itself polled at 59 percent support). This showed a steady increase from a poll conducted 
in 1992 before the UNTAC operation which estimated support among the West as being 66 
percent in the US and 54 percent in Japan.66 
As Assistant Professor Tanaka Akihiko of the University of Tokyo has stated, 'Japan and 
the US may be depicted as polar opposites with respect to their involvement In the UN',57 In other 
words, the US ;s able to deploy its power unilaterally or with the help of allies in any comer of the 
globe, yet is not overtly interested in UNPKO, Japan lacks this capability but is troubled by the 
issue. However, in a similar fashion to Japan, the US has been inhibited in its involvement in 
UNPKO by domestic factors. Thus, the US attitude to encourage Japan in the field of UNPKO Is 
evident and has been recognised and reciprocated by the Japanese side. Previously In 1990 
Vtce-Foreign Minister Kuriyama Takakazu explained Japan's future diplomatic strategy: 
Today, the time when Japan could take tor granted an Intemational order austalned by US 
strength .. .is long past. The two nations ... are In a position to share the reaponslbliltiea for wortd peace 
and prosperity together with Western Europe. This Is precISely what Is meant by g/obtl ptrtntrship 
[my stressl.58 
Thus, the norm that emerged was a constitutive one in that it encouraged a new defining 
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role for Japan and was based around partnership within an alliance with the US, rather than 
domination by the US-which in itself would be a questionable way to characterise Us-Japanese 
relations. The US began at this time to regard Japanese participation in UNPKO as one form of 
burden-sharing and to this end came to support Japan's quest for a permanent seat on the 
UNSC and increased financial contributions. In the light of the failure of the Somalian mission, 
the US has been keen to disengage from UNPKO and Japan is willing to expand its contributions 
and commitments. US policy was encapsulated in President Clinton's Presidential Decision 
Directive (POD), mentioned above, of May 1994 stating that 'US and UN involvement in 
peacekeeping must be selective and more effective'.69 US disengagement has, thus, provided an 
encouraging norm for Japan-a theme which becomes even more salient In the following 
chapter. 
Certain critics have objected to Japan's security ties with the US on the grounds that they 
have inhibited Japan from developing an independent, tullv-rounded role and, thus, US troops 
should be withdrawn from Japanese terntory.70 However, n Is evident that the US has played a 
positive and encouraging role for Japan in its pro-active, military role as long as It Is contained 
within either the UN, or preferably, the framework of relations with the US. Thus, the traditional 
norm of reliance on the US, the bedrock of the Yoshida Doctrine, has slowly eroded and now 
appears to be liberated to some extent by the norm of the UN and the international community. 
ExrERNAL NORMS: UNPKO 
Previous to the UNTAC operation, Japan had attempted to play an active role In the Cambodian 
peace process within the framework of the UN by sending a senior official to Phnom Penh In 
February 1990 to discuss a Japanese peace plan with the PRK govemment. In April of the same 
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year, Premier Hun Sen was invited to Tokyo for medical treatment; then in June, Japan acted as 
oo-host with Thailand for the 1990 conference intended to resolve the conflict. All this activity was 
regarded by the Japanese government as Ian unprecedented attempt in Japan's post-W.W.II 
diplomacy'.71 In March 1991, CGDK Premier Sonn Sann visited Tokyo for talks with Prime 
Minister Kaifu and Foreign Minister Nakayama. Nakayama met with Sihanouk the next month in 
Beijing. Japan later became a signatory to the Peace Accords and promoted the appointment of 
Akashi Yasushi to head the UNTAC operation.n Further co-operation came in January 1992 
when Tokyo dropped its insistence on the precondition that the conflict be resolved before 
overseas development assistance could be extended. A pledge of ¥1.1 billion to Cambodian 
reconstruction followed. The despatch of personnel was recognised by Miyazawa as necessary 
for the new ground-breaking UNTAC operation, I[UNTAC] will have a range of activities 
unprecedented in' UN history. Japan is now striving to make the necessary domestic 
arrangements to enable it to contribute personnel to peacekeeping operations',73 Akashi's 
encouragement prevailed throughout the UNT AC operation. In the early stages of the operation 
in mid-January 1992 Akashi proposed that Japan provide police support stressing that his own 
appointment was linked to the weighty international expectations of Japan to provide for the 
restoration of peace in Cambodia. The whole issue of SDF command was resolved when explicit 
reference was made to the UN. Commander of the Second Battalion, Ishioroshl Yoshlol stated a 
preference for command under the UN while conducting operations under the UNT AC operation 
(kokurengawa komando no meikaku na yOsenV4 
In his speech to the 126th regular Diet session, Foreign Minister and Deputy Prime 
Minister, Watanabe Michio, highlighted the growing number of UNPKO in addition to the 
development and evolution of new types of operations. In the light of these developments, 
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Watanabe called for 'greater flexibility' and 'further participation in UN peace efforts wor1d-wlde', 
stressing that 'I believe this is an issue that Japan, as a responsible member of the international 
community, must take up with all seriousness'.75 A known supporter of an expanded military role 
for Japan was able, thus, to refer to a new norm in the international community in the form of 
UNPKO to expand and justify Japan's military expansion. The development of policy around this 
norm was to become a salient characteristic of Japan's PKO policy. 
During his visit to Tokyo in mid-February, Boutros-Ghali praised Japan for Its participation 
thus far and sought to encourage further participation within the framework of the Constitution in 
a similar interpretation as adopted by the Ozawa Report, 'Japan, through her [sic) Constitution, 
and by political chance, has opted for the path of peace and of internationalism. Japan's support 
in the new UN will be crucial'. 76 Encouragement also came from Ogata Sadako, UN High 
Commissioner for Refugees, calling on the Japanese government to despatch SDF personnel 
even when the five principles of Japan's participation are not met.77 
As mentioned above, in reaction to the worsening security situation in Cambodia. Japan 
began to push for a solution through multilateral methods Including an International conference to 
place pressure on the Khmer Rouge via China.78 At the same Ume. within Japan there was a 
process of recogniSing what UNPKO actually Involved-an Initial apprenticeship learning an 
important lesson. As stated by Senior Superintendent YamazakI Hiroto of the National Police 
Agency, 'a peacekeeping mission is naturally a dangerous task. The UN and the International 
community had addressed the worsening situation. That Is the nature of the UN peacekeeping 
mission. Japan didn't realize that'.79 Further encouragement came from Akashl Yasushl In 
meeting Nakayama Toshio, head of the Defence Agency.eo Stressing to the Foreign 
Correspondents' Club of Japan that Japan would need to di8card Its insular thinking for fear of 
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damaging its international reputation, he stated that 'there is no free ride in international peace'.81 
Furthermore, the norm of limitation by fellow East Asian nations in the light of Japan's behaviour 
during W.W.II could be overcome by the goodwill created by participation in UNPKO in the East 
Asian region. In this light, in conversation with Miyazawa after the conclusion of the UNTAC 
operation, Akashi continued to praise Japan's role and particularly the part played by Miyazawa 
describing it as a monumental achievement (kinjit6).82 
The worsening Cambodian security situation for Japan reached its zenith in April and May 
1993 with the death of Nakata and Takata. The government's position was that although the 
Khmer Rouge had closed down its offices in Phnom Penh, it had not repudiated the Paris Peace 
Accords and, thus, Japan's continued participation in UNTAC was not compromised. This 
argument was summarised by Genkawa Sachio, an advisor at Hitachi and former general of the 
GSDF, when he stated that, 'as shown by previous UN operations, it's necessary to be prepared 
for danger even after a cease-fire goes into effect'.83 This was one of the many aspects of this 
new norm of peacekeeping that Japan was having to become used to and grasp the specificity 
of-an aspect that needs to be fully comprehended in understanding Professor Takubo Tadae of 
KyOrin University. when he asked rhetorically, 'but when have UN peacekeeping missions ever 
proceeded as originally hoped? And even though they have not, why have countries rushed to 
participate in them?'84 According to UN data, by the time of Takata's death, In all 896 personnel 
had died in UNPKO with the ONUC operation accounting for the largest number, 234, followed 
by UNIFIL in Lebanon and UNFICYP in Cyprus., In all, only 12 of the 28 UNPKO which had taken 
place up to the Japanese deaths in Cambodia had been free of casualties.85 The debate In 
Japan had lost sight of the fact that participation In ,UNPKO might entail sustaining C8sualties.86 
It was this distinction which divided the Japanese press into two clear camps: firstly, the 
, , 
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Sankei Shimbun and Yomiuri Shimbun formed the supportive group with the Sankel Shimbun 
writing that: 
We were surely prepared for certain risks and dangers, Including the possible loss of human life, 
when we decided to despatch personnel to Cambodia .... Just because of [Takata's] death, we should 
not go off on our own and upset the solidarity of the UN.87 
The Yomiuri Shimbun contributed to the debate by stating that: 
We believe that, in view of the objective of making an intematlonal contribution, It Is a mistake to call 
for the immediate withdrawal of Japanese civilian police offlcers and SeIf-Oefence Forces personnel 
and the halting of the despatch of election monitors to Cambodia.88 
The opposing camp consisted of the Asahi Shimbun and Mainichl Shimbun, both 
considerably more troubled by the deaths in Cambodia and unsure of the implications. The Asahi 
Shimbun stated its editorial position: 
Unfortunately, efforts to make an intemational contribution can involve the loss of lives. The important 
point is to determine for what purpose and for whom such unstinting efforts are to be made. What 
also must not be forgotten are the local conditions in the target area and the timing of the despatch. 
Human lives must not be sacrificed haphazardly in the name of making an Intemational contribution. It 
Seemingly, the Asahi Shimbun had not embraced the new norm of UNPKO and continued 
to cling to a tight interpretation of pacifism. The Mainichi Shimbun echoed this attitude: 
Unless the government demonstrates its sincerity to the people, all its claims to have guaranteed the 
safety of Japanese personnel In Cambodia and to have Improved the altualion for them will ring 
hollow. 90 
During this period of national soul-searching combined with the sense of commitment to 
the intemational community, the attitude of Nakata Takehito, father of the UN volunteer killed in 
April, played an important role in justifying the continued existence of the Japanese contribution 
to the UNTAC operation. Nakata corrected certain misreportings in the Japanese press that 
despite his grief he had not in fact sought to persuade his son from going to Cambodia; 
moreover, he had his son cremated in Cambodia rather than transporting the body back to Japan 
in accordance with his son's wishes and in giving his life for the ideal of peace was providing an 
example for the rest of the Japanese people to follow.91 He stated while In Cambodia that, 'my 
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son is alive in all your hearts. We have 10sLbut I believe that...he gave his life for the right cause 
and I hope that peace will come one day'.92 After his son's death, Nakata Takehito set up the 
Nakata Atsuhito Memorial Foundation to support the work of UN volunteers, a cause in keeping 
with his son's wishes.93 
Yanai Shunji, then Head of the Peacekeeping section of the Prime Minister's Office, 
maintained that the issue of whether the cease-fire had collapsed or not had to be examined 
holistically; although the Khmer Rouge was refusing to participate in the second phase of the 
UNTAC operation, the operation and peace accords as a whole were being respected and that 
out of more than forty nations participating in the operation not one country withdrew its 
personnel for fear of the peace accords and cease-fire not being in pJace.94 Thus, it can be seen 
that the govemment was making decisions on the basis of the new norm of UNPKO, rather than 
the traditional norm of pacifism which would have dictated a withdrawal from a dangerous 
situation involving the use of arms. As Yanai stated throughout the PKO debate, a cease-fire 
ought to be in place and Japanese television tended to give the impression that the SDF would 
be despatched to a war situation with images of tanks and warships in combat situations. Yet, it 
was also stressed that UNPKO are not wholly safe and that a degree of risk is inherently 
Involved.95 Equally Kakizawa KOji described PKO as something that a state had to participate In 
regardless of whether it liked the idea of PKO or not-an international commitment to an 
international society. 96 
The deaths of Nakata and Takata did have an educational effect on the Japanese public 
as to the worth and value of the norm of peacekeeping. With the victims not being members of 
the SDF attention was drawn to the non-military aspects of the work of the UN and its 
peacekeeping activities. During the Diet debate attention had not been paid to the non-milltary 
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aspects of UNPKO, but with the Japanese deaths in Cambodia the public began to accept the 
utility of UNPKO. This can be seen, for instance, in the Increase In the number of applicants to 
the Japan Overseas Cooperation Volunteers.S? Moreover, Nakata's father, who had done so 
much to explain his son's death to the Japanese people, introduced an initiative to establish a 
fund for UN volunteers. The fact that an amendment to the International Relief Force Bill to 
include SDF personnel passed by the Diet with few objections demonstrated that the relief and 
non-military aspects of UNPKO had an impact on the Japanese govemment and people. As long 
as military exercises were excluded and the 'honourable allergy' of the Japanese nation was not 
compromised, and the new norm of multifaceted peacekeeping could be supported and 
established in Japan.98 
Due to political developments within Japan in June and July, the lOP fell from power for 
the first time since its establishment in 1955 and a coalition government was formed under Prima 
Minister Hosokawa. The new Deputy Prime Minister, Hata Tsutomu, foresaw a continued effort 
by Japan with 'the ideal of the UN Charter-to maintain peace and stability in the worId-[not 
running] counter to that of the Constitution. We must be determined to sweat and do our utmost 
to bring about a peaceful world'.99 Hand in hand with this policy, Hata envisaged honesty In Its 
relations with neighboUring East Asian nations about the events of W.W.II and the attainment of 
a UNSC permanent seat in the near future. Thus, UN-centred policy was further promoted by 
Prime Minister Hosokawa in addressing the General Assembly when he stressed Japan's desire 
to strengthen the nation's bonds with the International community by quoting the Inter-war 
Japanese intemationalist Nitobe InazO, 'an international mind Is an expansion of the national, just 
as philanthropy or charity should begin at horns' .100 Perhaps, more bluntly stated but amounting 
to the same belief in a new norm of intemational behaviour, OIrector-Generat of the Defence 
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Agency, Nakanishi Keisuke, stated in the aftermath of the UNTAC operation that if Japan did go 
through with a unilateral withdrawal it would then lose face within the international community.l0l 
Japan's contribution of personnel to UNTAC was certainly not quantitatively or qualitatively 
of particular note. It is in understanding this and the importance of the UN and its peacekeeping 
activities that neo-liberalism, and particularly neo-realism, fail to provide convincing answers to 
expfain Japan's decision to playa role in UNPKO. Interest within Japan in these troop 
contributions, the US and East Asia can only be understood with a knowledge of the norms 
which had heretofore guided Japan's UN policy. By May 1993, Japan had contributed some 600 
troops, 41 civilians participating in the electoral component of the UNTAC mission and 75 police 
officers attached to the civilian police component out of the 20,000 in Cambodia under UNTAC at 
that time. When the four norms outlined in each section are understood, then this contribution 
truly can be seen as 'a sign of the changing strategic map that Japan for the first time since 
World War" may now send ground troops abroad' .102 The overtap between the traditional norms 
and the objectives of the UN became a hugely liberating norm for Japan, particularly in the case 
of the UNTAC operation. 
Within the UN system the contribution of Akashi must not be forgotten In promoting the 
UN's speCifiCity, durability and concordance. Akashi publicly thanked Japan for Its contribution 
describing it as a considerable pillar supporting UNT AC and taking this historic first step In a new 
direction for its diplomacy-contrasting starkly with the visible omission of Japan's name in 
Kuwait's public declaration of thanks.1OO Not only was Akashi supported by the Japanese 
govemment, but he a/so sought to encourage Its contribution by appearing in front of the House 
of Councillors' Special Committee on the UN Peacekeeping Support BII' advocating the 
government use the UN as a conduit for a new post..cold diplomacy. As demonstrated In the 
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section on the pacifist norm, opinion polls demonstrate that although anathema to military actions 
still existed in Japan, it could be negated or ameliorated by the UN. 
. · Japan's effort to co-ordinate policy with and contribute to the efforts of the international 
community were not limited solely to the contribution of personnel. Japan was one of the most 
vocal nations in favour of providing Cambodia with aid. Between March 1991 and November 
1992, Japan provided over $36 million of aid through bilateral channels and $70.9 million through 
international organisations. At the Paris Conference of October 1991 Japan proposed an 
international meeting on reco~struction in Cambodia to take place in Tokyo which was held in 
June 1992 entitled the Ministerial Conference on the Rehabilitation and Reconstruction of 
Cambodia chaired by both Japan and the UNDP, pledging $880 million in aid. This was praised 
by Akashi as 'the most remarkable success that Japan's diplomacy had in recent years'.104 
Japan appeared to be tying its reputation to that of the UN seeking to enhance both its and the 
UN's credibility. As Professor Tomoda Seki of Asia University has stressed, 'Japan's aid to 
Cambodia is becoming a touchstone for Japan which has a slogan of international 
contribution' ,105 
To achieve the objectives outlined above continued military spending has been cited as a 
necessity in order to, 'maintain this capability to participate in the efforts to uphold international 
justice and protect the gl~bal community'.'06 However, this was only in so far as it complemented 
Miyazawa's aim that 'we must reCClgnize that our international role in the building of' a global 
order for peace can only grow larger.... Among the indispensable underpinnings of our UN· 
centred efforts for global order are close co-operation with the US and friendly relations with 
other countries of Asia'.107 This was symbolically encapsulated in the flying of the UN flag. next to 
the Hinomaru at the camp in Takeo. Alone, the Hinomaru would have caused problems offending 
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the sensibilities of East Asian nations, so every opportunity was taken to link the UN to the SDF. 
Although stated in a different and negative context, the trend of Japan as under the spell 
of UN absolutism became steadily apparent with the passage of the PKO Bill and the despatch of 
troops to Cambodia.108 Yet, despite any UN absolutism, the reception of Boutros-GhaJi's Agenda 
for Peace and especially the proposed expansion of the remit of peacekeeping and creation of 
peace enforcement units can only be described as lukewarm. Foreign Minister Watanabe 
addressed the General Assembly in September 1992 as follows: 
Japan believes that the principles and practices of peacekeeping operations upheld by the UN for 
more than 40 years are still both appropriate and valid today and will continue to be so In the future. 
The idea of peace-enforcement units, proposed by the Secretary-General's report, offers an 
Interesting approach to the future peacemaking efforts of the UN, but requires further study because it 
Is rooted in a mode of thinking completely different from past peacekeeping forceS. 109 
With Boutros-Ghali's visit to Japan in February 1993, similar wariness was expressed 
when the Japanese government refused a request to despatch troops to Somalia for fear of the 
peace enforcement aspects of the mission. However, the suggestion of Mozambique where, 
Ithere is a solid cease-fire agreement and operations are under way for rehabilitation of refugees' 
was welcomed as the next avenue along which Japan could expand its UNPKO experience.11o 
This will be examined in the following chapter along with Japan's effort in the Golall Heights and 
Rwanda. 
A poll of SDF partiCipants in Cambodia demonstrated both the fact that partiCipation in 
UNPKO was a new e~perience and that a sense of contribution to the international community 
had developed. 58 percent of personnel believed it to have been a good thing that they came to 
Cambodia as opposed to 11 percent believing it to have been a bad thing; 49 percent wanted to 
partiCipate a second time in UNPKO with 19 percent unwilling to participate again; moreover, 55 
percent wanted to see the SDF participate in UNPKO again with 10 percent opposed. Most 
opposition was seemingly based on the meagre sum of ¥16IOOO a day paid as a peacekeeping 
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allowance; 59 percent were dissatisfied with this, with only 11 percent of personnel happy with 
the amount.111 The lessons leamt from the UNT AC mission were clearly reflected in the Advisory 
. Group on Defence Issues report of September 1994 entitled, The Modality of the Security and 
Defence Capability of Japan: The Outlook for the 21st Century (Nippon no Anzen HosM to 
86eiryoku no Arikata: NijOisseiki e Mukete no TenM). Otherwise known as the Higuchi Report, it 
stressed that Japan could not be exempt from contributing to the role of the UN and 
strengthening its peacekeeping functions: 
It is important to consider it a major duty of the $OF, along with the primary duty of national defence, 
to participate as positively as possible in various forms of multilateral co-operation that are conducted 
within the framework of the UN for the purposes of international security, including peacekeeping 
operations .. ~. Regarding the mode of SDF participation in peacekeeping operations, n Is desirable that 
discussions should be continued with a view to removing as soon as possible the provision in the 
International Peace Co-operation Law calling for the freeze on participation by the $OF in the field of 
peacekeeping activities mainly conducted by Infantry units. In this connection, Japan should study the 
. common understanding that is recognized by the UN with regard to the use of arms.112 
Thus, not only can the traditional pacifistiC role of the SDF as a self-clefence force used 
solely in. the event of an attack upon the Japanese homeland be seen to have expanded in its 
scope, the new norm of the UN and its peacekeeping operations has been incorporated as both 
a regulatory norm in that Japan is expected to participate within this norm and, moreover, as a 
constitutive norm as it can define a new, more multilatera', direction in its security and foreign 
poliCies. Furthermore, this norm was regarded as possessing the ability to promote transparency, 
confidence-building initiatives and, thus, security in East Asia through the execution of shared 
, 
military operations and mutual exchange visits.113 
Returning participants also managed to paint a favourable picture of their experience in 
, . 
Cambodia, thereby contributing to the acceptance of participation in UNPKO. Fukui Yusuke, SDF 
Colonel in the Cea~e-fire Observer mission of UNTAC, stressed the favourable response he had 
from Cambodians and other foreign nationals during his time in Cambodia and urged the 
, 
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Japanese government to continue its contribution to UNPKO.114 One point which deserves 
emphasis was highlighted in a press conference given by Akashi when he alluded to the need for 
the Japanese public to allow SDF participation within a PKF mission (yoron ga yuruseba).115 
Thus, despite the role of the UN, the US or the attitude of East Asian nations, the role of public 
opinion and the durable, restrictive norm of pacifism was still a factor to be taken into account. 
ExTERNAL NORMS: EAST ASIAN NATIONS 
As seen in the previous chapter, the attitude of East Asian nations was beginning to alter and 
polarise with one set of nations spearheaded by ASEAN supportive of an active and expanded 
Japanese role, while China and South Korea continued to be apprehensive of perceived 
Japanese remilitarisation. Yet, even these traditional stalwarts against Japanese activism could 
be seen in certain circumstances to be reconsidering their positions and creating a liberating and 
defining norm affecting Japanese policy. 
The nations of ASEAN were firmly behind the SDF's participation in the UNT AC operation 
and encouraged Japan to maintain its presence despite the threats to the cease-fire by the 
Khmer Rouge.116 On May 13, 1993 Malaysian Prime Minister Mahathir bin Mohamad stressed 
that Japan could not remain removed from UNPKO and would have to do more than contribute 
financially.117 Previously in April 1991, Thailand's Foreign Minister Arsa Sarasin had spoken on 
behalf of the members of ASEAN in stating that Japan's more pro-active role in East Asian 
security and UNPKO was 'the burden that comes with being a big power.... Japan should 
become actively involved, diplomatically and politically, in the search for solutions to regional 
conflict and tension as Japan is currently doing in the case of Cambodia' .118 This view was 
reiterated during Prime Minister Kaifu's visit to Thailand in May 1991 with particular reference to 
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the Cambodian conflict.119 Disillusionment with the traditional bipolar international order has led 
many states of East Asia to look to Japan as a new player and encourage pro-activity in the field 
of ODA, conflict resolution, diplomacy, etc. 
Sections of Cambodian society were also supportive of Japan's pro-active participation in 
the UNTAC operation. Prince Sihanouk asked the visiting JSP Chairman to encourage the 
despatch of Japanese troops to help clear mines and restore peace.120 Moreover, Premier Hun 
Sen travelled to Tokyo in March 1992 under the sponsorship of the MOFA and encouraged the 
Japanese government in the following terms: 
The purpose of my visit is to call on Japan to despatch Self·Defence Force troops, police and 
administrative officers to work with UNTAC. More than twenty nations have already decided to 
despatch their troops for UN peacekeeping operations In Cambodia. Why doesn't Japan decide to 
, despatch its troops? We hope that the political parties will co-ordinate their views In order to make It 
possible to despatch Self-Defence Forces to Cambodia .... Even if Japan despatches its troops to the 
UNTAC, no country would associate It with Japan's Greater East Asia Co-prosperlty Sphere concept 
which prevailed before and during the war.121 
In addition the Japanese government agreed to help the Philippines in transporting its 
equipment for participation in UNTAC and for a while the MOFA did consider discussing co-
operation with the Philippines, Thailand and Indonesia in the resettlement of refugees. 122 Thus, 
the working relationship with the nations of ASEAN was excellent. More specifically, the 
Singaporean attitude was positively encouraging in helping Japan weather the storm of Nakata 
and Takata's deaths. In a meeting on May 11, 1993 between Nakayama Toshio, Chief of the 
Defence Agency, ~nd Goh Chok'Tong, Singaporean Prime Minister, it was made Quite clear it 
believed that the Khmer Rouge was testing UNT AC and if Japan wavered confidence in the 
entire UNT AC operation would be questioned.123 As regards the possibility of JSDF withdrawal in 
the aftermath of the two deaths of Japanese citizens and the attack on the Japanese barracks, 
Goh Chok, stated that 'the world is watching Japan's reaction. If it is the only nation to withdraw 
its troops, then in the future Japan will not be regarded as a nation that can make an 
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international contribution'.124 . 
However, China and South Korea were the main obstacles to acceptance in East Asia of 
Japan's new role. As one Chinese official confidentially stated. 'what we are worried about is not 
the present but the future. The fear is that the law [regarding UNPKO] is a start in a bad 
direction'.125 During the time of the UNTAC mission, one of the most salient areas of Japan's 
relations with East Asia was over Japan's portrayal of its wartime behaviour in its schoolbooks 
and the necessity for Japan to apologise. Prime Minister Miyazawa visited Indonesia, Malaysia, 
Thailand and Brunei in January 1993 claiming that the Asia-Pacitic region is the focus of Japan's 
foreign policy. While this was encouraged in the nations of ASEAN. Foreign Minister MutO met 
with President Kim of South Korea on June 3D, 1993 and was told that although South Korea 
would not claim compensation Japan needed to face its history in a similar way to Germany, 
investigate the comfort women issue, and review' the way history is portrayed in Japanese 
schools.126 In the case of the nations of ASEAN, expectations were transferred. to an extent, 
from the USA as regional leader to Japan. In these nations memories of W.W.II have evidently 
not prospered with durability to the same extent as on the Korean Peninsula and China.127 
Yet, with the Japanese contribution to Cambodia, China can be seen to have adjusted 
slowly its opinion from the outright opposition demonstrated in the previous chapter. Towards the 
end of May 1993 the Chinese Vice-Prime Minister and Foreign Minister. Qian Qichen, visited 
Japan and was reported as having praised Japan's efforts as a positive contribution.128 Qian 
expressed on behalf of the Chinese government an understanding of Japan's PKO dilemma and 
praised Japan's contribution to the UNTAC operation as shouldering the responsibility of the 
international community, although still expressing general reservations about the despatch of 
SDF personnel abroad.129 . 
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Thus, it is clear that Japan's neighbours were set into two camps with the nations of 
Southeast Asia accepting Japan's expanded role and acting as a constitutive norm, while the 
traditionally opposed nations of South Korea and China continued to be wary of Japan's 
participation but would accept it within the framework of the UN. Ergo, the norm constituted by 
the UN was able to overcome traditionally restrictive norms of Japanese foreign policymaking. 
SUMMARY 
The final engineering battalion working with UNT AC returned to Japan and disbanded on 
October 3, 1993. Greeted by Defence Agency Chief Nakanishi, the battalion was welcomed and 
praised in a formal ceremony in Sapporo with Nakanishi justifying its despatch in so far as, 'the 
UN and many countries highly appreciate your activities in Cambodia. It has been a great 
historical significance as Japan's personal contribution to the world community' ,130 In all, Japan 
sent about 1,300 peacekeepers to Cambodia including military observers, civilian police, as well 
as over 1,200 engineering troops. In the aftermath of the operation the Japanese government did 
begin to seek ways in which the safety of Japanese peacekeepers could be ensured through pre-
despatch training but this was never confused with the pacifist norm which would dictate 
, j 
complete withdrawal from UNPKO.131 Akashi, having been strongly pitched by the Japanese 
government for the post of Special Representative to the Secretary-General in UNTAC, in return 
did a great deal to encourage Japan during the UNTAC period both in its financial, personnel, 
and military contribution. 132 He continued to draw the link between Japan's responsibility to the 
international community, a permanent seat on the UNSC, and expanded UNPKO duties: 
If Japan were given the status of a Security Council permanent member, It needs to act In 
accordance with its new responsibility because the Security Council Is responsible for ensuring 
world peace and security. If the Japanese people can hammer out a national agreement on this 
matter, I want Japan to send a contingent of foot soldiers as peacekeepers.133 
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This chapter has demonstrated that a national consensus of sorts was beginning to take 
shape during the UNTAC operation. Whereas, during the Gulf Crisis and Second Gulf War, 
policymaking was in a state of flux, with the SDF's despatch to Cambodia attitudes and norms 
began to solidify with agreement being built around acceptance of the SDF's participation as long 
as the Constitution was respected and, more importantly, activities took place under the aegis of 
the UN (see Diagram IV). This was of particular importance as regards Japan's Asian neighbours 
and especially during the controversy over the deaths of Nakata and Takata as justifying Japan's 
contribution to the international community. The norms of Japanese foreign and security policy 
were beginning to constitute Japanese identity rather than regulate it as had previously been the 
case. The next chapter will examine how these norms continued to shape Japan's UNPKO policy 
•• < • ~ 
as the government continued to expand Japan's peacekeeping profile. 
l .. 
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CHAPTER SIX: SUBSEQUENT MISSIONS 
INTRODUCTION 
This chapter will address the UNPKO missions in which Japan subsequently took part following 
the watershed UNTAC mission, namely ONUMOZ, UNAMIR, and UNDOF. The chapter will begin 
with a general introduction to the particular characteristics of each peacekeeping operation 
before proceeding to examine, as in previous chapters, the roles played by the various norms in 
both constraining and encouraging Japan's contribution and policymaking processes. This 
chapter also seeks to bring the reader up-ta-date by including the most recent developments in 
, . 
Japan's security milieu, like the reviewed US-Japan defence guidelines with the US, and will 
, (" 
attempt to judge how these developments have influenced, and continue to influence, specifically 
Japan's PKO experience and more generally its foreign policymaking. . 
POST-COLD WAR PEACEKEEPING OPERATIONS 
Despite the title attributed to this sub-section, there is still a peacekeeping operation in progress 
; . 
to which Japan is contributing, namely UNDOF, which originated in the Cold War period. 
However, looking at UN activities holistically the catholic nature of peacekeeping operations is 
r < 
evident. First, there are the 'traditional' peacekeeping operations like UNDOF which entail the 
observance of a cease-fire and the blue helmets of the UN acting as a 'thin blue line'.1 Second, 
there are the newer post-Cold War operations typified by UNTAC in the previous chapter as a 
nation-building exercise and continued in Mozambique with election monitoring and organisation. 
Third, there are humanitarian operations which have expanded the remit of UNPKO to include a 
new norm of international society in providing relief from persecution, starvation, and poverty. 
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Finally, the issue of peace-enforcement has never been very far away with the situation in the 
former-Yugoslavia demanding forceful action from the international community. However, with 
these kind of operations in mind, attention will be paid to the actual operations to which Japan 
has contributed; a description of which will follow. 
ONUMOZ 
Mozambique gained independence from Portugal in 1975 after a long civil war led by the Frente 
de la Uberta~ao de Mo~ambique (FRELlMO), a Marxist-Leninist group which formed the 
government and began to receive aid from the Soviet Union. In reaction to this, aid was 
channelled to the Resist~ncia Nacional M~ambicana (RENAMO) by Rhodesia and South Africa. 
, . 
Throughout this conflict, estimates of almost one million Mozambican deaths due, not only to 
combat, but also to hunger and disease, have been made in addition to over one and a half 
million people who fled the fighting to neighbouring countries. In a similar situation to Cambodia, 
a stalemate or 'lose-lose' situation developed allowing the possibility of a solution from outside to 
be adopted. Initially the government of Kenya and Zimbabwe, and soon Malawi and Botswana, 
led the way to a diplomatic solution with Italy, the UK and the US subsequently contributing to 
these efforts. 
, 
The FRELlMO' government and the RENAMO rebels agreed to a general peace 
agreement in Rome in October 1992 calling for the UN to monitor the implementation of the 
agreement, provide assistance for the upcoming elections and monitor these elections once a 
cease-fire had come intoeffect.2 The two sides were to withdraw, be separated, and prepare for 
the election to be held before October 1993. Secretary-General Boutros-Ghali outlined the UN's 
role as not only election observation but also humanitarian aid and planned to appoint a special 
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representative, which was to be an Italian senior staff member of the UN Development 
Programme (UNDP), Aldo Ajello.3 
As in Cambodia, violations of the cease-fire were again a typical occurrence.4 There was a 
recognised risk involved in the operation due to the instability in Mozambique with the Secretary-
General characterising the danger in the following terms: 
in the light of recent experiences elsewhere, the recommendations in the present report may be 
thought to invite the international community to take a risk. , believe that the risk is worth taking; but I 
cannot disguise that it exists. 5 
The ONUMOZ mandate comprised four interdependent elements: political, military, 
electoral and humanitarian. Its duties included monitoring and verifying the cease-fire, separating 
the two parties, ensuring the collection, storage and destruction of weapons, verifying the 
withdrawal of foreign troops, providing vital infrastructures, and generally promoting the peace 
process. Demobilised soldiers were provided with humanitarian assistance in readjusting to 
civilian society. Moreover, technical assistance was made available in the organisation of the 
legislative and preSidential election. Furthermore, food supplies were distributed to the civilian 
victims of the civil war. 
Preparations for the election proceeded apace with registration taking place in the first two 
weeks of September and the campaign commencing on September 22, 1994. Demonstrative of 
the interdependence of each aspect of the operation, the repatriation successfully proceeded 
with 75 percent of displaced persons returned and registered for the election. By October, 
750,000 soldiers had been demobilised, the cease-fire was intact and Boutros-Ghali reported to 
the Security Council that Mozambique was ready for the election.6 As a result, but with ONUMOZ 
still having to ensure the two factions would honour the results, polling stations opened on 
- , 
October 27 until October 29, 1994.7 The elections were conducted in a fair and organised 
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manner experiencing no major irregularities, with the voting rate in some areas reaching as high 
as 90 percent returning FRELIMO to power in both the presidential and legislative elections.8 The 
Secretary-General's Special Representative issued a statement after the election declaring the 
process as 'characterized by the impartiality, dedication and high professionalism of the electoral 
authorities'.9 The Security Council endorsed the results on November 21, 1994 allowing the new 
parliament and president to be installed and the ONUMOZ mission to be dissolved in December 
1994. 
The ONUMOZ mission was typical of the post-COld War variant of peacekeeping mission 
with a variety of roles being played at one time, but all dependent on each other. The electoral 
and political processes could not have gone ahead without the humanitarian process of clearing 
land mines and securing financial investment, and the military process ensuring the safe return of 
Mozambicans and the secure environment in which to conduct elections. The changes in thinking 
about security in the post-Cold War world and the advocates of a wider definition of security 
could see their arguments realised in this and similar operations. UNPKO developed a hybrid of 
peacekeeping, peacemaking, and humanitarian aid to ensure negotiations between a one-party 
socialist regime and an armed rebellious group for the peaceful resolution of their dispute. By 
providing a trust fund, the UN was able to encourage RENAMO to transform itself from a militia 
group into a pOlitical party participating within the democratic process. This, in addition to the 
humanitarian effort, was the major achievement of the ONUMOZ operation. 
UNDOF 
The UNDOF operation Originates back in the 1973 war between Syria and Israel. Fighting on the 
Syrian front was contained by Security Council Resolution 338 of October 22 1973 with the 
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Israeli troops occupying territory around the Golan Heights intruding into Syrian territory-a 
situation which was characterised by high tensions and sporadic military clashes. In order to 
address this state of affairs, the US Secretary of State brokered a deal between Israeli and 
Syrian forces in May 1974. The result of the deal was reported to Secretary-General Kurt 
Watdheim and the Security Council.10 Israel and Syria were to respect the cease-fire on air, sea, 
and land. The sides were to be separated according to an agreed formula ensuring an equal 
area for both sides with equal levels of armament to be allowed and decided by the military 
representatives of Israel and Syria. These agreements to disengage and remain disengaged 
were to be monitored by UNDOF personnel with the aim of providing a stepping stone to a peace 
agreement not a peace settlement per se. 
Security Council Resolution 350 was adopted on the same day, May 31, 1974, as the 
agreement was signed by Israeli and Syrian representatives calling on the Secretary-General to 
take the necessary measures to realise the creation of UNDOF. UNDOF personnel levels were 
set at 1,250 chiefly taken from forces already in the region and originally given a six-month 
mandate to be extended by the Security Council. Initially troops from Austria, Peru, Poland and 
Canada made up the core of the force with UNDOF reaching near full-strength by June 1974.11 
The situation has remained relatively stable since this time despite tensions elsewhere in the 
Middle East.12 The Polish logistic unit was withdrawn in 1993 and its duties transferred to the 
Canadian unit. It was this unit that was augmented with the despatch of a Japanese SDF 
transportation unit in 1996 consisting of 45 personnel. 
UNDOF's activities included originatly overseeing the disengagement phase of the 
operation with the objective of ensuring Israeli and Syrian troops were safely separated. 
FollOwing this, UNDOF personnel clearfy delineated the zones of separation with the 
216 
establishment of checkpoints and observation points and, thus, began UNDOF's major task of 
supervising the area of separation to ensure there was no military activity therein through 24 
surveillance observation posts, patrols, and the regular inspection of the zones or arms limitation 
on each side of the area of separation. In addition to this traditional peacekeeping role, UNDOF 
embraces humanitarian roles in encouraging and overseeing the repatriation of prisoners and the 
retum of bodies, in addition to the exchange of mail and the supervision of Druze family reunions 
separated by the zones of separation. In fulfilling these duties UNDOF has incurred a number of 
fatalities and causalities over the years. However, since 1991 there have been no major 
problems except the occasional straying of shepherds into the zone of separation searching for 
better grazing pastures-a typical example of the essential peaceful nature of the UNDOF 
operation in the Middle East.13 
OTHER PEACEKEEPING OPERATIONS 
In addition to participation in the two main operations above, there have also been smaller 
operations in Africa which the Japanese govemment has seen as suitable and in keeping with 
the development and maturing of Japan's peacekeeping experience. 
In 1975, with the fall of the Portuguese Empire, the future of Angola was fought over by 
three factions: the Movimento Popular de Liberta~o de Angola (MPLA), the Frente Nacional de 
Libert~o de Angola (FNLA), and the Uni!o Nacional para a Independ~ncia Total de Angola 
(UNIT A). The main confrontation was between the established govemment party, MPLA, backed 
by the Soviet Union and Cuba and UNITA supported by the US and South Africa. However, with 
. 
declining Cold War tensions UNA VEM I was created to ensure the withdrawal of foreign troops 
from Angola. With this achieved UNAVEM /I was created in 1991 charged with the duties of 
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observing and verifying the first elections, demobilising the troops, and creating a joint armed 
force, and monitoring the police. Subsequent to this mission was the 1995 UNAVEM III operation 
which sought to achieve national reconciliation through five fields of military, political, 
humanitarian, electoral, and police assistance. Japanese participation was in UNAVEM 1\ and 
was limited to a small number of peacekeepers despatched as election observers. 
Rwanda's plight was rooted in ethnic differences between the Hutu and Tutsi tribes 
comprising respectively 85 percent and 14 percent of the population. Ethnic violence erupted 
with the deaths of President Juvenal Habyarimana of Rwanda and President Cyprien Ntaryamira 
of Burundi in an unexplained plane crash at Kigali airport. Hutu violence was directed at the Tutsi 
population and Hutu sympathisers with between 500,000 and one million victims. The rapidly 
established UNAMIR operation concentrated on addressing this tragedy by securing a cease-fire 
and providing humanitarian assistance often in the face of strong opposition from both sides. 
Not only the above operations have encouraged the Japanese government to actively re-
consider its peacekeeping contribution. Other events, like the revised defence guidelines with the 
US, have touched on the peacekeeping debate and affected the norms which govern Japan's 
foreign policymaking process. This chapter seeks to include these events in its analysis, as well 
as the concrete participation in the operations outlined above. 
tNTERNAL NORMS: PACIFISM 
Protests within civil ,society against perceived Japanese militarisation through UNPKO continued 
to be in evidence during subsequent peacekeeping debates and continued to be framed within 
the traditional pacifist language. One protest outside the MOFA in February 1993 demanded no 
further despatch of SDF troops with claims that military force would solve nothing.14 These 
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protests often equated UNPKO with brute military force and failed to take cognisance of the 
changing nature of peacekeeping in the post-Cold War era. As demonstrated in Chapter Two, 
UNPKO could now involve humanitarian and social aspects as saliently as the military aspects. 
Ogata Sadako, however, did recognise this evolving and not so absolutist interpretation of 
pacifism and called on the Japanese govemment to overcome the constraints of the five 
conditions and participate in UNPKO involving numerous different aspects within one mission. 
The govemment can be seen to have understood this position when, as seen in the previous 
chapter, amidst the controversy of the deaths of Nakata Atsuhito and Takata Haruyuki and 
despite the opposition of various civil society groups, an SDF advance party of six officers arrived 
in Maputo to make preparations for the SOF's second despatch on UNPKO of eventually forty-
two SDF members charged with transport control operations to the ONUMOZ operation in 
Mozambique. 15 , 
However, with the rise in Japan of coalition politics after the fall of the LOP in July 1993, 
the SOPJ came to take up govemment poSitions under the coalition leader, Hosokawa Morihiro, 
yet were forced to compromise their position on UNPKO while a member of the coalition.16 Thus, 
with the advent of coalition politics compromise became a watchword for the various factions. 
This was evident in coalition partners urging the SDPJ to accept the submission of a bill to allow 
JSOF aircraft to be used in the evacuation of Japanese nationals from crisis situations stressing 
that each coalition member had agreed to maintain the security and foreign pOlicies of the LOP .17 
In reaction, the SOP J declared it would rethink its position for fear of putting the coalition at risk.18 
The party leaders were pressured by younger members of the govemment into accepting a bill 
dealing with the despatch of SOF aircraft otherwise the impression would be created that the 
Socialists were unconcemed about the safety of Japanese nationals overseas.19 The one 
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concession to the traditional norm of pacifism was that the SDPJ gained guarantees that 
considerations would be allowed over restrictions on the type of aircraft to be used and the type 
of weapons allowed during an airlift.20 In addition to this process of compromise coalition politics 
within the SDPJ,' Ichikawa YOichi of the KOmei Party announced his party's support for 
unfreezing an article in the PKO Law proscribing the use of weapons. In the review scheduled to 
start in the summer of 1995, Ichikawa supported reconsidering this freeze in the light of the 
understanding East Asian nations now displayed for UNPKO after the Cambodia mission.21 
Civil society was also undergoing a process of reassessing its traditional pacifism. Public 
opinion polls in the aftermath of the UNT AC mission demonstrated a fresh understanding and 
support for Japan's peacekeeping role. The Prime Minister's Office polls demonstrated a steady 
increase in support for Japan's PKO contribution. In May 1997, the Public Opinion Poll on the 
Self-Defence Forces and Defense Issues was released by the Prime Minister's Office with the 
statistic that 64 percent of those polled agreed with Japan's partiCipation-the highest ever' 
proportion polled. Compared with the previous poll in 1994 this demonstrated a rise of 15.6 
points to take the support rate over the 50 percent mark for the first time. Opposition to PKO 
participation stood at 13.6 percent, a drop of 17 percentage points. Related to this, support for 
the despatch of the SDF on relief missions increased to 78 percent, whereas 11.9 percent were 
opposed-a huge and convincing majority demonstrating a positive Image of the SDF which was 
borne out by the statistic that 80.5 percent of those polled had a good impreSSion of the SDF with 
only 11.7 percent left with a bad impression.22 A Yomiurl Shlmbun poll of June 1994 
demonstrated that the SDF was beginning to 'put down roots in the population' with 53.1 percent 
regarding the SDF as constitutional and of the 22.1 percent which regarded it as unconstitutional 
57.8 percent still regarded the SDF as necessary. Furthermore, 71 percent supported PKO 
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participation to some degree. Yet, there were still misgivings about the unfreezing of the PKF 
aspects of PKO with 48 percent preferring to see Japan's participation continue at its existing 
rate.23 More recent opinion polls continued to demonstrate support for the SOF's participation in 
UNPKO. Another Prime Minister's Opinion Poll showed a steady increase in support for some 
contribution including the despatch of personnel in solving regional conflicts to 38 percent in 
1996, an increase from 35.2 percent in 1995 and 28.8 percent in 1994. The important work of the 
UN which should be actively supported by Japan was deemed to be the support of international 
peace and security by 69.3 percent, an increase from 67.2 percent in 1995 the previous year and 
from 66.3 percent in 1994. The same poll demonstrated support of the level of contribution made 
this far as being 46.4 percent with 23.5 percent (an increase from 15.5 percent in the previous 
poll) seeking a more active role for Japan. In contrast, only 18.3 percent (a decrease from 25 
percent) wished Japan's contribution to be as minimal as possible and 5.7 percent opposed to 
any participation at all. However, as regards Japan's role as a possible permanent member of the 
UNSC (which a considerable minority of 15.7 percent of those polled opposed) the main reason 
for opposition was seen to be the military role Japan would have to play by 23.4 percent of those 
polled. Yet, it must be stressed that this was a considerable decrease from 31 percent with the 
same opinion in the previous poll.24 
Regarding Japan's role in the UNT AC and ONUMOZ operations, 74.8 percent responded 
that resuHs had been achieved with' 18.9 percent believing participation to have achieved little or 
no result. As regards SDF participation in humanitarian assistance 76 percent believed they had 
achieved results with 16.6 percent failing to discern any substantial results. In reference to future 
participation, 75.1 percent approved to various degrees further participation with 14.2 percent 
opposed. Humanitarian assistance was slightly more popular with 80 percent approving and 10.7 
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percent disapproving of future participation.25 
1997 was a prominent year as the 50th anniversary of the Japanese Peace Constitution 
and a great deal of debate in the media centred upon its future. The nation appeared to be 
equally divided over the issue of revision as it was over UNPKO. In contrast to the overwhelming 
support for SDF participation in PKO, 45.6 percent supported revision of the Constitution with 
43.7 percent opposed. Generational differences naturally were a/so evident with people born 
after the war tending to support revision and those born during or before the war tending to 
support the present Constitution. Political parties also appeared to be fairly divided with ShintO 
Sakigake and ShinshintO members expressing over 50 percent support for revision and TaiyOtO, 
MinshutO and ShamintO members displaying over 50 percent support for preservation of the 
status quo; however, sizeable minorities existed opposed to each majority opinion.26 Thus, 
although the idea of contribution to international society through the UN was widely supported, 
the constitutional changes that may be connected to such a pro-active policy were more divisive 
within Japanese society. 
The press reaction within Japan was mixed with the traditional stalwarts of the Constitution 
criticiSing the expansion of Japan's role. The Asahi Shimbun stated that: 
In light of the principles set forth in Article ,X, Japan should not supply weapons and ammunition to 
US warships in international waters, nor should it take actions that would be part and parcel of US 
military operations.27 
In contrast, the Yomiuri Shimbun declared that: 
The government's current views and interpretations of Article IX, established during the so-called 
1955 system make it difficult for Japan to provide effective co-operation. The new guidelines offer an 
. opportunity to give a wider Interpretation to Article IX so that the right of collecUve self defence can 
never be exercised.28 
And the Nihon Keizai Shimbun arguing that: 
As a member of the international community, Japan cannot simply watch on the sidelines In the event 
of conflict on the Korean Peninsula an in other areas around Japan. We must seriously discuss in 
specific terms what Japan should do to ensure national security.29 
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Thus, the media opinions remained solidly compatible with the editorial stance of each 
particular newspaper which had prevailed throughout the Second Gulf War and the UNT AC 
~ '" 
operation. 
The effect of these altering public opinions and coalition politics on the SDPJ was that it 
was forced into clarifying what exactly the party's position was. At first, a certain degree of 
pacifism returned to characterise Japanese politics. Prime Minister Murayama stressed that 
Japan would never participate in the military aspects of UN peacekeeping missions. The SDPJ 
also sought to suspend the fact-finding mission in the Golan Heights after it had been decided.3o 
This was supported by the troops already in the field with UNDOF Force Commander Major. 
General Johannes C. Kosterf of the Netherlands stating that the SDF would not be welcome, 
would be highly disruptive, and that UNDOF was functioning perfectly as it was.31 Encouragement 
did exist, however, with Syrian Foreign Minister Faruq Shara's statement to the Japanese fact· 
finding mission that Japan's participation would be welcomed.32 Equally, Israeli Foreign Minister 
Shamon Peres welcomed Japanese peacekeepers.33 
'., \ 
Within the opposition parties confusion could also be seen with the KOmei Party declaring 
Japan's participation in UNPKO as Ipremature' whilst its ShinshintO and DSP partners began to 
tilt towards UNPKO participation.34 The LDP was clear in voicing its support for Japanese 
partiCipation, yet ShintO Sakigake and the SDPJ were more wary in expressing their support until 
further negotiation.35 The SDPJ eventually came out against participation in the UNDOF 
operation with the Central Executive Committee regarding it as a premature move as the SDF 
J \ '" 
may well become involved in a combat situation.36 However, after much deliberation the SDPJ 
Central Committee agreed to the despatch of an army transportation unit with no participation in 
transporting ammunition or weapons for other national contingents.37 Eventually, the stalwarts of 
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Japanese pacifism slowly abandoned the most incompatible of their policies and recognised the 
existence of the SDF and the Security Treaty with the US. The advent of Murayama Tomiichi as 
the SDPJ Prime Minister did put on hold the idea of the Hata government to despatch the SDF to 
Cambodia during the crisis of 1997. The necessary policy reversals of the SDPJ were a 
precondition before acceptance. The MOFA and the Defence Agency officials also urged the 
Murayama administration to undertake these commitments in order to promote consistency in 
Japan's foreign and security poliCies. Soon after the decision came to despatch between 200 and 
300 SDF troops from the engineering, sanitation, and transport units to nations bordering 
Rwanda. This contribution was further encouraged by Ogata Sadako in meetings with Murayama 
and KOno YOhei of the LDP faction in the ruling coalition. In a similar fashion to the Cambodia 
miSSion, Prime Minister Murayama stressed that the SDF would be withdrawn from Zaire if the 
security situation continued to deteriorate, yet stressed that this despatch was nothing to do with 
Japan's bid for a UNSC permanent seat, but rather to do with responding to a call from the 
, 
international community. as Japan's contribution to the situation in Rwanda began with financial 
aid pledged in response to requests by Boutros-Ghali. In July 1994, Chief Cabinet Secretary 
Igarashi KOzO promised an additional 32.3 million dollars in humanitarian aid In addition to the 
nine million dollars already pledged but stressed that personnel contributions could not be 
contemplated until a cease-fire was in place, as had been made clear in the five conditions.39 
However, a government fact-finding tour did report from Central Africa that the option of 
deploying SDF peacekeepers should be kept open, whilst in the meantime the Defense Agency 
planned the despatch of 300 SDF personnel to assist Rwandan refugees pending approval by 
the cabinet.40 The main issues surrounding the participation of Japanese personnel again proved 
to be the scope of actions they may take and the deteriorating security situation. The number of 
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peacekeepers in Zaire varied at different times at around the 260 figure and questions were 
asked about the rights they had to protect other civilians they were assisting. Tamazawa 
eventually clarified the situation by stressing that SDF personnel would only be withdrawn if the 
civil war in Rwanda spread to Zaire, the SDF personnel's neutrality came under threat and the 
units were no longer required.41 
These changes to the SDPJ's credo were adopted officially at a party conference at the 
beginning of September 1994 with pledges to maintain the security relationship with the US and 
to recognise the SDF with over 60 percent of the party agreeing to these changes. Based on the 
Shadow Cabinet Security Special Committee and the policy shingikai, the Socialists produced the 
Challenge for Peace proposal (Heiwa e no ChOsen) which moved the Socialist stance on defence 
from one of limited security (gentei Mel) to one of minimum self-defence (saish6g8n jieiryoku). 
Within this document the debate of whether to despatch the SDF or create a new organisation 
was raised, but with consideration for both points of view placing the emphasis on the non-military 
contribution that should be made by either organisation with the understanding of neighbouring 
AsCan nations.42 Rumours even appeared that the SDPJ was beginning to accept the idea of 
peace enforcement units.43 The 180-degree change in the thinking of the SDPJ and the trouble 
this caused for the bureaucracy has its origins in the report entiUed Choices for the 2181 Century 
submitted to the Temporary Party Congress in September 1994 which recognised partiCipation In 
operations like Cambodia and promoted a review of the idea of creating a separate organisation 
for PKO duties. The SDPJ's new thinking on PKO was that participation in traditional operations 
would be acceptable and that participation In new operations, which do not Include any military 
element, could be promoted.44 This was reiterated in Murayama's speech to the 31st SDF High 
Level Chief Meeting (Jieitai K6kyD Kanbuka/) where active participation in PKO of the sort so far 
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promoted was supported. Before Murayama had recognised the constitutionality of the SOF, the 
frait coalition was in jeopardy over the extent of Japan's PKO participation. Thus, any role in a 
possible Macedonian mission was turned down in January 1994, but Zaire was possible by 
August of the same year. Traces of the SOPJ's originally anti-PKO policy was in evidence 
recently with its retraction at a defence affairs meeting in May 1998 of support for the LOP-
sponsored legislation to ease the use of arms within UNPKO, calling for further discussion with 
the LOP after having Originally approved the proposed legislation.'t5 The objective of this reform 
was to entrust the right to authorise the use of weapons to the SOF's senior officers, rather than 
Individual peacekeepers. In addition, the remit of Japan's participation would be expanded 
beyond missions organised by the UN to include regional security organisations. Moreover, in the 
field of humanitarian aid, relief could be despatched whether a cease-fire is in existence or not. 
Thus, the Japanese government would be able to overcome the problems' encountered in 
Rwanda where no cease-fire existed and as a consequence humanitarian aid was only able to be 
extended after compromises with the non-cabinet member coalition partners. The SDPJ's chief 
concern was that Japan's denial of collective self-defence would be compromised and the 
Constitution violated.· The LOP's Policy Research Council insisted that the legislation was 
necessary as these changes had been called for by Japanese peacekeepers in the field, and, 
thus, <the revision is in keeping with intemational common sense. Thus, I hope the SDPJ will be 
able to approve it' -once again showing the pacifist norm slightly altered by the international 
peacekeeping norm, and also the lOP feeling confident enough that the coalition with the non-
Cabinet members of the SDPJ and the ShintO Sakigake would not be broken in submitting this 
revisionist legislation which had originally been drawn up In Autumn 1996.46 
Changes in the credo of the SDF can also been seen with its participation in the UNDOF 
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operation. The Golan Heights were first mentioned as a possible future destination for SOF 
peacekeepers in May 1994 when the Middle East was regarded as a potential destination as the 
five conditions for Japanese participation were met and would be a new regional experience for 
Japanese peacekeepers.47 Opposition to the UNDOF participation was voiced by a number of I 
Cabinet members, expressing particular worries about the possibility of becoming embroiled in a 
long-term UNPKO commitment and the independent behaviour of the MOFA in deciding the '. 
SDF's next despatch without reference to the government. The government did stress one ; 
. . . 
aspect of its PKO participation: that only one mission would be addressed at a time by the SOF 
with troops having to return from Mozambique first.48 Especially in the aftermath of the Hanshin 
Earthquake of January 1995, the SOPJ argued for the despatch of SDF troops to be postponed 
and concentrated upon aiding victims of the quake disaster.49 However, it was eventually decided :' 
by all three government factions in discussion with the MOFA and the Defense Agency in March 
~'~~~(~r ,-~,.'" .... ~:- .;-<-r::;.-(\,:-':-J:'-:~>T( ~~. 
1995 to send a fact-finding mission to the Golan Heights to explore the SOF's possible 
I 
p8I1Icipation.50 The results of the tact-finding mission weill also the cause of debate and concern i) 
over the length of the mission and the fact it was a ce~~~~~!'8 observance mission between I 
i 
nations not within a nation-a new direction for Japan; Home Affairs Minister, Nonaka Hiromu ) 
" -- ,. ~ ~-.~-~ .. ~.~. -"_.. ." .' 
.. -, 
described the region as the powder keg of the world.S1 The LOP faction of the government 
f 
quickly came to the decision to support despatch to the Golan Heights with the SOPJ and I 
Sakigake delaying any decision and stressing further consultation. Yet, eventually the SOPJ did 
agree to the Golan despatch starting in February 1996 armed with light machine-guns, despite 
initial emphaSis on pistols only. Thus, the SDPJ underwent one more of many change~,_i 
demonstrated above during the adjustment to coalition politics in Japan. 
The five principles of Japan's participation in UNPKO can be seen as an aspect of Japan's 
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internal norm of pacifism becoming the basis of Japan's refusal to respond to a UN demand to 
despatch hygiene troops to work with the medical personnel in the evolving PKO on the Iraq-
Kuwait border in September 1993 as there existed no consensus or agreement with the warring 
parties, explicitly stated in the five principles.52 Again these principles were raised in June 1994 
when the unofficial request from the UN came for Japanese participation in the UNDOF operation 
as well as the claim that Japan would only participate in one UNPKO at a time and as troops 
were committed to the extended ONUMOZ operation Japan was in' no position to despatch 
troops. 53 In the case of despatching troops to the UNDOF operation, the SDPJ demonstrated 
how its pacifist ideals had diminished by eventually compromising with its coalition partners over 
. allowing SDF personnel to carry arms, thereby allowing the coalition to draw up plans for the 
SDF despatch and maintain the SDPJ presence in the government.54 
, . 
A further challenge to the traditional pacifist norm came when the opposition ShinshintO 
party adopted legislation to expand the SDF's role in UN operations to include participation in 
multinational forces and sought to present it as a bill.55 However, the ShinshintO's position was 
not solely that of Ozawa IchirO, as opposition was led by Akamatsu Masao, a junior party 
member supporting only non-military activities. Support for Ozawa's position tended to cut across 
party divides (with the exception of the Communist Party) so that the alleged 60 percent of Diet 
rnembers supporting constitutional revision failed to follow party Iines.56 Yet, the importance of 
UNPKO and the extent of Japan's participation had been demonstrated during the negotiations 
for the creation of the ShinshintO with the KOrnei Party against the unfreezing of the PKF aspects 
, 
of the PKO Bill for fear of the reaction of the SOka Gakkai.57 Thus, the weak foundations on 
which ShinshintO were built were exacerbated by the issue of UNPKO. 
In mid-July 1997 with the deteriorating security situation in Cambodia the Japanese 
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govemment sought to evacuate Japanese nationals in Phnom Penh by using ASOF C-130s. 
Although this airlift never materialised due to the improvement in the situation in Cambodia it 
sparked a debate over the appropriate policy. Certain editorials like the Mainichi Shimbun 
questioned the move: 
The Prime Ministers decision to send SOF planes abroad has raised many questions. The 
apologists may say the operation was just a 'dud' that hurt nopody. But how would the Prime 
Minister respond to the criticism that his hasty decision has just created a lot of confusion?58 
In contrast, the Yomiuri Shimbun argued that: 
'In certain emergency Situations SDF ships may be more effective than SDF planes.... Given the 
uncertainty in situations around Japan, it is clear that aircraft are not the only available means of 
transportation. Relevant legislation should be amended as soon as possible. 59 
Equally, the peacekeeping operations that never materialised demonstrate the extent of 
Japan's actions and the changes of the paCifist norm. A request made by Akashi Yasushi in 
January 1994 for Japan to contribute a small number of unarmed officers to an observer team in 
Macedonia was rejected by Hata Tsutomu, Foreign Minister and Deputy Prime Minister, due to 
divisions in the coalition between hawks and doves. The supportive and pro-active position taken 
by the MOFA was in keeping with that of the short-lived Hata cabinet. From April to June 1994, 
the Prime Minister and Foreign Minister were both known publicly to be supportive of Japan's 
permanent representation on the UNSC. However, with the fall of Hata and the rise of the unholy 
alliance of the LOP, Sakigake, and SOP J, the MOFA's position weakened considerably. The LDP-' 
Sakigake-SDPJ 'Study Group for the Deliberation of Japan's Entry to the UNSC' reported that the 
Prime Minister should appoint an advisory committee on the issue of UNSC representation and 
clearly state that Japan will not participate in UN military actions. Prime Minister Murayama readily 
~ ,.' 
accepted the findings of this study group under the chairmanship of Koizumi JunichirO.6o The 
SDPJ's foreign affairs panel soon after confirmed the party's conditions for entry to the UNSC and 
stressed the support of China and South Korea before securing entry to this elite group of nations 
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and placed emphasis on the non-military nature of Japan's contributlon.61 Further divisions could 
be seen within the coalition with Sakigake issuing its own position paper on the UNSC issue in 
protest at KOno's speech at the UN 'General Assembly omitting the condition of UN reform. KOno 
was seen to be tom between the MOFA and the traditionally pacifist wings of the coalition 
creating a 'triangular grid linking the cabinet, the chief party secretary, and the bureaucracy 
[coupled with a1 failure in interparty policy co-ordination in the governing coalition'.62 Furthermore, 
divisions among all three parties of the coalition were in evidence with a vocal minority within the 
lOP led by Koizumi attaching similar conditions to UNSC membership as the leadership of the 
Sakigake and SOPJ. Yet, despite the veneer of unity on the issue and support for harsher 
conditions attached to UNSC entry even the Socialists were divided on the issue. An Asahi 
Shimbun poll estimated 49 percent of SOPJ members opposed to UNSC membership as it 
promoted big powerism, with 20 percent supportive, and 31 percent failing to respond.53 
, The effect on the relationship between the bureaucracy and the politicians appears not to 
have strengthened the bureaucracy's position in the absence of govemment unity. Instead the 
MOFA has been seen to have to lobby politicians a great deal more and attempt to create a 
consensus with little result. Thus, coalition politics has to a degree brought about immobilism in 
Japan's UN policy for a period with bureaucrats being forced into a position where they must 'do 
the rounds' and visit each party with the aim of describing the ministry's objectives and inquiring 
as to the particular party's agenda. With the ascendancy of the lOP after the 1997 election this 
may be surmounted; however, with the SatO incident and the perennial problems of the Japanese 
economy, the future of the lOP and the stability it can create in Japanese domestic politics is In 
question.64 
The long and stili awaited review of the P~O. B.illwhich began In 1995 did make some 
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preliminary reports in September 1996. The Peace Co-operation Department of the Prime 
Minister's Office stated in a report to Prime Minister Hashimoto RyQtarO that it believed that the 
use of arms should be allowed, suggesting that to avoid conflict with the Constitution either a new 
body should be established or the law cleared Up.55 In a Lower House Budget Committee, Ozawa 
confronted Hashimoto over security issues with Ozawa backing more active participation in 
UNPKO quizzing Hashimoto over whether Japan would be allowed to enforce UN sanctions and 
participate in peace enforcement units. Hashimoto maintained the traditional interpretation that 
Article IX does not include UNPKO with an element including the use of force.66 Similar traces of 
the old pacifist norm can still be noted in the debate of the revised defence guidelines and the 
necessary legislation. The Cabinet Legislation Bureau decided that when hailing and inspecting 
ships under UN resolutions, SDF personnel would not be allowed to fire waming shots as this 
. ~ 
would be an aggressive act prohibited by the Constitution.67 The Mayor of Naha, KOsei 
Oyadomari, opposed the US-Japan defence guidelines and the consequent use of Naha port by 
US forces in the event of an emergency in areas surrounding Japan.68 This necessary legislation 
also served to force a rift between the LOP and SOPJ, resulting in a growing animosity between 
the two parties. Doi claimed that 'mutual trust among the ruling parties has gone.'69 However, 
despite this claim, the Socialists have abandoned their adherence to the once durable, pacifist 
norm of Japanese society and have shown little sign of leaving the coalition. 
ExTERNAL NORMS: THE UNITED STATES 
The attitude of the Clinton administration to the UN has been to arrange a re-negotiation of the 
formula employed for the calculation of the peacekeeping budget with the objective of lessening 
the burden of the US so its budget deficit could be addressed. Fears expressed within the US as 
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regards the efficacy of the UN also created a vacuum for Japan to fill in the UN system both 
financially and in other materially personnel ways. Fears that the UN is failing to protect US 
interests as the chief contributor have been expressed in particular reference to the voting 
system. The one-nation/one-vote system has often allowed minor and micro states to scupper 
US plans for reform of the UN. For this reason, the US began a policy of withholding 
contributions.7o The obvious target was to place more burden on Japan and Germany, a plan 
which President Clinton outlined in a speech to the UN General Assembly suggesting a reduction 
from the 30.4 percent contribution to 25 percent with Germany and Japan making up the 
difference.71 A further call was made by Bill Richardson, US Ambassador to the UN, that Japan 
make up the difference when the US cuts its contributions to the UN budget to 20 percent. 72 This 
~icy direction continued in July 1994 with the US Senate urging Japan to follow Germany's 
example and shed any inhibitions about full UNPKO partiCipation. The Senate passed a 
resolution threatening not to support Japan's bid for a permanent seat on the UNSC unless it 
lived up to a full commitment to UNPKO particularly with reference to the possibility of war on the 
Korean peninsula.73 Thus, the relationship with the US was becoming increasingly a constructive 
norm for Japan. 
As seen in the previous chapter, in the aftermath of the UNOSOM missions in Somalis, the 
US had begun to adopt a new UNPKO policy under the Presidential Decision Directive (POD) 
stating that, 'US and UN involvement in peacekeeping must be selective and more effective' in 
addition to encouraging Japanese UNPKO contributions. Thus, UNPKO has become for the US 
another area to encourage burden-sharing. In the fiscal year 1989, the US share of UNPKO was 
$29 million and by 1991 had increased to $107 million. By 1994 it had exceeded $1 billion forcing 
the US to introduce a ceiling on UNPKO contributions of 30.4 percent of all peacekeeping costs 
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in April 1995. The US attitude is that it cannot push Japan to take up the slack, but if Japan 
expresses the desire to expand its expertise in this direction then the US will readily provide 
support in the form of the Acquisition and Cross-Servicing Agreement (ACSA) agreement. 74 
In September 1994 Vice-President AI Gore continued to call for Japanese assistance and 
approached T amazawa T okuichirO requesting that Japanese SDF troops be allowed to take part 
in the multinational invasion of Haiti in addition to providing financial aid for reconstruction. 
T amazawa stated that he would certainly explore the possibility but stressed the five principles of 
Japan's UNPKO participation and the constitutional restrictions.75 Eventually KOno YOhei was 
reported as planning to offer President Clinton the financial aid and civilian police for the 
resolution of the Haiti issue only once stability had been secured on the is/and.76 In any event, 
Tamazawa stated that SDF troops would not be despatched as 'Haiti will hold elections without 
help and there will be no request for UN peacekeeping operations and a despatch of 
personnel.'" Thus, the style of operation was the guiding factor In Japan's decision not to 
participate. 
In April 1996, in a meeting between Prime Minister Hashimoto and President Clinton, 
Japan was urged to assume more of the UN burden previously shouldered by the US. However, 
for Japan to carry this weight, a greater level of representation would be necessary to persuade 
Japan and this is where the importance of a permanent seat on the UNSC comes into play. A 
corollary of this is that the US supports a permanent seat for Japan on the UNSC. Thus, Bill 
Richardson declared a seat for Japan as a sine qua non of any UN reform.78 
US-Japanese co-operation has recently been extended to include the· previously 
mentioned ACSA. By this agreement the US would supply Japan with the information and 
transport aircraft for UNPKO participation and Japan would provide fuel, food, lodgings, and 
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medical care for these operations. This plan was most actively promoted by William Perry, US 
Secretary of State in talks with the Defense Agency. The unveiling of the interim report of the 
review of 1978 US..Japan defence guidelines in June 1997 was an extension of this policy 
obliging Japan to extend the full co-operation of the SDF in joint US exercises, save for a war 
situation. During a conflict Japan would be obliged to conduct minesweeping exercises, repair 
US battleships and aircraft and join US blockades. In the event of an attack on Japan it was 
stated that Japan and the US would co-operate in repelling an Invader rather than Japan acting 
alone at first. This demonstrated a continuing commitment from the US but also clearly 
. . 
expressed a desire to increase Japan's role and extend the security interest of Japan to a 
regional level. Peacetime co-operation based on the ACSA was also to be encouraged.79 The 
release of the. actual revised guidelines stressed as one of the main points the promotion of 
UNPKO and humanitarian operation when either or both countries are involved. Expanding 
duties to minesweeping and the evacuation of refugees and non-combatants extends Japan's 
range of duties both geographically and qualitatively. A similar policy could be seen in Secretary-
General of NATO Javier Solana's praise for Japan's UNPKO policy as Ian important contributor 
to the i~temationaJ effort in Bosnia' despite the fact that Japan contributed no personnel there.8o 
Essentially the policy was similar to the US in encouraging a pro-active role for Japan within the 
bounds of the bilateral relationship and seeking to lessen the burden upon NATO. 
As this relationship is expected to continue for the foreseeable future, It Is necessary to 
examine the role it can playas a norm, especially as the alliance is now aimed at promoting 
regional stability through multilateral means rather than pointed at anyone enemy.81 The US still 
regards the relationship with Japan as 'the linchpin of US security policy In Asia' .82 This was re-
confirmed with the Signing of a revised bilateral agreement on mutual logistic support In April 
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1998 when Madeleine Albright stressed that, 'the US-Japan alliance remains the cornerstone of 
regional security:83 Moreover, co-operation with the US was stressed by the Japanese 
government submitting two bills to the Diet in order to accommodate the revised guidelines.84 
And it must be stressed that this is not an attempt to constrain Japan and prevent it becoming a 
'normal' nation, In actual fact the US relationship in the case of UNPKO can be seen as 
encouraging an active role for Japan as constitutive rather than restrictive. Yet, this has been 
recognised by Asian observers in negative terms believing that the US has: 
deputized part of its role as policeman In the region to Japan .... Basically I don't object to the new US-
Japan security pact due to the lack of altematives, but the problem lies in the momentum generated 
by developments that started with Japan's participation in the UN peacekeeping operations and will 
continue with the unshackling of devices put in place to prevent it from becoming a military power.85 
However, this unshackling from militarism is not the concern of most US and Japanese 
policymakers: On the Japanese side, Prime Minister Hashimoto RyOtarO stressed the centrality of 
" 
the US to Japan in that 'our bilateral relationship is growing in importance, offering a foundation 
for stability and prosperity in the Asia-Paciflc region',86 On the US side, Assistant Secretary of 
DefenCe for International Security Affa'irs, Joseph Nye declared that 'regional peacekeeping 
operations aimed at reinforcing UN peace missions will become important in East Asia', streSSing 
that Japan should thus play a more active role in UNPKO and the US would in return support 
Japan with information and transportation assistance, very much in keeping with the ACAS 
agreement. 87 Thus, the US envisages and encourages a peacekeeping role for the SDF and 
Japanese pro-activism within the UN; however, this role is very much within the framework of the 
US-Japan Security Treaty, the revised defence guidelines and the ACAS agreement. As will be 
seen later with the Higuchi Report, the US advocates multllateralism but only as an adjunct to 
bilateralism: 
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· ExTERNAL NoRMS: UNPKO 
With the possibility of Japan participating in the UN's mission in Somalia, Foreign Minister and 
Deputy Prime Minister Watanabe Michio addressed the 126th regular Diet session in January 
1993 with a call to adopt a new flexibility towards the changing nature of peacekeeping 
operations: 'I believe that this is an issue that Japan, as a responsible member. of the 
international community, must take up with all due seriousness'.88 Thus, the five conditions 
restricting Japan's partiCipation were seen to be symbols of an old pacifism, incompatible with the 
changing security and peacekeeping demands. With the changing norm of UNPKO participation 
and the demands this new norm would make on Japan, Watanabe advocated that the 
government jettison its old pacifism for a new set of intemational norms by which to guide 
Japan's foreign and security policies. 
This direction was supported by other government members like Mitsuzuka Hiroshi, head 
of the lOP's Policy Affairs Research Council, who proposed the addition of a clause to Article IX 
of the Constitution stressing that a UN decision would supersede the Constitution's provisions.89 
Although Mitsuzuka's particular proposals were linked strongly with a Japanese bid for a 
permanent seat on the UNSC as he had advocated settling the issue of what Japan was and was 
not in a position to do before joining the UNSC, framing this debate within the work of the UN 
system can only be understood by the norms and culture of peacekeeping in the post-Cold War 
world. To exchange a degree of sovereignty for UN centralism is to dilute the power of the state 
rather than accumulating power, in this case through representation of the UNSC. This was in 
contrast to Ozawa's line that reinterpretation of the Constitution was the key to an expanded 
participation in UNPKO; however. they both stress the centrality of the UN in the Japanese state 
rather than the Japanese state in the UN system. 
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Kakizawa KOji, parliamentary vice-minister for foreign affairs in the Miyazawa cabinet, 
summed up the expanded sense of commitment by stressing that 'our place in the world today 
has evolved to a point where this country can no longer afford to remain preoccupied only with 
the affairs of Asia but must raise its sights beyond if,90 Thus, he began to advocate participation 
in the UNITAF effort in Somalia and the ONUMOZ operation in Mozambique, Kakizawa stressed, 
unlike Mitsuzuka, not the need to demonstrate what Japan can and cannot do but rather, 'help 
dispel the suspicion at home that the passage of the PKO Bill last year was engineered in a 
hasty, politically-motivated move to send SDF personnel abroad with only Cambodia in mind, 
The truth is that the International Peace Co-operation Law is an instrument of co-operation for 
UN peacekeeping operations everywhere in the world and not one of serving Japan's interests in 
our part of the world alone',91 ' 
The position of the new coalition govemment of Hosokawa was highly supportive of a 
more active role in UNPKO with Hata Tsutomu, Foreign Minister stressing the effort that Japan 
must produce in order to realise peace in international society, 'we must be determined to sweat 
and do our utmost to bring about a peaceful world',92 When considered with Hosokawa's speech 
to the General Assembly quoting the famed Japanese inter-war internationalist Nltobe InazO, this 
demonstrates the administration's commitment to intemational society cannot be interpreted by a 
traditional realist approach to the study of International relations which places no importance on 
philanthropy or standards of behaviour in its narrow analysis.93 Furthermore, as mentioned In the 
previous chapter, the Hosokawa government sanctioned for the first time In two decades the 
advisory report The 'MOdality of the seCurity and Defense Capabt1lty of Japan: The Outlook for 
the 21st Century, This report stressed a new direction for Japan's foreign and security policy: 
Seen In this light [the Increased importance of the UN In the post-Cold War world] It should be 
emphasized anew that one of the major pillars of Japan's security policy is to contribute positively to 
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strengthening the UN functions for international peace, Including further improvement of 
peacekeeping operations. Furthermore, such contribution is important in the sense that Japan's firm 
committing {sic] to such an international trend regarding security problems will strengthen its role 
befitting its international position. The closer the world moves to the realization of the Ideal held up in 
the UN Charter of a world without wars, the better place it will become for nations such as Japan, 
which aspires for a true peace in the original sense of the word; therefore, It is extremely important 
to Japan's national interest to make utmost efforts toward this goal. The SOF, whose most important 
mission is to ensure the security of Japan, cannot be exempt from this duty. From this viewpoint, a 
number of improvements are needed in such areas as statutes governing the operation of the SOF, 
SOF organization, eqUipment and training.94 
Thus, it was recognised that the work of the UN would be a new direction for the SDF to 
enhance its reputation. The newer aspects of peacekeeping were to be stressed in addition to 
whatever contribution Japan could make within the constraints of its pacifist traditions. The 
ramifications of further participation would be both intemal and external: 
Giving the SDF opportunities to participate in peacekeeping operations and other International 
activities wi" greatly help, internally to broaden the InternatiOnal perspective of the SDF and defense 
authorities and enhance the public understanding of the SDF and, externally to Increase transparency 
. in the real image of the SDF and eventually build confidence in Japan.95 
. This emphasis in Japan's security, defence and foreign policy on the UN and its 
peacekeeping operations,evoked memories of Sakamoto Yoshikazu's Sekai article mentioned in 
. Chapter Three and also caused controversy in the US. The report stressed multilateral co-
operation under the UN and the US-Japan Security Treaty as the basis of Japan's security policy 
in that order. Criticisms from a Clinton Administration failing to live up to its declaration of 
'aggressive multilateralism' accused the report of regarding the bilateral relationship too lightly 
and gaiatsu was applied in order to reverse the order.96 This episode demonstrated the currency 
the UN had gained within Japan after the end of the Cold War as a legitimate forum for a pro-
active contribution to international society, in addition to the fears that any overtly independent 
policy direction could arouse in the US. As has been demonstrated, the US was keen to promote 
Japan's UNPKO policy as one area of burden-sharing, but not at the expense of the bilateral 
relationship... 
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The original orders for despatch on the ONUMOZ mission came in May 1993 at the height 
of fears over the safety of SDF peacekeepers in Cambodia, although considerably less· 
controversy was created by the threat of conditions in Mozambique with the cease-fire in 
existence.97 Controversy did occur over the slow pace of the peace process and the need to 
delay the election. However, in Japan the term of the UN force was extended with the minimum 
of opposition. With the formation of a new 48-man team despatched to Mozambique to replace 
the first team, Nakanishi Keisuke, Director-General of the Defense Agency, urged a review of 
Japan's PKO restrictions to allow the bearing of arms to be decided by the force commander 
and, furthermore, to avoid a unilateral withdrawal of troops in a future operation. The DSP also 
took up this theme proposing a review of the use of weapons by SDF troops with a view to 
possible participation in the peace enforcement units envisaged by Boutros-Ghali. It was 
because of comments like this that Nakanishi was eventually forced to resign and was replaced 
with Aichi Kazuo who supported a role for the SDF in UNPKO without creating a new 
organisation but would not go so far as to support participation in peace enforcement units. 
, EI Salvador became the third recipient of Japanese peacekeepers In March 1994 with 
fifteen Japanese personnel despatched to observe the presidential election scheduled for March 
of that year. At the same time, Owada Hisashi's appointment as Japanese Ambassador to the 
UN was widely regarded as an attempt to secure a permanent seat on the UNSC-an accurate 
appraisal considering the MOFA appoints its own officials; however, not a move to be confused 
with Japan's participation in PKO which Is characterised more as an attempt to live up to a norm 
of international society. This undertaking of intematlonal responsibility was also evident in 
Japan's active role In drafting and becoming a party to the Convention of the Safety of the UN 
and Associated Personnel In June 1995, as well as ·contribufing $500,000 to a project aimed at 
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improving the protection of UN Volunteers-a direct consequence of the lessons from the 
UNTAC operation. Moreover, in April 1997, Owada Hisashi, Permanent Representative of Japan 
to the UN, elaborated a plan to the Committee on Peacekeeping Operations for the 
strengthening of the UN's peacekeeping activities stressing co..operation with regional 
organisations, provision of humanitarian assistance and preventative diplomacy.98 
With the debate over whether to participate in the UNDOF operation or not between the 
three coalition government members, the MOFA stressed that participation was not linked with 
the attainment of a permanent seat on the UNSC, but with avoiding discrediting Japan's 
reputation in the eyes of the world.99 Thus, rather than a realist interpretation of power 
accumulation, Japan is being seen as having to live up to certain standards and norms of the 
international community. This was in evidence when Murayama promised 'forward-looking 
consideration' of Japan's partiCipation in UNDOF in reaction to fears expressed that Japan was 
not making a full commitment to international SOCiety by Canadian Prime Minister, Jean 
Chretien.1OO Andre Quellet, Canadian Foreign Minister, intimated to Tamazawa TokuichirO, 
Director-General ~f the Defense Agency, that Canada would welcome Japanese SDF forces in 
the Middle East 'and in return would support Japan's bid for a permanent seat on the UNSC if 
Japan lived up its role in the world.101 Japan did soon after begin to Investigate the possibility of 
despatching troops to the UNDOF mission with a view to replacing the Canadian logistics 
. . 
battalion hit by Canadian peacekeeping cuts and sent a preliminary fact-finding mission. 
However, Significant opposition existed within the Cabinet citing public attitudes and also 
criticising the manner in which the MOFA was behaving without reference to the government 
, . 
stressing that only one UNPKO would be contemplated at a time and SDF troops would have to 
retum from Mozambique beforehand.102 Japan's particular contribution to the UNDOF mission 
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continued as predicted with the despatch renewed in July 1997. Kyuma Fumio, Director-General 
of the Defence Agency, upon visiting the SDF units in Syria and Israel stated that, 'our forces, 
which were just newcomers at the start, have now started to build a firm position in UNDOF' with 
participation expected at the least until February 2000.103 
Japanese personnel have steadily gained a higher profile within the UN system and have 
encouraged the Japanese government to act in a more pro-active manner. In particular with his 
subsequent appointment as Special Representative to the Former Yugoslavia. Akashi Yasushi 
continued to use his position to encourage a more active role from Japan particularly in its 
despatch of foot soldiers stressing that: . 
If Japan were given the status of a Security Council permanent member, it needs to act in 
accordance with its new responsibility because the Security Council is responsible for ensuring world 
peace and security. 104 
Japan's Ambassador to the UN, Owada Hisashi, stressed the importance of the changes 
in peacekeeping and the role Japan could play in new, multidimensional peacekeeping: 
In the post·Cold War era, cases are increasing In which the traditional type of UN peacekeeping by 
Itself cannot bring about the desired goal of political stability .... Japan Is convinced that a new 
innovative approach to peacekeeping is urgently needed and pledges its best endeavour to reshape 
and re-organlze a new paradigm for the UN peacekeeping operations which could function as an 
effective means for the prevention and the resoluHon of the conflict in a new International 
environment,lOS 
Owada stressed a multilateral approach bringing together the disparate strategies of 
cease-fire negotiation, humanitarian assistance to refugees, the stationing of troops, etc., 
, 
combined with the promotio~ of rapid deployment units and co-operation with regional 
organisations. 
In the case of Rwanda, the SDPJ agreed to the despatch of medical personnel under the 
, " , ' 
PKO law with the condition that the contribution was limited to medical work in recognition of the 
severity of the mission' and the necessity to make a contribution as a member of the international 
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community.106 Ogata Sadako again encouraged the Japanese government to contribute with 
etaims that, 'we are expecting the general support of financial, material and personnel. Now is a 
time when the military can make a non-military contribution'-an opinion echoed by Prime 
Minister Murayama and Foreign Minister KOno.107 Thus, Japan's first SDF despatch under the 
humanitarian terms of the PKO Law was inaugurated and the SOPJ continued its redefinition of 
its post-war security and foreign stances. This was also an option which was preferable to the 
SDPJ, which although recognising the existence of the SOF, was not willing to actively despatch 
it, as was seen in its agreement to the UNDOF operation as long as the SOF was not 
automatically premised for despatch.108 More recently, government activism with the aim of 
improving Japan's peacekeeping contribution has been very much in evidence. The Defence 
Agency decided upon the creation of a peacekeeping office including about seventy staff to 
coflect information on various peacekeeping activities from all over the globe, in addition to 
assisting in the training of future peacekeepers which started operations in 1997.109 
ExTERNAL NORMS: EAST ASIAN NATIONS 
Prime Minister Murayama, like his post-Cold War Prime Ministerial predecessors, also took the 
initiatiVe in attempting to dilute the influence of W.W.II in Japan's diplomacy with East Asia. 
Murayama especially stressed the importance of ASEAN and stated that: 
we will promote our Asia diplomacy with a strong determination to maintain our pacifist Constitution 
and never repeat our mistakes by becoming 8 military power.110 
In particular Murayama addressed the issues of the 'comfort women' and the treatment of 
W.W.II in Japanese school textbooks. Nevertheless, the watchword of Murayama's policy was 
caution and often this softly-softly approach was thrown into contrast with the activism of leaders 
like Mahathir who strongly advocated a pro-active role for Japan in the UNSC.111 This activism 
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was echoed by the Thai leader Chuan Leepai supporting Japan's role as appropriate considering 
its financial contributions.112 The chairman of the Philippine Star newspaper recognised the 
raison d'atre for Japan's existing military strength and stressed that rearmament by Japan was 
nothing to fear despite the fact he had fought in the Philippine resistance and lost family and 
friends in W.W.II to Japanese imperialism.113 Yet, a stronger role for Japan was seen as a 
growing reality and something to be encouraged. 
However, South Korea still expressed doubts to a certain, but softening, degree. Foreign 
Minister Han Sung Joo informed Foreign Minister KOno that Korea understood Japan's desires 
and position in the international order but refrained from all-out support for Japan's bid for a 
permanent seat on the UNSC.114 Whereas South Korea's approach may have been seen to have 
softened throughout the 19908, China always sought to ensure that the East Asian nations' 
memory of W.W.II remained intact as a norm restricting any trace of military activism in Japan. 
This was evident with the announcement of the revised US..Japanese guidelines, where the 
Japanese government favoured an early publication and flew to Beijing in order to deal with fears 
in neighboUring East Asian nations. When the US..Japanese revised guidelines were released in 
September 1997 the importance of China was stressed as the two nations both sought to 
improve bilateral ties with China and despatched advisors to qualm fears In Beijing, China was 
vehemently against the expan?ed role for Japan stressing the Cold War mentality behind it and 
the danger of expanding Japan's role Into the Asian region. Hashimoto's four-day visit to Beijing 
in September 1997 was characterised by Chinese fears that Japan would involve itself with the 
Taiwan dispute. Hashimoto departed with the aim of making 'efforts to promote relations of trust 
between Japan and China by keeping In mind lessons learnt from such history, This is the 
biggest aim of my visit to Chlna'.11! 
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South Korea, however, was notably taciturn about the guidelines chiefly because in the 
case of conflict with North Korea it would benefit from US-Japanese military co-operation. South 
Korea was not so concerned as long as 'the Japanese government obeyed the principle of 
transparency and the Constitution [then1 the new guidelines will contribute to Asia-Pacific 
. stability'.116 South Korea has generally in the 1990s become more lenient in its dealings with 
Japanese military and political activism. Fears have been expressed in South Korea over Japan's 
acquiSition of a permanent seat on the UNSC; a group of 30 politicians submitted a proposal to 
the Korean parliament to overturn the government's understanding of Japan's desire to gain a 
permanent UNSC seat unless apologies, compensation, and the return of cultural treasures to 
Korea were undertaken by the Japanese side.117 However, this is an exception and generally 
South Korea has moved closer in line with the majority of East Asian nations and away from the 
unyielding line taken by China. With the release of the revised guidelines certain nations like 
Indonesia and the Philippines were, as had previously occurred, less concemed about the 
possibility of Japanese remilitarisation. 
There were reports in July 1995 of Defense and Foreign Affairs officials of Japan and 
South Korea discussing joint co-operation in the field of peacekeeping with joint training 
exercises and the mutual use of transport planes.118 Similar reports surfaced over Sino-Japanese 
relations with a view to improving the bilateral relationship as well as refining PKO skills.119 These 
developments had been previously mooted by' Kakizawa KOjl with his proposal for an Asian 
Peacekeeping Force under UN auspices.120 This Is possibly one area where the traditionally 
restrictive norm of Japan's relations with its Asian neighbours can be turned Into an invigorating 
and constructive norm allowing both sides to redefine their military activities In addition to their 
own bilateral relations with a new specificity and concordance. 
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SUMMARY" 
With the General Election of October 20 1996 the LOP regained a lot of the ground it had lost in 
the previous three years winning 239 of the 500 seats available with ShinshintO acquiring 156 
seats.121 The LOP was, thus, able to form a minority government with only informal connections 
to its former coalition partners ShintO Sakigake and the SDPJ, and the reformist parties were now 
marginalised and proceeded to fracture in opposition along the lines of old party and personality 
loyalties. Thus, one of the effects on the govemmenfs UNPKO policy ought to have been that 
the LOP was in a position to influence the direction Japan took with little reference to other 
domestic actors. 
However, since this time there has been no obvious test of Japan's UNPKO policy with 
stability prevalent on the Golan' Heights. Moreover, Prime Minister Hashimoto has compromised 
his public popularity with his handling of the appointment of SatO Koko from the Nakasone faction 
to his cabinef In 'an upsurge of public opposition,' Hashimoto was forced to withdraw this 
appointment and his approval rating almost cOllapsed. Whether the post-1993 period of coalition 
politics will continue or not remains, thus, vague. However, one of the major effects of coalition 
politics was not so much the SOPJ managing to insist upon its traditionally pacifist agenda, but 
more in the SOPJ altering its traditional post·1945 stance on security and foreign policy. As 
demonstrated in previous chapters, the SDPJ came to be the political personification of the 
Japanese pacifist norm, yet has altered its position to such an extent that only the Communist 
Party has remained true to its pacifist leanings. Yet, it would be missing the point to regard this 
as a Simple jettisoning of principles; it would be more accurate to view it as a re-conceptuallsation 
of the pacifist norm in the light of the primacy of UNPKO in post-COld War security. Thus, the 
SDPJ has responded to the norm of international co-operation through possible military means, 
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incorporating it into their casting of pacifism. This is one of the main themes of Japan's period of 
coalition politiCS and of this chapter, in addition to the steady support coming from the US within 
the bilateral framework, and the gradually shifting attitude of Japan's East Asian neighbours, as 
demonstrated in Diagram V. 
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CONCLUSION 
This study has sought to demonstrate that norms matter in the formation of Japan's foreign and 
security' policies. This was achieved by outlining in Chapter One the traditional approaches to 
" ' 
intemational relations, and by examining the literature related to nonns in order to settle upon a 
". 
definition of norms. The following Chapter Two built upon this by tracing the development of the 
particular norm of UNPKO. Thus, this study has sought to comment not only on Japan but also 
on the practice of peacekeeping as a security issue. Chapter Three then outlined traditional 
approaches to the study of Japan's foreign and security poliCies and what these approaches 
could and could not tell us about Japan's watershed contribution to UNPKO. In addition it 
highlighted gaps in our knowledge, and suggested ways in which the study of norms could 
contribute to our deeper understanding. This chapter also brought the reader up-to-date on 
Japan's contribution to UNPKO during the oft-ignored period from 1956 to 1990 by setting the 
historical scene in preparation for the following empirical chapters. Thus, Chapters Four, Five 
and Six examined empirically how these norms have manifested themselves in each case study 
from the outbreak of the Second Gulf War through to the present time. This conclusion will 
highlight the main findings of this study by commenting upOn the changes which have 9CCurred 
over this time frame. Following sub-sections will deal with recognising the existence of norms, the 
changing nature of norms and how to measure these changes, the degree of compliance with 
these norms, the role of the UN In influencing Japan's foreign and security policies and the level 
of intemationalism, and the role of civil Society in Japan. The findings are summarised In Table I. 
In addition, areas which merit further research will be suggested in summarising. 
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THE exiSTENCE AND IMPORTANCE OF NORMS 
Norms are undoubtedly important as seen in Kratochwil's work on the Cuban Missile Crisis.1 
Norms, often overlooked in the realist-dominated literature, dictated what options were available 
to the US and the USSR in resolving the crisis. In a similar fashion, this study has sought to 
, , 
contribute to this ignored field of study in the international sphere by explaining the norms which 
have informed Japan's watershed decision to dispatch the SDF on UNPKO. In addition, our 
understanding of how the norms (both the internal pacifist norm and external norms. like the US 
and East Asian Nations) which inform Japan's foreign and security policies are changing has 
been deepened. Moreover, attention has been drawn to the influence of a Super-Leviathan in the 
form of the UN and its peacekeeping functions acting as the intervening variable in influencing, 
constraining and encouraging state behaviour. Of course. the role of individuals in the 
policymaking project is not being denied. Simply, in a similar fashion to the genetic structure of 
the human body deciding the remit of available actions, the norms which have been pOinted to in 
this dissertation create the environment in which politicians and bureaucrats (like genes in 
relation to their host organisms) make their decisions. 
The reverence extended to these norms can be seen in various examples throughout this 
study and provide these supposedly elusive norms with a tangible body proving to be more than 
the exogenously given preferences of actors as both neo-realism and nee-liberalism contend. All 
the actions described above in KratochwU's quotations can be seen in Japan's UNPKO policy, 
thereby demonstrating the existence and recognition of these norms. Through these examples 
we can see that norms of international behaviour do exist borne of Internal and external sources 
that can both constrain and liberate the decisions of the Japanese government. Particularly the 
sense of ought has come clearly through in this study with a compulsion on the part of 
. . 
government, bureaucratic and civil societal circles to contribute something to international society 
in the security field consummate with Japan's international economic standing. With the evidence 
offered in this study in mind a definition of a norm can be proffered: 
an intersubjectively understood standard of behaViour rooted either in domestic or international 
society, often (but not a/ways) embodied in the form of a treaty, charter, constitution, etc., which 
upon gaining a degree of legitimacy frames the gamut of decisions and actions available to 
individual decision-makers. 
Thus, norms are accorded a great deal more attention as an influencing variable than neo-
realism or neo-liberalism, the traditional interpretations of IR theory, have conceded. With this 
point established, the aims and objectives of the Japanese government and bureaucracy also 
. . 
need to be rethought; simply maximiSing power and wealth is not sufficient. A social sense of 
duty and contribution to international society which has little concrete or immediate gain behind it 
has become ~ clear objective for Japanese decision-makers. Norms, like UNPKO, can influence, 
encourage, or limit the objectives of governments. Thus, state interests are seen to extend 
beyond simple power maximisation and are not given but constructed endogenously. 
MEASURING CHANGING NORMS 
Stili, it is not simply enough to Identify norms. It Is also necessary to explain their origins, which 
. ' . 
are more relevant, and how they rise and decline in influence. In the case of the Second Gulf 
War, it is clear that a crisis can . always bring about change and cause havoc as to which 
traditional noons possess influence. However, in concluding it has to be stressed that there Is 
also a more subtle and evolutionary way in which noons can alter. In Chapter One I proposed 
examining the changes in norms by centring on the three criteria expounded by lagro: 
SpecifiCity, durability 'and concordance. This definition of norms is lacking in that he only 
examines regulatory noons and pays no attention to the idea that noons can liberate, encourage 
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and constitute human action. However, these three criteria are still applicable to the task of 
discovering which norms are in the ascendance and which are in decline. Thus, norms which 
score highly in each of these criteria will be presumed to be influential in character and vice-
versa. In the case of Japan's peacekeeping experience, the four identified norms can be 
measured by these guidelines (see Table I) to attain an understanding of which internal and 
external norms matter. 
SPECIFICITY 
The domestic norm of pacifism, with its social rather than Christian origins, is well understood in 
Japanese society. With a strong tradition going back to the pre-war period when Japan's military 
enterprise in Asia was called into Question, through to the A-bombing of Hiroshima and Nagasaki 
and the firebombing of Tokyo, the anti-militaristic tendencies have been clearly expressed in 
opinion polls throughout this period. The specifIC objects of this restrictive norm have been the 
US..Japan Security Treaty, revision of the Constitution, particularly Article IX, the existence of the 
SOF and its dispatch overseas. Thus, dUring the Second Gulf War, the traditional pacifist 
attitudes of Japanese civil society were still largely intact and reflected the stance the SOPJ had 
taken since shortly after W. W. II. ' 
So, if this' domestic norm and its restrictive nature is widely recognised and 
comprehended, why has its specificity been classified in Table I as 'Middle-Falling'? Simply put, 
this is due to the emerging norm of the UN and its peacekeeping functions. This norm, as is 
demonstrated later. has been categorised in its specificity as 'Middle-Rising', and I would suggest 
that the international norm of UNPKO is rising at the expense of the domestic norm of pacifism. 
In the aftermath of the Second Gulf War and the failed attempt to pass legislation to allow the 
250 
dispatch of SDF personnel, as was seen in Chapter Three, the Japanese government came 
under a great deal of criticism from the international community and it became increasingly 
evident that some kind of military contribution would have to be made. The question for the ruling 
LOP was how to realise this contribution without invoking the domestic norm of pacifism and its 
restrictive nature. The answer was to avoid a unilateral dispatch of SDF personnel within a 
multinational force and to marry an international contribution with the UN system, recently 
liberated from the confining structure of the Cold War and enjoying a renaissance. Any 
contribution that could be justified under the UN Charter could also be justified under the 
Japanese Constitution with their common origins. A hard-nosed neo-realist interpretation would 
regard this contribution as part of the Japanese government's policy of continuing to avoid 
international contributions for as long as possible, rather than reacting to an intemationalist norm 
embodied by the UN and a pacifist norm embodied in civil society. However, neo-realism only 
gains a limited understanding of Japan's policymaking process as it fails to comprehend how 
deep anti-militarist roots had been put down in post-W.W.II Japanese society, and, moreover, the 
extent to which the Japanese government has had to use stealth and incrementalism in 
responding to both international and domestic norms. There has been a clash of intemal and 
external norms in Japan for the last half-century over the role of the UN in relation to domestic 
pacifism and the dominant role of the Us-a clash seen throughout the empirical chapters. The 
nee-realist approach is ahistoric and by regarding all nation-stales as similar 'bilHard balls' is 
incapable of factoring in the specific characteristics of a nation-state-unlike a study which lays 
an emphasis upon norms. 
Thus, during the Diet debates concerning the passage of the PKO Bill and in dealing with 
the neighbouring states in East Asia. Japanese politicians and bureaucrats stressed that the 
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contribution of personnel would take place within the framework of the UN. This policy was 
realised with the first dispatch of SOF troops on the UNT AC mission where the terms of the UN's 
mandate and the maintenance of a cease-fire were repeatedly referred to-a trend that has 
oontinued up until recently with the recent attempt at revising the PKO law including contribution 
to peacekeeping operations under the aegis of regional organisations. However, the strength of 
. feeling for a multilateral commitment is still noteworthy. In this way, the lOP leadership, eager to 
expand Japan's contribution to international society and in particular the UN with one eye on a 
UNSC permanent seat, was able to weaken the traditionally stringently recognised norm of 
pacifism by oombining it with the norm of the UN and its peacekeeping activities. The norm of 
UNPKO is still of a paCifist nature but recognises the use of force in achieving the goal of peace. 
In this way, the LOP leadership could proceed in its goal of making Japan a 'normal' state and 
overcoming the anti-militarist 'allergy', For these reasons, the pacifist norm Is regarded as not 
having necessarily weakened but having mutated to permit a level of force acceptable to the 
Japanese government and society of the day . 
. However, UNPKO have shown themselves to be undergoing a process of redefinition In 
the post·Cold War world leading to a degree of fuzziness in their definition not only in Japan, but 
elsewhere In the world-especially the US. The three remaining norms, domestic pacifism, the 
relationship with the US, and the attitude of East Asian nations, have much more of an 
understood hiStory in Japan and are much more clearly defined and are Institutionalised in the 
Constitution, Article IX, and the US.Japan Security Treaty, and are, thus, legitimised. In contrast. 
this lack of understanding of UNPKO can be seen during the Second Gulf War. Partfy because 
the operation was a UN-sanctioned multinational operation under the leadership of the US and 
not a traditional UNPKO, a warped Impression of the practice of peacekeeping was ourrent 
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among the Japanese public. Thus, the fear of an inevitable loss of Japanese life was anticipated 
and activated the traditional, internal norm of Japanese pacifism with the result that, after the 
public and Diet debate, the PKO Bill could only be passed successfully with the attached five 
guidelines. 
Moreover, during the UNTAC operation the outrage caused in Japan by the deaths of the 
UN volunteer, Nakata Atsuhito, and civilian policeman, Takata Haruyuki, was partly borne out of 
a failure to understand the risks of UNPKO and the fact that causalities are not uncommon. Due 
largely to the actions and statements of the volunteer's father, Nakata Takehito, the furore and 
clamour to bring back the SDF personnel abated and a deeper understanding of the practice of 
peacekeeping was attained. 
Only recently has the ruling LOP, nearly five years after the initial legislation, felt strong 
enough to attempt to once again challenge the domestic, regulatory norm of pacifism and 
redefine the US-Japan defence guidelines concerning firstly, the existence of a cease-fire In the 
case of the dispatch of humanitarian aid, and secondly, the order to use force residing with the 
unit commander and not the individual, thus questioning the denial of the right to collective self. 
defence.2 There still exists a certain vagueness in the understanding of UNPKO generally and 
Japan's contribution specifically. Moreover, the process of defining what the SOF can or cannot 
do is still being debated and it may be some time before a clear consensus Is reached. However, 
although the details may be vague, the sense of making a contribution to international society is 
clearty understood across party divides. This can be seen in the SDPJ's major policy reversals 
originating in the report entitled, Choices for the 21st Century submitted to the Temporary Party 
Congress in September in 1994 and continued through until the New Security Proposals In 
September 1997. The concrete outcome of these proposals was that the SDF, the US-Japan 
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Security Treaty and the necessity of contributing to UNPKO were all recognised. In short, a 
broad understanding of the need to make an international contribution has been reached but the 
details of how the SDF may be permitted to realise this contribution are still vague. 
Despite this, the process of re-deflnltion of UNPKO, the globs/isstion of the practice of 
peacekeeping has been shown to have progressed in the post-Cold War world and to have 
gained a near global acceptance (see Appendix I) which is all the more remarkable as UNPKO 
lacks a degree of legitimisation and institutionalisation by not being mentioned anywhere in the 
UN Charter. It is through a behavioural process of acceptance by a vast majority of states that 
UNPKO has gained its current acceptance and understanding. Thus, UNPKO can be classifled 
as a standard of international behaviour to which states feel an obligation to respond-in other 
words, a norm. The process of this political globalisation has been a more lengthy process than 
any economic globalisation due to the not-so-obvious benefits to be gained. However, 
peacekeeping goes against the traditional Western-based Interpretations of globalisation. It 
cannot be seen as having laid down roots firmly as a western action from an early stage of the 
UN's development as India, Pakistan, Fiji etc. were all traditional supporters of UNPKO. And 
recently, with the end of the Cold War, UNPKO have gained currency and comprehension In both 
Westem and non-Westem societies, most remarkably in Japan in a positive sense, and in the US 
in a negative sense. Thus, the globalisstion of peacekeeping has created over time a truly global 
norm and set of values and is not simply the transplantation of Westem values of democracy and 
free market economics-as a Marxist interpretation would posit. In Table I, as UNPKO is stili 
undergoing a process of being comprehended and re..cJeflned, despite the necessity of these 
activities being recognised, the specifICity grading has been rated as 'Medium-Rising', 
The relationship with the US Institutionalised in the US.Japan Security Treaty is clea~y 
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understood. The fact that the US has wanted Japan to playa more active role in regional and 
global security; but not at the expense of the bilateral relationship, has been clearly stated in 
various pronouncements and declarations from the Second Gulf War onwards. Although not so 
obvious during the UNTAC episode (certainly when compared to the attitudes of Japan's Asian 
neighbours), it was intersubjectively understood and kept alive through William Perry's visit to 
Tokyo in May 1993 in the aftermath of the deaths of Nakata and Takata and the Presidential 
Decision Directive in May 1994. Further substance was given to the US-Japan relationship and 
the encouraging, constitutive norm it has proved to be with the release of the ACSA in February 
1995 and the reviewed US-Japan defence guidelines in June 1997. Thus, with this in mind, the 
relationship with the US has been graded as 'High' in the field of specificity (see Table I). 
> > East Asian nations have made clear their opposition in a comprehensive, almost 
automatic, reaction to anything that smacks of Japanese remilitarisation. From the time of the 
Second Gulf War reaching a height during the UNTAC operation and still evident in recent years, 
China and South Korea have been the most vociferous opponents of what is perceived In these 
nations, not as a necessary international contribution, but as a sign of Japanese remllitarisation. 
However, states that have come directly Into contact with Japan in participating in the UNTAC 
operation have come to an· understanding of Japan's contribution. Particularly with the 
encouragement from the Cambodia factions,· the working relationship with the Philippines In 
transportation duties,' and the proposed co-operatlon with Thailand, Indonesia and the 
Philippines in the resettlement of refugees, certain of Japan's neighbours can be seen to have 
broken away from their traditional monolithic opposition to a more proactive role for Japan. Thus, 
in diagrams III and IV, the policymaldng matrices after the Second Gulf War have made a clear 
distinction between the two camps. Moreover, even the stalwart opposition of South Korea has 
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softened in recent years with the proposal of joint exercises between the two nations first 
appearing in July 1995. Especially in the light of the revised US-Japanese defence guidelines, it 
is in South Korea's interests to promote a co.operative and less critical relationship with Japan as 
in the event of a crisis on the Korean Peninsula it will be the US and Japan which are expected 
to come to South Korea's aid. 
Thus, it is clear that slowly over time the once solid opposition of the nations of East Asia 
to the rising pro-activism of their former colonial master has waned and clearly divided. For these 
reasons, the specificity of the regulative norm created by the attitudes of East Asia nations has 
been given a rating of 'Medium-Falling'. 
DuRABILITY 
The obvious victim from all of the norms examined in this work appears to be the domestic norm 
of pacifism, seen in the failure to cheek the dispatch of SDF personnel abroad and the electoral 
embarrassment of the 'SDPJ, the self-professed guardians of the Japanese Peace Constitution, 
in the October 1996 Lower House elections. In addition to this, the once monolithic opposition of 
the Japanese public to any hint of 'militarism' began to fracture in the aftermath of the Second 
Gulf War and Japan's embarrassment in failing to co.ordlnate a meaningful contribution to the 
US-led International effort. Demonstrated In repeated opinion polls, the Japanese public has 
~ , >. > ' 
come from a stage of opposing any participation with regularly over 50 percent voicing their 
opposition in a variety of opinion polls, to a stage where 71 percent supported a degree of 
participation in peacekeeping activlties.3 The reason for this undeniable turnaround In public 
perceptions ending the durability of the pacifist norm can be credited In great measure to the role 
of the UN. In the opinion polls cited in each chapter the proviso for Japanese participation In 
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peacekeeping activities has always been the leadership and guidance of the UN. Thus, 
Japanese participation in non-UN missions like that in Haiti has been unthinkable and repeatedly 
declined by the Japanese govemment, citing the aegis of the UN as a prevailing norm. 
Moreover, the initial opposition of the business community has, In parallel fashion to 
Japanese public opinion, steadily weakened since the controversy of the Second Gulf War. The 
wariness at the time of organisations like the Tokyo Chamber of Commerce and Industry and 
Nikkeiran has metamorphosed into the representative attitude of organisations like the Kansal . 
Association of Corporate Executives (Kanssi DOyDksJ) and its recent report entitled, Thinking 
Straight about Japan's Security: Toward Strategic snd Proactive Decision-making and 
Responsible Action. This report was clear in placing its emphasis upon national, regional and 
global security: 
while conducting positive diplomacy in peacetime we must also make steady preparation In 
peacetime in order to make prompt and accurate judgement in times of crisis. We must think, but not 
. in terms of legal interpretation, what is the best option for this country.· 
Thus, in similar fashion to civil society, the business community's representative opinions 
. , . 
have gradually changed in line with the work of the UN system and the concept of multilateral 
security. 
The durability of the relationship with the US is beyond question. Already Institutionalised 
in the US-Japan Security Treaty, it has been further strengthened by the revised guidelines. 
Despite recurrent doubts expressed, particularly in Okinawa, about the continuing stationing of 
US troops in Japan, the central position each govemment accords to the relationship is a 
prevailing factor. Unlike the domestic norm of pacifism. the extemal norm of the relationship has 
gone through no great re-interpretation and, thus, scores highly in its durability. 
Once again. the UN, and Japan's relationship with it, has been the beneficiary of 
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developments since the end of the Cold War. Already accorded high levels of support within 
Japan since admission in 1956, the UN and its peacekeeping functions have been strengthened 
tn their normative power by the metamorphosis undergone by the domestic interpretations of 
pacifism. The UN, now married to traditional Japanese paCifism, scores highly in its durability 
and, for similar reasons, its concordance. For these re,asons, although an important change in 
Japan's post-Cold War foreign and security policy climate, it would be an oversimplification to 
regard the pacifist norm as waning. A more accurate interpretation would be to link this internal 
norm with the international norm of participation in international society institutionalised in the UN 
and its peacekeeping activities. The UN's new-found legitimacy in the post-Cold War world has 
been married to the traditional pacifism whereby the use of force for peaceful ends, ends defined 
by the UN, has become a new international standard. 
CONCORDANCE 
With which norms has Japan felt a duty to comply and what are the factors which have ensured 
compliance by Japan? The reasons for any compliance are both internal and external and 
through institutionalisation exist within the norms themselves as they become what Durkheim 
termed 'social facts'. 
Compliance is strongly linked to the Idea of legitimacy and coherence. This aspect has 
been defined by Thomas Franck as: 
a property of a rule or rule-making institution which Itself exerts a pull toward compliance on those 
addressed normatively because those addressed believe that the rule or Institution has come Into 
being and operates In accordance with generally accepted principles or right process.' 
The development of the new norm of UNPKO is backed up by a history ouUined In Chapter 
Two. Through this historical development it is evident why as far as certain states such as 
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Scandinavian states, Canada, India, etc., are concerned, the concept of UNPKO is clearly 
understood and this comes across in the high regard for this practice in these states, the level of 
their contribution, and the respect which these nations have eamed for their participation and their 
ability to redefine their security policies in the light of this multilateral norm. 
In Japan the understanding of UNPKO, which is a proviso to its consequent concordance, 
;s still developing as seen in the deaths of Nakata and Takata during the UNTAC operation. 
However, in Japan with its traditional norm of pacifism, anything that smacked of the dark side of 
militarism resulted in outcry and demands to recall the SDF. The reaction of the government was 
to refer to a more clearly comprehended norm in Japan in the form of the UN. As mentioned 
previously, the UN has traditionally received high levels of support from the Japanese public, and 
the government knew the process of education about SDF dispatch on peacekeeping activities 
could be assisted by making reference to the UN system and international society. Legitimacy 
and coherence could be acquired for the newer norm by reference to the more traditional norm 
within which it existed. This is connected to the perlocutionary effect of norms, i.e. the success of 
communicating norms and how they are intersubjectively understood. This has been relatively 
successful in the case of the emerging norm of UNPKO, due to what Fiorini has called an 
entrepreneurial evolutionary path which can exist for a norm. Under the aegis of a sponsor like 
the UN or the US, a practice, like UNPKO, can gain legitimacy. This Is evident In the central role 
the UN played in justifying Japan's new pro-activlsm In the field of peacekeeping. From the 
reflections of this belief in opinion pot's through to the LOP's Policy Affairs Research Council's 
proposal to attach greater weight to UN resolutions than the Peace Constitution, the utility of the 
UN as a means of justifying the end and providing the practice of peacekeeping with 
/egitimisation has been demonstrated in this study. 
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There is also an almost anti-legitimacy argument for legitimacy in the form of emulation. 
Anti-legitimate in the sense that it is a passive, rather than active, form of legitimisation. Often at 
times of incomplete information where the logic of a decision is unclear or the available 
alternatives are not obvious, emulation of allies and neighbours can be an option. These 
decisions are far from irrational but would be unacceptable to a hard-nosed, realist rational· 
choice theorist. This aspect can be seen in the reverence for the relationship with the US. This 
study has shown that the relationship still possesses a great deal of normative power within 
Japanese government circles. However, it is also evident that in the post-Cold War world, where 
the justification for the relationship was weakened with the disappearance of the Soviet Union, 
following the US lead or the process of emulation has been evident, especially during the Second 
Gulf War where gaiatsu was at its most obvious. Since that time an effort has been made to 
reinvent the relationship with the US through the revised guidelines and its normative power has 
continued to be in evidence by encouraging a pro-active role, within the limits of multilateral 
institutions, for Japan's foreign and security policies. 
Moreover, 'by going back to the analogy of human genetiC make-up, a deeper 
understanding of Japan's concordance with the norms highlighted here can be attained. The idea 
of inheritance has played an important role in deciding which norms have govemed the decisions 
the Japanese govemment has made. For example, the attitudes of Japan's neighbouring Asian 
neighbours have been inherited throughout the generattons to influence those with neither 
experience nor memory of Japan's colonisation of Asia from the Melji period. Like the information 
contained in a gene, the information contained in this norm has been to oppose any degree of 
Japanese remillitarisation unquestioningly. In the case of China and South Korea, the Inheritance 
process has been going on, for a longer time and has reached a greater level of 
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institutionalisation. In the case of nations like Thailand and Malaysia, the war-time experience 
, 
may be quite different, but has weakened as this norm has been contested by other norms, like 
UNPKO or the attitude of the US, carrying different information and instructions from the 
traditional norm. To continue Fiorini's genetic analogy, the law of survival governs which norms 
prevail and, in the case of these states bordering on Cambodia, the immediate desire for a strong 
UN presence restoring security to the region mitigated the traditional opposition to Japan's 
perceived remilitarisation. Two directiy opposed norms cannot be followed at once; thus, an old, 
traditional norm is driven out or weakened by a new rising standard of intemational behaviour, 
although there may be a period of following polymorphically two separate norms before a new 
standard is found. This can currently be seen in the case of South Korea. The traditional 
opposition to Japan's UNPKO participation is slowly being accepted and the previously 
inconceivable state of affairs that South Korea and Japan conduct joint military training exercises 
, , 
together has been mooted and encouraged by the UN and US informed norms-the two of which 
have been credited with a higher degree of concordance than the internal pacifist norm and the 
norm created by the attitudes of East Asian nations. 
SUMMARY 
This study has located sources of activity and reactivity in Japan's foreign and security policy by 
shifting the focus away from the traditional concepts of realist material definitions of power 
towards a study of the norms of international behaviour. This study has demonstrated that the 
UN has been able to provide: 
a boundedly rational forum for the mounting of innovations [and it is not inevitable for the UN, 
international and regional organizations to] remain the tool their creators have In mind when they set " 
them up-means toward the attainment of some end valued by the creators. Alternatively, 
intemational organizations can become ends in their own right. become valued as Institutions quite 
apart from the services they were Initially expected to perform.8 
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During this process over the years since the end of the Cold War, the traditional norms of 
domestic pacifism and externally-based constraints raised by the nations of East Asia have as a 
result been both weakened and metamorphosed. In contrast, the highly institutionalised, 
understood and durable relationship with the US has remained by and large a constant 
throughout the period .. 
This study has had to be limited to an extent in its scope. However, there are a number of 
possible future research projects both theoretical and empirical stemming out from this initial 
work on Japan and peacekeeping. On the theoretical level, it has been shown that norms provide 
a rich framework for research which, unlike the 'nea-neo' synthesis of neo-realism and neo-
liberalism, avoids the pitfalls of positivism and pays respect to constructivist interpretations by 
attempting to measure such vague concepts as identity and interests. Differing from the 
traditional approaches addressed in Chapter One, an approach based on norms possesses 
explanatory power in a wide variety of fields, but also reclaims the field of security traditionally 
claimed by the realists as the area of their explanatory superiority. 7 
On the empirical side, as regards Japan's relationship with the UN, it would be both 
interesting and original to examine the role of individuals and epistemic communities in framing 
Japan's interaction with the UN. The role of these non-govemmental individuals (NGls) has a rich 
theoretical background going back to Robert Cox's idea of the executive head mentioned In 
Chapter One, and has not been addressed in the literature pertaining to Japan, although it was 
touched upon briefly in this study with reference to the work of Akashl Yasushl, Owada Hisashi 
and Ogata Sadako. Similarly in the security field, the changing relationship with its East Asian 
neighbours, particularly South Korea, will be of great interest if the anticipated joint military 
training exercises proceed smoothly. Hopefully such projects can be undertaken in the future, as 
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all demonstrate that slowly, but surely, Japan is showing signs of realising the preamble to its 
Constitution: 
We desire to occupy an honored place in an international society striving for the preservation of 
peace, and the banishment of tyranny and slavery, oppression and Intolerance for all time from the 
earth. We recognize that aI/ peoples of the world have the right to live In peace, free from fear and 
want. 
We believe that no nation is responsible to itself alone, but that the laws of political morality 
are universal; and that obedience to such laws is incumbent upon aft nations who would sustain their 
own sovereignty and justify their sovereign relationship with other nations. 
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ApPENDIX I: UNPKO 
1.1 FIRST-TIME PARTICIPANTS IN UN PEACEKEEPING AND OBSERVER MISSIONS SINCE 1989 (ONLY 
MISSIONS LISTED BY THE UN AS PEACEKEEPING MISSIONS ARE INCLUDED). 
(Source: Findlay, T., Challenges for the New Peacekeepers, Oxford, Oxford University Press, 1996, pp. 4-5). 
UNPROFOR 
UNAMIC 
UNTAG 
UNTAG 
UNTAG 
UNTAC 
UNAVEM I 
UNOSOM II 
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Luxembourg UNPROFOR 1992 
Malawi UNAMIR 1993 
Mali@ UNAMIR 1993 
Namibia UNTAC 1992 
Niger UNAMIR 1994 
Romania UNIKOM 1991 
Russian Federation UNIKOM 1991 
Saudi Arabia UNOSOM II 1993 
Singapore UNTAG 1989 
c cSlovakiaCD UNPROFOR 1993 
South Korea UNOSOM /I 1993 
Spain UNAVEM I . 1989 
Switzerland UNTAG 1989 
Togo UNTAG '. 1989 
Trinidad and Tobago UNTAG 1989 
Uganda UNOSOM II 1993 
Ukraine UNPROFOR 1992 
United Arab Emirates UNOSOMI 1993 
USA@ 
-
UNIKOM 1991 
Zimbabwe UNAVEM 1/ 1991 
, CD On December 31, 1992 Czechoslovakia split into the Czech Republic and Slovakia. 
, (2) Participated in ONUC 1960-61 as the United Arab Republic. 
@ The Federal Republic of Germany and the German Democratic Republic merged into one 
state in 1990 . 
. @ Participated in ONUC in 1960 as a part of the Federation of Mali (now Mali and Senegal). 
Senegal participated for the first time as an independent state in UNEF" in 1974. 
@ The USA was involved in two earlier missions, UNTSO (1948 to date) and UNMOGIP (1949-
~. . 
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1.11 FIRST -TIME PARTICIPANTS IN NON-UN PEACEKEEPING AND OBSERVER MISSIONS SINCE 1989 (ONLY 
COUNTRIES WHICH HAVE NEVER PARTICIPATED IN UN MISSIONS. IN ADDITION TO STATES, THREE NON-
STATE ACTORS (SOUTH OSSETIA AND NORTH OSSETIA IN GEORGIA AND THE TRANS-DNIESTER REGION 
IN MOLDOVA) ARE INVOLVED IN RUSSIAN-LED PEACEKEEPING OPERATIONS IN FORMER SOVIET 
REPUBLICS. 
(Source: Findlay, Challenges for the New Peacekeepers, p. 6). 
MNF 1994 
ECOMOG 1990 
South Ossetia 1992 
M 1994 
MNF 1994 
CIS 1993 
CD OSCE Spillover Mission to the Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia. 
@ South Ossetia Joint Force in Georgia. 
® CIS Tajikistan Buffer Force in Tajikistan (Afghan border). 
@ Moldova Joint Force in Moldova (Trans-Dniester). 
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ApPENDIX II: POLITICAL CARTOONS 
11.1 UN SECRETARy·GENERAL BOUTROS BOUTROS·GHALIINVITES PM MIYAZAWA TO SIT ABOARD THE 
MATERIALISING TANK REPRESENTING A UN PEACE ENFORCEMENT ARMY. MIY AZAWA IS MORE 
CONCERNED ABOUT THE RESTRICTIONS OF THE JAPANESE PEACE CONSTITUTION 
(Asahi Shimbun, February 3, 1993, p. 2) 
- ... ~- .. ~--.-.. --- .. 
"tJ l~1~?lJ!~ .. Icmbh"C{), 
~r.t.tJ;tJ::r. .. .... tlJ ffi .•• ,. 
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11.11 PRIME MINISTER MIY~WA IS TROUBLED NOT ONLY BY THE PROBLEM OF UNPKO DESPATCH BUT 
ALSO THE DETERIORATING SECURITY SITUATION WITHIN CAMBODIA 
(Asahi Shimbun, May 12, 1993, p. 2) 
" 
1# . 
.. 
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II.lIl ONE JAPANESE CARTOONIST PAYS RESPECT TO THE ROLE PEACEKEEPERS HAVE PLAYED IN 
BRINGING PEACE TO THE WORLD, IN THIS CASE FACILITATING CO-OPERATION BETWEEN THE THREE CO-
OPERATIVE CAMBODIAN FACTIONS 
(Yomiuri Shimbun, May 16, 1993, p. 2) 
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II.lV THE GOVERNMENT MAINTAINS THAT THE CEASE-FIRE IS HOLDING DESPITE CONTINUED 
AGGRESSION BETWEEN THE KHMER ROUGE AND THE CAMBODIAN GOVERNMENT 
(Yomiuri Shimbun, February 3, 1993, p. 2) 
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ILV AGAIN BOUTROS-GHALI ATTEMPTS TO ENTICE PM MIYAZAWA INTO WEARING THE OUTFIT OF A UN 
PEACE ENFORCEMENT ARMY 
(Yomiuri Shimbun, February 2, 1993, p. 2) 
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II.VI AT THE SAME TIME AS THE J·LEAGUE INTRODUCED SOCCER TO A SUSPICIOUS JAPAN 
TRADITIONALLY REARED ON BASEBALL, POLITICIANS ApPEAR ILL·EQUIPPED TO DEAL WITH THE 
SIMILARLY NEW ISSUE OF UNPKO 
(Yomiuri Shimbun, May 17, 1993, p. 2) 
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ILVII MURAYAMA ATTEMPTS TO 'BAZOOKA' THE SDPJ CONFERENCE WITH A NEW SECURITY POLICY 
PROPOSAL 
(Asahi Shimbun, September 1, 1997) 
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ILVIII THE JAPANESE GOVERNMENT EXPERIENCES PROBLEMS WITH ITS FIRST HUMANITARIAN UNPKO 
(Asahi Shimbun, September 12, 1994) 
-_.----_._ ......... - ............................ _ ....... -...•. _ ..... -_ .. .. _._ ............................ .. 
r ~ ib c.'? -r -!> ~J :t. ·CI1-r-> -.> -r )/(:lc (, (j)(j) .... . . 
L1J m •• 
L-__________ .. _ . ____ .. __ .... __ ....... ___ ...... _ .. _ .... _ ........ .. 
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II.IX MURAYAMA, BURDENED DOWN BY PARTY CONCERNS, ATTEMPTS TO NEGOTIATE THE DESPATCH 
OF SDF PERSONNEL TO THE GOLAN HEIGHTS 
(Yomiuri Shimbun, August 26, 1995) 
• • 'I • • • 
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II.X PRIME MINISTER HASHIMOTO TROUBLED BY PEACEKEEPING OPERATIONS (PKO) CONSOLES THE 
OTHER HASHIMOTO CONVALESCING AFTER CRITICISMS OVER PRICE KEEPING OPERATIONS (PKO) 
(Asahi Shimbun. April 2, 1998) 
............................................................................................................................................................................................ · .. · .... · .... · .......... .... 1 
I 
........................ ...... , .......... ....... " .. . .... ' ........ 11 .... " ............... ,,· ...... , ... , .............. , ........... ..... . ......... ... .. .. ............ .... ............................... , ................. .. . 
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_ApPENDIX III: MAPS 
IILI MAP OF CAMBODIA DURING THE UNTAC PERIOD 
(Source: Mayall, J. (ed.), The New Interventionism 1991-1994: UN Experience in Cambodia, Former Yugoslavia and 
Somalia, Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 1996, p.27) 
Inlernalional boundary 
UNTAC mililary seClors 
THAILAND 
.. ' 
'0 
G uJl of 
Thailand 
o 25 50 miles , . . 
o 40 00 kilometres 
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111.11 ASSIGNMENTS OF JAPANESE MILITARY DeSERVERS (CEASE-FIRE MONITORS) 
AND CIVILIAN POLICE OFFICERS (FINAL POSTINGS) 
(Source: The MOFA Homepage, http://www.mofa.go.jp/pko/2_S.html) 
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111.111 ENGINEERING UNITS POSTING MAP 
(Source: The MOFA Homepage, http://www.mofa.go.jp/pko/2_4.html) 
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III.IV ELECTORAL OBSERVERS POSTING MAP (TAKEO PROVINCE) 
(Source: The MOFA Homepage. http://www.mofa.go.jp/pko/2_6.html) 
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III.V POSTING OF ELECTORAL OBSERVERS IN MOZAMBIQUE 
(Source: The MOFA Homepage, http://www.mofa.go.jp/pkol2_9.html) 
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III.VI POSTING OF JAPANESE STAFF OFFICERS AND COMPONENT IN MOZAMBIQUE (FINAL POSTINGS) 
(Source: The MOFA Homepage, http://www.mofa.go.jp/pko/02_3.html) 
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III.VII POSTING OF JAPANESE ELECTORAL OBSERVERS IN EL SALVADOR 
(Source: The MOFA Homepage, http://www.mofa.go.jp/pko/2_11.html) 
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III.VIII JAPANESE CONTRIBUTIONS TO INTERNATIONAL HUMANITARIAN RELIEF OPERATIONS 
(Source: The MOFA Homepage, http://wwW.mofa.go.jp/pko/3_2.html) 
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IIUX OPERATION SITES OF JAPANESE UNITS ON THE GOLAN HEIGHTS 
(Source: The MOFA Homepage, http://www.mofa.go.jp/pko/2_14.html) 
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NOTES 
INTRODUCTION 
1 Examining why peacekeeping, and at a later stage why Japan, are the focus of th is study is at the heart of what 
Peter Evans has termed the 'microfoundations' of research; in other words, our motivations for undertaking research. 
This is an integral first step in proceeding beyond a positivist standpoint and recognising that the subject and object 
of research are connected. See Kohli, A, Evans, P., Katzenstein, P. J., Przeworski, A , Rudolph, S. H., Scott, J. C., 
and Skocpol, T., 'The Role of Theory in Comparative Politics: A Symposium', World Politics, Vol. 48, No. 1 (1995), p. 
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